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Abstract 
 
This is an ethnographic study of business model innovation in an established manufacturing 
company. The motivation of the thesis is to propose a sensemaking (Weick, 1995), with focus 
on enactment (Weick, 1979), analysis of a business model innovation process, stepping outside 
the usual perspectives employed in analysing such a phenomenon, namely activity system, 
dynamic capability and transaction costs, discovery driven or cognitive perspective. 
 
The research question guiding the thesis is:  
How do established companies enact new business models?  
 
The innovation of business models in established companies is an intricate process, and a 
mountain to climb in the eyes of top management. Often, in the choice between innovation and 
control the latter wins. Studies have shown that technologies and processes, which have the 
potential to challenge the exiting model, are being filtered out. In here, the dominant logic, and 
so-called managerial inertia, is defining the selection criteria. However, in face of perceived 
serious exogenous factors, such as financial crisis or losing significant market shares, companies 
are left with nothing else than the choice of innovating their business model.  
The question then arises: why do managers leave such an important decision to the last minute? 
While Clayton Christensen (2003) offers a resource-based answer, arguing that new models are 
“unattractive” since they would require a significant effort on building up new resources for an 
unpredictable profit, Chesbrough and Rosebloom (2002) explain that it is a sensemaking matter. 
Managers act on contextual rationality and they often struggle in overcoming obstruction and 
confusion.  
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The research conducted under a discovery driven and cognitive perspective is in consensus with 
Chesbrough and Rosebloom (2002) argument, and state the need of sensemaking studies for 
unfolding the innovation processes of a business model.  Formulating one possible answer to 
this need is the aim of my thesis.   
By drawing on enactment theory (Weick, 1979), which is the core of sensemaking, it gives the 
opportunity to study the processes of emergence of a new business model when this is not 
triggered by exogenous factors, but by internal sensemaking. Enactment assumes organizations 
to be intrusive and active, to enact their own environment, away from being reactive with the 
sole purpose of responding to exogenous stimuli. Furthermore, whilst the business model is an 
outcome, it is not a fixed one; it is only “a moment in the process” (Weick, 1995: 33), as 
sensemaking is an on-going process.  
My findings show that the difficulty of innovating business models comes from the need of 
overcoming an heterogeneity of interruptions scattered unevenly across the elements of the 
model; while dominant logic is only one of them. Underestimation of the product’s potential on 
the market, quality versus cost dilemma, divergences between paradigms, a lack of knowledge, 
and a lack of trust between co-development partners, are further interruptions emerged in this 
study. 
These interruptions are being dealt by a team of people, external partners and internal from 
different departments, who are drawing on different vocabularies and believes. Thus, there is a 
need of reaching an intersubjectivity level, where compromise is possible, in order to allow 
innovation to happen. Still, in the urge of reaching moments of stability and creating control too 
fast, more interruptions emerge.  
In these conditions, my study illustrates that the enactment of a business model is not a liner 
process, as shown by the activity system perspective, nor it is strictly dependent on the internal 
resources, but rather an emerging one, a collective effort of reaching temporary intersubjectivity 
that would allow innovation to continue, against ideology, need of control, and divergences 
between paradigms. It is based on continuous action that allows organization to move further, 
and never stand still. Thus, trial and error, experimentation, benchmarking for formulating 
reference points, labelling, co-creation and co-development, permitted the organization I studied 
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to enact. Positive market feedback, possibility of reducing costs productions, and a visionary 
leadership, were the cues that advised against the ideology, allowing the emergence of a new 
business model.  
Therefore, business models are subjective interpretative manners of how managers choose 
which interruptions to focus on and their processes of restoration, influenced by the vocabularies 
they operate with. 
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Abstract in Danish  
 
Resume   
Formålet med denne afhandling er at forstå, hvordan en etableret virksomhed udvikler en ny 
forretningsmodel. Afhandlingen bygger på et etnografisk studie af, hvordan processerne foregår 
ved at fokusere på enacment (Weick, 1979). Derved adskiller analysen sig fra de traditionelle 
perspektiver på dette fænomen, der normalt analyserer aktivitet system, dynamiske kapabiliteter, 
transaktionsomkostninger, discovery driven og kognitive perspektiver.  
 
Afhandlingen forfølger dette spørgsmål:  
Hvordan enacter etablerede virksomheder nye forretningsmodeller? 
 
Innovationen af forretningsmodeller i etablerede virksomheder er en enactment proces og 
topledelsen anser det for at være et bjerg, der skal besejres. Når valget står mellem innovation 
og kontrol, er det ofte kontrollen, der vinder. Studier har vist at teknologier og processer, der har 
potentiale til at udfordre den eksisterende forretningsmodel, ofte blive filtreret væk. Det bliver 
hermed den dominerende logik og den såkaldte ledelsesmæssige inerti der får lov til at definere 
selektionskriterierne. I lyset af eksterne faktorer som finanskrisen og store tab af markedsandele, 
er virksomheder dog tvunget til at udvikle nye forretningsmodeller.   
 
Man kan undre sig over, hvorfor ledere udskyder en så vigtig beslutning som udvikling af nye 
forretningsmodeller indtil sidste øjeblik. Clayton Christensen (2003) argumenterer ud fra et 
ressourcebaseret perspektiv og forklarer at de nye modeller ikke er attraktive, fordi de kræver 
store investeringer i nye ressourcer, samtidig med at udbyttet af de nye modeller er usikre. 
Chesbrough og Rosebloom (2002) forklarer at det handler om meningsskabelse. Ledere reagerer 
ud fra en kontekstafhængig rationalitet og kæmper ofte mod forhindringer og forvirring. 
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Resultaterne fra discovery driven og kognitive studier er i overensstemmelse med Chesbrough 
og Rosebloom, når de argumenterer for behovet for studier af meningsskabelsesprocesser for at 
forstå, hvordan innovationen af nye forretningsmodeller foregår.  
 
Ved at anvende enactment teori (Weick, 1979), der er kernen i meningsskabelse, giver det 
mulighed for at studere, hvordan nye forretningsmodeller emergerer, når de ikke skabes af 
eksterne faktorer, men af intern meningsskabelse. Enactment antager at organisationer er aktive 
i at skabe deres egne omgivelser gennem handlinger, hvilket adskiller sig fra ideen om at 
organisationer er inaktive og kun reagerer på ydre stimuli. En forretningsmodel anses for at 
være et resultat, men er ikke en stabil størrelse. Det er kun ”Et øjeblik i en proces” (Weick,1995; 
33), fordi meningsskabelse er en kontinuerlig proces.  
 
Mit studie illustrerer at enactment af en forretningsmodel hverken er en lineær proces, som 
aktivitet system perspektivet foreslår eller kun er afhængig af interne ressourcer. Det er derimod 
en emergerende proces, der er afhængig af en kollektiv indsats for at opnå midlertidig 
intersubjektivitet, der gør det muligt for innovationen at forsætte på trods af modstand fra 
ideologi, behovet for kontrol og uenighed mellem paradigmer. Det er baseret på kontinuerlig 
handlen, der tillader organisationen at udvikle sig. I den organisationen, jeg studerede, var det 
trial and error, benchmarking for formuleringen af referencepunkter, kategorier og samskabelse, 
der satte organisationen i stand til at enacte.  
 
Studiets resultater viser at det er svært at udvikle nye forretningsmodeller fordi det kræver at 
man kan overvinde modellens forskelligartede forhindringer, hvor dominerende logik kun er en 
ud af flere. Studiet viser at undervurdering af produktets markedspotentiale, dilemmaet om pris 
versus kvalitet, paradigmers forskelligheder, mangel på viden og mangel på tillid mellem 
udviklerne også er forhindringer for at udvikle en ny forretningsmodel.  
Disse forhindringer bliver håndteret af en gruppe af mennesker, eksterne partere og forskellige 
individer fra forskellige afdelinger. De anvender forskellige ordforråd og trossystemer. Derfor er 
der behov for at opnå intersubjektivt enighed, fordi det gør det muligt at indgå et 
kompromis,  der muliggør forsat innovation, men denne trang til at hurtigt skabe stabilitet og 
kontrol får flere forhindringer til at emergere.  
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Positiv markedsrespons, mulighed for at reducere produktionsomkostningerne og et visionært 
lederskab var de ledetråde, der advarede mod ideologien og muliggjorde emergensen af en ny 
forretningsmodel. 
 
Det kan derfor konkluderes at forretningsmodeller fortolkes subjektivt i forhold til, hvilke 
forhindringer lederne fokuserer på, deres processer for opretholdelse og det ordforråd de 
anvender.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
Table of Content  
 
Aknowledgements................................................................................................................................ 3 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................... 5 
Abstract in Danish ................................................................................................................................ 8 
Table of Content ................................................................................................................................. 11 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................................................... 14 
List of Tables ....................................................................................................................................... 15 
Chapter I: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 16 
1.1 Contribution ............................................................................................................................................ 20 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions ................................................................................ 22 
1.3 Structure of the thesis .......................................................................................................................... 23 
CHAPTER II: Business Model Innovation: Present and Emerging Perspectives ......... 26 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 26 
2.2 Business Models and Business Models Innovation ................................................................... 29 
2.2.1 What is a business model?........................................................................................................................... 29 
2.2.1 What is business model innovation? ....................................................................................................... 35 
2.3 Business Models Innovation: Existing theoretical perspectives .......................................... 37 
2.3.1 Activity System Perspective ....................................................................................................................... 40 
2.3.2 Dynamic Capability Perspective ............................................................................................................... 45 
2.3.3 Discovery Driven Perspective .................................................................................................................... 51 
2.3.4 Cognitive Perspective .................................................................................................................................... 53 
2.3.5 Actor Network Theory .................................................................................................................................. 57 
2.3.6 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................................ 58 
2.5 Conclusions and an emerging perspective: Enactment ........................................................... 64 
Chapter III: Sensemaking and enactment theory ................................................................... 66 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 66 
3.2 What is Sensemaking? .......................................................................................................................... 66 
3.3 Seven Properties of Sensemaking .................................................................................................... 73 
3.4 What Triggers Sensemaking? ............................................................................................................ 76 
3.5 Enactment Theory ................................................................................................................................. 79 
Chapter IV: Research Design ......................................................................................................... 88 
4.1 Ethnographic Method ........................................................................................................................... 89 
4.2 Gaining access to the field................................................................................................................... 92 
4.3 Data Collection ........................................................................................................................................ 95 
4.4 Data Analysis ........................................................................................................................................... 99 
4.5 Writing up! ............................................................................................................................................. 101 
 12 
CHAPTER V: Analysis of Context for Sensemaking .............................................................. 103 
5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 103 
5.2 Analysis of the cue: Woodstock ...................................................................................................... 104 
5.3 Analysis of the context: Pinta Inc. A/S .......................................................................................... 112 
5.3.1. Pinta Inc.’s Business Models ................................................................................................................... 116 
5.3.2 “What do you mean by a business model?” .......................................................................................... 122 
5.3.3. R&D versus Business Development ..................................................................................................... 126 
5.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 129 
Chapter VI: Analysis of the enactment processes in the case company. Enacting 
business model elements ............................................................................................................. 131 
6.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 131 
6.2 Enacting components of a value proposition ............................................................................ 132 
6.2.1 Woodstock generation 1 (G1) ................................................................................................................. 136 
6.2.2 Woodstock generation 3 (G3) ................................................................................................................. 140 
6.2.2.1 Creation of meaning for co-branding ................................................................................................................. 140 
6.2.2.2 Creation of meaning for warranty ....................................................................................................................... 143 
6.2.2.3 Creation of meaning of aesthetics ........................................................................................................................ 152 
6.2.3 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................................... 155 
6.3 Enacting the market segment ......................................................................................................... 158 
6.3.1 Segmentation criteria and strategy for approaching the market ............................................................ 159 
6.3.2 Co-creation process ..................................................................................................................................... 165 
6.2.2.1 Triggers for co-creation ........................................................................................................................................... 166 
6.3.2.2 Co-creation: adding and subtracting .................................................................................................................. 171 
6.3.3 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................................... 176 
6.4 Enactment of value chain .................................................................................................................. 179 
6.4.1 Value chain interruptions in G1 .............................................................................................................. 180 
6.4.2 Value chain interruptions in G3 .............................................................................................................. 184 
6.4.2.1 Production process related interruptions at Woodstock ............................................................................ 184 
6.4.2.2 Logistics-related interruptions .............................................................................................................................. 195 
6.4.2.3 Handover and transfer of knowledge interruptions ..................................................................................... 201 
6.4.3 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................................... 206 
6.5 Enactment of value network ............................................................................................................ 209 
6.5.1 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................................... 217 
6.6 Enactment of Revenue Model .......................................................................................................... 218 
6.6.1 Reaching intersubjectivity on cost ........................................................................................................ 219 
6.6.2 Benchmarking pricing structures .......................................................................................................... 225 
6.6.3 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................................... 230 
6.7 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 232 
Chapter VII: The Emergence Process of a New Business Model ..................................... 243 
7.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 243 
7.2 Co-influences between elements ................................................................................................... 244 
7.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 254 
7.4.1 Woodstock: from intended to realized business model ............................................................... 255 
 13 
Chapter VIII: Discussions and Conclusions ............................................................................ 259 
8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 259 
8.2 Summary of findings ........................................................................................................................... 260 
8.2.1 Frame and cue ............................................................................................................................................... 260 
8.2.2 Enactment processes for business model elements ...................................................................... 262 
8.2.3 What enables the emergence process of a new business model? ............................................ 266 
8.3 Contributions ........................................................................................................................................ 267 
8.3.1 A dialog between sensemaking and the activity system perspective..................................... 268 
8.3.2 A dialog between sensemaking and the dynamic capabilities perspective ......................... 269 
8.3.3 A dialog between sensemaking and a discovery driven perspective ..................................... 271 
8.3.4 A dialog between sensemaking and the cognitive perspective ................................................. 272 
8.3.5 A dialog between sensemaking and the ANT perspective .......................................................... 273 
8.3.6 How do established companies enact new business models? ................................................... 279 
8.4 Reflections on conducting ethnography ...................................................................................... 280 
8.5 Avenues for further research .......................................................................................................... 281 
8.5 Implications for practice ................................................................................................................... 282 
List of references ............................................................................................................................. 285 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 2. 1 Business Model Framework. Source: Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002:5536). ................ 32 
Figure 2. 2 Business model levels. Source: Wirtz (2011:67) .................................................................... 42  
Figure 3. 1 Major constituents of the sensemaking perspective. Source: Sandberg et al., (2015:12) ....... 73 
Figure 3. 2 The organizing process. Source: Weick (1979:134) ............................................................... 80 
Figure 3. 3 Enactment. Source Weick (1979:134)..................................................................................... 81 
Figure 3. 4 Relations between the Interpretation Modes and Organizational Processes. Source: Daft and 
Weick (1984:291) .............................................................................................................................. 83 
Figure 3. 5 Enactment process. Own creation ........................................................................................... 86 
Figure 4. 1 'Fly on the wall.' Field trip document ...................................................................................... 94 
Figure 4. 2 Identified interruptions per business model element. First and second round of coding ...... 100 
Figure 5. 1 Woodstock Generation 1   ..................................................................................................... 104                                
Figure 5. 2 Woodstock Generation 3 ....................................................................................................... 104 
Figure 5. 3 Woodstock Timeline ............................................................................................................. 111 
Figure 5. 4 Woodstock business model. Source: Internal document, 2010 ............................................. 124 
Figure 6. 1 Woodstock G1, timeline. Source: Internal document, 2010 ................................................. 134 
Figure 6. 2 Woodstock's value chain, generation 1. Source: Internal document, 2010 ........................... 137 
Figure 6. 3 Value chain positioning in wood windows. Source: Internal document, 2012 ..................... 182 
Figure 7. 1 Source of benchmarking........................................................................................................ 245 
Figure 7. 2 Interlinkages in the G1 business model ................................................................................. 253 
Figure 7. 3 Interlinkages in the G3 business model ................................................................................. 253  
Figure 8. 1 Business model theoretical perspective, seen through Daft and Weick (1984)'s model. Source: 
Own creation .................................................................................................................................... 274 
 
 
 15 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2. 1 Similarities and differences between product and business model innovation. Source: 
Bucherer et al., 2012:194 ...........................................................................................................................43 
Table 2. 2 Activities conducted to create and capture value, organized by clusters of dynamic 
capabilities. Source: Katkalo et al., 2010:1180 ..................................................................................46 
Table 2. 3 Comparison of theoretical perspectives. Source: Own creation ................................................63  
Table 4. 1 Total of internal documents analysed........................................................................................96 
Table 4. 2 Formal interactions within the field ..........................................................................................97 
Table 5. 1 Five-year summary for the financial evolution of Pinta Inc. Source: Pinta Inc. Annual Report, 
2015 ..................................................................................................................................................114 
Table 5. 2 Perceived differences between Pinta Inc. Business Models. Source: Author's own ...............119 
Table 5. 3 Parameters for evaluating business models. Source: Woodstock business plan, 2011 ...........126 
Table 6. 1 Enactment processes of the value proposition ........................................................................156 
Table 6. 2 Enactment processes of market segments ...............................................................................177 
Table 6. 3 Enactment processes of the value chain ..................................................................................209 
Table 6. 4 Enactment processes of the value network .............................................................................218 
Table 6. 5 Enactment processes of the revenue model .............................................................................231 
Table 6. 6 Interruptions in Woodstock's business model creation ...........................................................235 
Table 6. 7 Outcome of the enactment processes ......................................................................................238 
Table 6. 8 Cumulative and non-cumulative effect of the enactment processes. Examples ......................239 
Table 7. 1 Linkages in business model ....................................................................................................251 
Table 8. 1 Comparison of theoretical perspectives. Source: Own creation ..............................................278 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
Chapter I: Introduction 
 
“The failure of incumbent firms to manage effectively in the face of technological change 
can be understood as the difficulty these firms have in perceiving and then enacting new 
business models, when technological change requires it” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002:532). 
 
The aim of my thesis is to analyse the enactment process of a business model within an 
established company through a new theoretical lens, namely sensemaking (Weick, 1995), where 
the focus is on enactment (Weick, 1979). By conducting an ethnographic study, I want to 
contribute to the literature of business model innovation (Spieth, Schneckenberg, and Ricard, 
2014). 
 
Business models, and business model innovation, are considered “a hot topic in various 
management fields” (Demil and Lecocq, 2015) but are still underdeveloped and in search of a 
theoretical foundation (Foss and Saebi, 2015; Wirtz et al., 2015) that would facilitate a greater 
understanding of the concept. This field is often studied using perspectives such as the activity 
system perspective (Amit and Zott, 2001, 2012; Zott and Amit, 2008, 2010; Zott, Amit and 
Massa, 2011), the discovery driven perspective (Mcgrath, 2010), the resource-based and 
transaction costs view (Da Silva and Trkman, 2014), and the cognitive approach (Martins et al., 
2015). As their premises are different, the business model and its innovation process gets 
defined differently under each perspective. Hence, business models are analysed as being tightly 
coupled systems, compact units and “real” objects which have a structured innovation process of 
“concrete choices” (Amit and Zott, 2001; Zott and Amit 2010; Osterwalder et al., 2010, 
Casadesus –Masanel and Ricard, 2010), but they are also defined as subjects in a continuous 
development. This latter point of view, founded through the discovery-driven and the cognitive 
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approach, argues that experimentation is central and managerial cognitive schemata drive the 
innovation of business models (Martins et al., 2015).   
 
Yet, studies under these perspectives do not reveal the enactment processes hidden in the 
emergence of a new business model insight an established company and the processes that allow 
this new model to arise, despite the so-called managerial inertia (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002).  
 
In 2002, Chesbrough and Rosenboom defined the term ‘business model’ as being a mediation 
device between technology and economic output, arguing that established companies struggle to 
develop new business models that challenge their inertia, identifying Xerox as an example. The 
authors explain that business models are “complex tasks” and one needs to approach them 
through “sensemaking” (Weick, 1995) since managers act on contextual rationality (Chesbrough 
and Rosenbloom, 2002). Chesbrough (2010) underlines the importance of leadership, 
experimentation and effectuation to overcome obstruction and confusion, given a certain 
“cognitive blindness” (Baden-Fullar and Mangematin, 2013: 423) that impedes business model 
innovation.   
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002)’s argument that business models should be analysed 
through a sensemaking perspective becomes the point of departure in my study. Moreover, I 
have chosen to use their business model framework, having focus on value proposition, market, 
value chain, value network, cost and pricing model, and competitive strategy, for structuring and 
analysing my empirical data.  
  
Originating in the field of organizational studies, sensemaking describes how people create 
meaning when an unexpected event interrupts the anticipated flow of ongoing situations. 
“Sense” refers to meaning and “making” refers to the activity of creating something (Weick, 
1995: 7) and it is guided by two questions, namely:  what is going on here? / what is the story? 
and what am I going to do next? (Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005). Thus, 
sensemaking aims to understand how people “construct what they construct, why, and with what 
effects” (Weick, 1995: 4), and it consists of three elements: a frame, a cue and a connection. The 
connection between frame and cue requires enactment. The core of sensemaking is enactment 
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(Weick, 1995), and it is the “making” part of the sensemaking.  Since we are not passive 
inhabitants of our environment, we enact, we real-ize (Weick, 2001: 187) our environment, 
which afterwards influences our choices. Thus, enactment “involves acting on a more complete 
sense made of the interrupted situation, in order to see to what extent it restores the interrupted 
activity” (Sandberg et al., 2015: 14). Facing uncertainty and unanalysable markets, managers act 
not only on normative market analyses, forecasting and planning, but regardless of the internal 
resources or dynamic capabilities existent, they “may leap before they look, perform trial and 
error to learn what an error is, and discover what is feasible” (Daft and Weick, 1984: 288).  
 
I have analysed the emergence process of a new business model in an incumbent company with 
enactment theory, having focused on the interruptions as triggers for sensemaking, the actions to 
restore the interruptions, and the enacted environment (Weick, 1979); model elaborated in 
chapter three.   
Furthermore, Weick (1995: 4) argues that things cannot be understood outside their context, and 
that a frame of reference will provide a direct interpretation according to a context that 
determines which cues would be noticed, and which actions taken. The context of this thesis is 
an incumbent company which has, over the years, developed certain types of “beliefs about 
cause-effect, preferences for certain outcomes, and expectations of appropriate behaviours” 
(Weick, 1995: 111) which are localized in the vocabularies of society, namely ideology (Weick, 
1995: 111). Apart from ideology, different vocabularies of work, namely paradigms, are often 
met in companies.  Paradigms - which are “set[s] of assumptions, usually implicit, about what 
sorts of things make up the world, how they act, how they hang together, and how they may be 
known” (Brown, 1978: 373, in Weick, 1995: 118) are found in companies, where each 
department has its own paradigm. Weick, (1995: 118) explains that encounters between 
different paradigms result in conflicts, being a trigger for a sensemaking process.  
 
When analysing sensemaking in organizations, Weick (1995) underlines the process of going 
from “I”, an individual sensemaking, to “We”, an intersubjective level of reinforcing believes 
and values, to a generic subjectivity, where systems take place of individuals and focus is on 
control. Innovation happens at an intersubjective level (Weick, 1995), while managers often opt 
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for reaching a generic subjective level very fast, hindering innovation. This interplay between 
innovation and control is present in my study.  
 
The frame of my study is an 80-year-old, well-established Danish company in the insulation 
industry. It is cost-focused, engineering oriented company, which has developed a new 
technology with even higher insulation proprieties. The decision to embed this new technology 
into a solution for the windows industry, a market that they had never served before, was the cue 
for initiating a sensemaking process. The aim was to offer a solution to the EU2020 demands 
imposed on the windows industry to create windows with high insulation proprieties. This idea 
was received with enthusiasm by the group’s management and the Woodstock project was born, 
without any notion of the disruptive effect it would have on the company. It would challenge its 
production process, usual manner of interacting with customers, mechanisms of entering new 
markets, pricing practices, and manner of creating value networks.  
 
As different from other studies of business model innovation in incumbent companies, where 
the objective is to analyse the innovation of the existent business model triggered by external 
factors, such as financial crisis, e.g. Aspara et al.’s (2013) case study of Nokia, or stagnation 
over time (Sosna et al, 2010), my study analyses the enactment processes of an innovation 
which has not been caused by external factors (Martins et al, 2015:100). 
 
For both confidentiality and ethical reasons, as my analysis includes direct quotes from 
interviews and meetings, the company will be addressed as Pinta Inc., and the name of the 
project as Woodstock. The name “Pinta” was inspired by Christopher Columbus’ fastest ship 
used in his transatlantic exploration. I find this name a good metaphor for depicting the 
exploration processes Woodstock’s team has undergone. “Woodstock” was the actual name the 
project had internally, during development.  
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1.1 Contribution 
 
Demil and Lecocq (2015:32) argue that empirical research which focuses on “the micro-
processes leading to a business model’s emergence” is necessary, suggesting that the processes 
involved in business model creation in established firms are underexplored. Therefore, rather 
than addressing how companies should or could innovate a business model in a normative way, 
my study presents insights into the actual sensemaking processes and those interruptions which 
lead towards the enactment of a new business model.  
Following a sensemaking/enactment perspective, a business model can be defined as an 
outcome of a temporary moment of intersubjective stability that emerges from the interactions 
between environment (different external actors), ideology and paradigms. Business models are 
subjective interpretative manners of how managers choose which interruptions to focus on and 
their processes of restoration, influenced by the vocabularies they operate with. 
My study illustrates that the enactment of a business model is not a linear process, as argued by 
the activity system perspective, but rather an emerging one. Not all the elements of the business 
models, nor the linkages between them, are planned, or can be planned, by managers, as argued 
by the activity system perspective (Zott and Amit, 2010). They are enacted progressively as 
response to heterogeneity of interruptions, mediated at two levels, intersubjectivity or general 
subjectivity, thus by innovation and the need of “mutually reinforcing interpretations, and 
beliefs, values, and assumptions” (Weick, 1995:73)” or need of control. The linkages, being 
either enacted or inherited, were the enablers of the enactment processes, allowing the model to 
be mediated, to be shaped, and reshaped as time passed and more learning was gathered.  
When enacting new business models, managers are drawing on more vocabularies, meaning that 
the innovation process is not hindered only by inertia and dominant logic (Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Chesbrough, 2010). There is a heterogeneity of interruptions triggered by an 
underestimation of the product’s potential on the market, quality versus cost dilemma; 
challenges to ideology (by installing new routines); divergences between paradigms; a lack of 
knowledge, and a lack of trust between co-development partners. These interruptions have 
triggered different enactment processes that have facilitated Woodstock’s business model to 
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emerge, namely trial and error, experimentation, benchmarking for formulating reference points, 
labelling, co-creation and co-development. Interestingly, the lack of retrospective was the main 
source and driver for enactment. 
Furthermore, three factors, positive market feedback, possibility of reducing production costs, 
and a visionary leader, have mediated the connection between the “frame and the cue” (Weick, 
1995:110), and advised against the ideology (Chesbrough and Rosenblom, 2002) allowing 
Woodstock to be developed.  
Therefore, the enactment of a new business model becomes a search for answers to the 
questions: “how does action become coordinated in the world of multiple realities?” (Weick, 
1995:75), How do we discover things to enact? Who needs to collaborate with whom about 
what? How do we enact linkages? How do we reach and maintain intersubjectivity? How do we 
enact an interplay intersubjectivity – generic subjectivity - intersubjectivity? 
 
My contribution to the business model innovation literature is summarised in figure 8.1 and 
table 8.1. In here, I take the identified theoretical perspectives on business model innovation 
from chapter II, and analysed them through Daft and Weick (1984)'s model, to show how they 
are positioned in relation to enactment. The model suggests, as well, the comparability between 
the perspectives and opportunities to be mixed for further studies. At the opposite pole to 
enactment, in terms of assumptions about environment and passive organizational intrusiveness, 
it is the activity system perspective. Furthermore, there is a strong connection between 
discovery driven and cognitive approach, as they assume managers to act, regardless if the 
environment is analysable or not. Yet, studies under dynamic capabilities assume that 
organizations act only when input is available in the environment. Lastly, ANT has a special 
position, as it takes into consideration both human and non-human actors.  
Table 8.1 offers a comparison between all the five perspectives, and the sixth one guiding this 
study, which I called co-enactment. In here, I show the position each perspective takes in terms 
of definition of business model, company-environment relation, role of managers in innovating 
business models, triggers for BMI and processes, linkages between the elements, performativity 
role played by business model innovation, and lastly, strategy- business model relation.  
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1.2 Problem statement and research questions  
 
The problem statement that has guided this research is: 
 How do established companies enact new business models?  
I have worked with supportive questions for building up the theoretical framework: 
What is business model and business model Innovation (BMI hereafter)? And which 
theoretical perspectives can be identified in the literature when analysing business model 
innovation. This is answered in chapter II. 
How can sensemaking and enactment theory enlarge our understanding of business model 
innovation? This is answered in chapter III. 
The following supportive questions have guided my analysis:  
What context did managers draw on when developing Woodstock and why was Woodstock 
perceived as a sensemaking trigger? This is answered in chapter V. 
What are the enactment processes that enabled the creation of the elements of 
Woodstock’s business model and how do managers of Pinta Inc. made sense of the 
creation of a new business model?  This is answered in chapter VI. 
What enables the emergence process of a new business model? This is answered in 
chapter VII. 
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
My thesis is structured in the following way:  
 
Chapter 1 
The present chapter has the aim of bringing forward the positioning of the study in the field and 
the relevance for the field, the theoretical foundation employed, and contributions.  
 
Chapter 2  
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the present research on business model innovation and to 
discuss the existing theoretical perspectives. The theoretical perspectives on business model 
innovation have been grouped into five streams, namely activity systems, dynamic capabilities, 
discovery-driven perspective, the cognitive perspective, and actor network theories. My analysis 
shows that there is a consensus between these perspectives regarding the vital roles of managers 
in directing the process of business model innovation; however, these perspectives assume 
different levels of rationality. Furthermore, all the perspectives put forward acknowledge the 
contingency effect from business model innovation on companies’ survival, although they differ 
in accepting the same triggers and manners of acting. The discovery-driven and the cognitive 
perspective affirm the need to understand the enactment processes involved in the emergence of 
a new business model, while ANT argue for ethnographic studies.  
 
Chapter 3 
In this chapter I introduce Weick (1995)’s sensemaking concept as an emerging perspective for 
analysing business model innovation, with particular focus on enactment (Weick, 1979). 
Sensemaking theory has provided a vocabulary for analysing the interruptions that managers 
encountered in their innovation endeavours, the selections they made and the enacted 
environment. Thus, the analytical framework used in chapter six emerges here.  
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Chapter 4  
Chapter four presents considerations regarding the method and the manner as to how the study 
was conducted. Here I argue why my study becomes ethnographic, and I detail my encounters in 
the field and how the data were collected and analysed.  
 
Chapter 5 
This chapter provides an analysis of the empirical case study. It details the situation that has 
activated the sensemaking processes, which led to the emergence of a new business model 
within an established company. I analyse the context that Woodstock was born within, both in 
terms of ideology (namely Pinta Inc.), and the paradigms involved, since both became resources 
in the sensemaking process. Chapter 5 analyses, as well, Woodstock’s first business model 
together with the intentions integrated in that model, and why it was perceived as being different 
and consequently a trigger for managers to make sense of it. Lastly, this chapter analyses the 
present usage of the business model concept, identifying that this term is never actively 
employed, but rather exists in the idea of “how do we reach the market?” 
 
Chapter 6 
Chapter six examines the interruptions encountered by managers in building each of the 
elements of the business model framework, as identified by Chesbrbough and Rosenbloom 
(2002). Each of the elements is being analysed separately by using the enactment model 
discussed in chapter three, where the focus is on interruptions, enactment processes and the 
retention/outcome of enactment (Weick, 1979). As explained in chapter three, interruptions are 
“perceived” and identified as such in the actors’ own words. Examples of this include reactions 
such as “shock,” “surprise”, “showstopper”,” crisis”, “conflict”, “problem”, and “major risk.” 
197 interruptions, dispersed across all six elements, were identified and then grouped into 30 
interruptions identified as being the most important by the actors involved. Thus, chapter six 
gives a detailed account from practice as to how business models emerge, showing the 
heterogeneity of interruptions which need to be overcome. This shows that the emergence of 
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business models needs to overcome more barriers than simply inertia and resistance to change, 
as demonstrated by the business model literature.  
 
Chapter 7  
The final chapter of my analysis of the emergent process of the business model looks at how the 
linkages between the elements are enacted. While activity system perspective and dynamic 
capability argue for the existence of continue, tightly coupled linkages between the elements of 
the business model, parts of a purposeful design (Zott at Amit, 2010:2918), my findings show 
that the manner elements co-influenced each other cannot be planned. Linkages were enacted by 
the approach managers took in their sensemaking process when facing certain interruptions, 
enabling the ongoing innovation flow. When elements happened to be linked one to another, it 
was a result of either active enactment by development team, or emerged from unexpected 
events, or inherited from the ideology.  
Taking into consideration the analysis of Woodstock throughout chapters five, six, and seven, 
chapter seven ends with an objective (Weick, 1995:34) illustration of the differences between 
the intended and the ”real-ized” (Weick, 2001:187) business model of Woodstock. The” real-
ized” version is according to the time I left the field. Yet, the model was already reshaping itself 
as a new business director had entered the company, showing the ongoing nature of the 
sensemaking process.  
 
Chapter 8 
The purpose of the discussion chapter is to formulate an answer to each of the research 
questions that have guided the analyses, to show the findings. Furthermore, a dialog between the 
existing theoretical perspectives and sensemaking is shown, in order to unfold where and how 
sensemaking and enactment adds to the theory of business model innovation. These dialogs 
show the main contribution of my study. Additionally, this discussion also provides suggestions 
for further research that have emerged from my study, and the concomitant managerial 
implications.  
 26 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II: Business Model Innovation: Present and Emerging 
Perspectives  
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
As in a good novel, the particulars of every business model will be unique, but, in 
one way or another, every business model is a story about the basic human activities 
of making and selling (Magretta, 2002:49). 
The concept of the business model has been the subject of academic review for over fifty years, 
reaching “near-inflationary use” over the last twenty years (Wirtz et al., 2015). A search on 
Google.com for the simple term “business model” resulted in an impressive 528,000,000 hits, a 
search on Google scholar returned 2,840,000 results, while a search in Business Source 
Complete yielded 27,931 academic hits, of which 7,527 were peer reviewed papers (as per 
12.10.2015). This number has grown exponentially since 2002, when Henry Chesbrough, who 
reported conducting the same search on the World Wide Web, found 107,000 references 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002:532). Interestingly, Da Silva and Trkman (2014) have 
shown a direct correlation between NASDAQ trends following the Internet boom and papers 
published on business models. Per their research, the number of papers having business models 
in the title or content has increased remarkably from fewer than 300 papers in 1992 to 4000 
papers in 2010 (Da Silva and Trkman, 2014:380). Indeed, Internet has prompted companies to 
rethink their manner of creating and delivering value for customers. 
 However, organizations focused on profit making have always applied models when 
conducting their business, and models for attracting and absorbing value existed long before the 
Internet began changing our purchasing habits (Gambardella and McGahan, 2010; Wirtz et al., 
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2015). Historically, value creation models existed long before the capitalist free market; 
examples of this can be found in records from medieval times,1 and as the industrial revolution 
transformed small-scale production to factory systems. Interestingly, the life span of a model 
often correlated with technological development, as such models flourished until the point when 
a certain technology became obsolete and a new one was introduced questioning their relevance 
(Witzel, 2004; Baden-Fuller and Morgen, 2010). A notorious example dates to 1880, when the 
meat packing industry was forced to completely revise its practices following the invention of 
refrigerators (Teece, 2010).  
Despite this “near-inflationary use” of the concept, there is still a lack of consensus in research 
with regards to defining business models, what business model innovation is and what are the 
processes behind such an innovation, what theoretical foundations should be employed for 
understanding the concept (Schneider and Spieth, 2014; Wirtz et al., 2015; Foss and Saebi, 
2015).  
In this context, this chapter aims to answer the questions What is business model and business 
model Innovation (BMI hereafter)? And which theoretical perspectives can be identified in the 
literature when analysing business model innovation? 
The first question: What is business model and BMI? has been formulated with the intention of 
setting the scene of this study and understand the field. This question is addressed in the first 
section of the chapter, were the focus is on defining what is and what is not a BM and how do 
researchers define business model innovation. The next section presents the existing theoretical 
perspectives when analysing business model innovation; these perspectives are not priory 
predefined, but they have been identified in this study. This prompts discussion about the 
implications of employing enactment for business model innovation theory. The final section 
formulates and offers conclusions to the questions of this section. 
This literature review was conducted systematically, following the three-stage model of 
Tranfield et al., (2003: 214). In stage one I have formulated a protocol that was guided by the 
research question of my thesis. Thus, the inclusion criteria were articles that have been 
                                                     
1 For example, in medieval times, monasteries were competing against each other to attract members and donors with the purpose of 
establishing themselves as powerful monastic orders. By either installing a pyramidal model to attract members, or by allowing their members 
the independence to colonize other territories, monasteries were utilizing different competitive models, out of a need to sustain themselves, 
grow, and respond to the external environment (Witzel, 2004). 
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published in special issues regarding business models, and research published in innovation 
journals that were selected using the ABS ranking list between 1990 and 2015. Key words used 
for generating results were “business model”, “business model innovation,” and “development of 
business model.” Since the focus of my thesis is incumbent companies and their endeavours to 
create a new business model, exclusion criteria were related to research covering business model 
development in newly formed organizations, and business models for entrepreneurial purposes. 
The exception of this criterion was Doganova and Eyquem-Renault (2009), which was added to 
the study because of the utilization of a new perspective for analysing business models, namely 
actor network theory. 
Stage two - the actual search of articles - was generated in the first phase (Tranfield et al., 
2003:215). The result was 120 articles covering different aspects of business models, of which 
70 focused specifically on business model development and innovation. Since I am conducting a 
qualitative study, the research phase has been a process of continual reiteration (Tranfield et al., 
2003: 215). Thus, further articles and books have been added as a result of both “going 
backward for reviewing the citations of for the articles identified in step 1” (Webster and 
Watson, 2002: 16), re-running the search at later points in time, based on the same criteria, and 
seeing how the field has changed.  
Given that the purpose of my study is to analyse business model innovation through a new 
theoretical lens, namely sensemaking (Weick, 1995), identifying and analysing other existing 
perspectives was also important. Webster and Watson (2002) describe these types of reviews as 
showing the gap between “what we know and what we need to know”, explaining that “showing 
how competing theories or philosophical assumptions explain an important phenomenon can be 
very influential” (Webster and Watson, 2002: 19). Therefore, each of the articles matching the 
inclusion criteria was placed within a theoretical perspective, based on the authors positioning of 
their work. Thus, five perspectives have been identified, namely: activity systems, dynamic 
capabilities, discovery-driven, cognitive and actor network theory.  
The next section introduces the business model field by addressing two conceptual definitions: 
business models and business model innovation.  
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2.2 Business Models and Business Models Innovation  
2.2.1 What is a business model? 
 
In recent years, the need to create strategies to address the change from conventional routes to 
market, such as brick-and-mortar distribution outlets (Magretta, 2002; Osterwalder et al., 2010), 
has led both practitioners and academics to begin debating the term business model. There is an 
acknowledged lack of consensus among scholars regarding the definition, the manner of 
representing, and the number of components a business model has. Moreover, the thin line 
between strategy and business model is under debate, as well as what does it mean to innovate a 
business model. Numerous articles have tried to deal with these challenges, especially the 
special issue published by Long Range Planning 2010, attempting to: 
a. Define the term, and offer different proposals for how a business model framework 
should appear and how many elements it should contain (Afuah, 2004; Amit & Zott, 
2001; Magretta, 2002; Linder & Cantrell, 2002; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Demil and Lecocq, 2010; Teece, 2010; Casadesus-Masanell and Ricard, 2010).  
b. Encompass the ongoing debate about the demarcation between business model and 
strategy (Shafer et al., 2005; Markides, 2006; Casadesus-Masanell and Ricard, 2010; 
Casadesus-Masanell and Tarziján, 2012), as well as discussing the differences and fit 
needed between a business model and a product’s market strategy (Bond and Houston, 
2003; Zott and Amit, 2008; Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 2013). 
The term “business model” was first employed by Bellman et al. (1957) (see Osterwalder et al., 
2005 and Da Silva and Trkman, 2014) when the authors were proposing the development of a 
business game for managers, to enable them to simulate different scenarios before taking 
decisions: “we construct actual models and proceed to determine the behaviour of systems by 
direct experimentation” (Bellman et al., 1957:474). Interestingly, in endeavouring to construct a 
model, the authors admitted that the decision-making processes for managers “in the business 
world” was far more complex than that of engineers, as “human beings” were involved. They 
concluded that:  
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“We must first construct a mathematical model, then construct a simulation process based 
on it. And many more problems arise to plague us in the construction of these business 
models than ever confronted an engineer.” (Bellman et al., 1957:474) 
Therefore, the usage of the term was largely understood in relation to the process of “business 
modelling,” which had existed formerly, until the work of Paul Timmers (1998), who was the 
first author to write specifically about business models. In his work, he defined the term from an 
inside-out position, describing business models as structures that enable a product or a service to 
bring revenue to a company, while concentrating on the actors involved and benefits to 
stakeholders:  
“A business model is an architecture for the product, service and information flows, 
including a description of the various business actors and their roles; and a description of 
the potential benefits for the various business actors; and a description of the sources of 
revenues.” (Timmers, 1998:32) 
In 2001, Amit and Zott shifted their focus towards understanding value creation relative to 
business opportunities for customers, suppliers and partners, when defining business models as 
transactional. 
Nevertheless, there is significant consensus among researchers when defining business models 
as means to create value for customers while informing mechanisms for value appropriation for 
the company (Amit and Zott, 2001; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Magretta, 2002; Bond 
and Houston, 2003; Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 
2009); Osterwalder et al., 2010; Teece, 2010; Zott and Amit, 2010; Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 
2010). Depending on the domain they are representing, whether strategic (Casadesus-Masanell 
and Ricart, 2010), innovative (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002), entrepreneurial 
(Osterwalder et al., 2010; George and Bock, 2011), interdisciplinary (Teece, 2010), independent 
(Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013), or the theoretical perspective taken (whether focused on 
an activity system perspective, dynamic capacities, resource-based and transaction costs, an 
evolutionary/discovery driven approach, a process-based perspective, or a cognitive approach), 
researchers have added new dimensions to their definitions, and created business model 
frameworks comprising different components to support their perspectives.  
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Definitions of the concept centre around different foci, from narratives and assumptions about a 
firm’s performance (Magretta, 2002), to financial outcomes (Bond and Houston, 2003); also 
considering the dynamics between value chain members and their role in the chain (O’Connor 
and Rice, 2013), the firm’s logic (Teece, 2010), a reflection of strategy (Casadesus-Masanell 
and Ricart, 2010), cognitive devices (Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 2013), and specific 
combinations of resources (Da Silva and Trkman, 2014).  
 
The word “model” in relation to the concept of a “business model” is very important. For 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002:532) a model is a “focusing device that mediates between 
technology development and economic value creation.” They stress the mediation power of a 
model, as a tool to connect technical input (feasibility, performance) with economic output 
(value, price, profit), while seeking to apply the following six functions:  
 “To articulate the value proposition- the value created for users by the offering based 
on technology;  
 To identify the market segment - the users to whom the technology is useful and for 
what purpose;  
 To define the structure of the value chain within the firm required to create and 
distribute the offering, and determine the complementary assets needed to support 
the firm’s position in this chain, and how to maintain one’s position in this chain; 
 To estimate cost structure and profit potential of producing the offering, given the 
value proposition and the value chain structure chosen; 
 To describe the position of the firm within a value network, linking suppliers and 
customers, including identification of potential complementors and competitors; 
  To formulate a competitive strategy by which the innovating firm will gain and hold 
an advantage over its rivals” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002:533) (See Figure 
2.1).  
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Figure 2. 1 Business Model Framework. Source: Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002:536). 
 
Their definition echoes Morrison and Morgan’s (1999:11) study, which argues that models 
mediate between theory and data, while functioning autonomously. A model is independent in 
terms of both variables, but at the same time has the power to connect them. Morgan (2005:317) 
makes a distinction between experiments and models; explaining: “experiments are versions of 
the real world captured within an artificial laboratory environment, models are artificial worlds 
built to represent the real world.” Similarly, Maki (2005:305) argues, “models involve a 
semantic aspect: notion of representation and resemblance, and an epistemic aspect: 
characterized by the aim of indirectly acquiring information about the system they represent”. 
Elsewhere, Baden-Fuller and Morgan (2010:157) argue that: business models “provide a set of 
generic level descriptors of how a firm organizes itself to create and distribute value in a 
profitable manner.” They also argue that analysing business models creates an understanding 
about a firm’s behaviour, and that these behaviours can then be labelled, such as, for example 
MacDonald’s model, and the Ryan Air model, when they become iconic and successful 
practices. Baden-Fuller and Morgan (2010:165) suggest that these models become “models in 
the ideal sense, in depicting how they want to be in the future, a model to strive for, an ideal 
outcome.” Furthermore, they explain that a model can also take on the role of a recipe; whereby 
companies imitate what previous firms have already successfully attempted. However, “there is 
no one way by which a business can make money, but many generic types, and many possible 
variations within each” (Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010:166). These models are for managers 
“more like the biological model or organisms- an incredibly complicated set of arrangements 
where every slight change in one bit is likely to alter all the other relationships” (Baden-Fuller 
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and Morgan, 2010:165), and due to these “complicated set of arrangements” managers need to 
experiment to gain an understanding of how the model works.  
In explaining the advantages of the word “model”, Baden-Fuller and Haefliger (2013:420) 
affirm: 
“We note that this approach of seeing the business model as a model is similar to the logic 
of reasoning and understanding that exists in economics, biology and physics. In each of 
these fields, as explained by philosophers of science, models are ‘manipulable instruments 
with which to reason and into which to enquire’ and tools that ‘allow the user of the model 
to explore ideas”. 
Interestingly, the vast majority of authors engaged in business model theory not only try to 
formulate new definitions, but also to present new frameworks to describe their models. Godin 
(2015) explains that models can be seen as conceptualizations, narratives, figures, tools, and 
perspectives, which have entered scientific vocabulary, to describe the “sequence and stages of a 
process” (Godin, 2015:572). The author refers to Roger et al.’s (1977) study, in which models 
are defined as follows:  
“Models are sets of symbols, of concepts abstracted from the real world, which are 
organized together to represent a problem. Any interaction of concepts can be represented 
as a model ... Models are never true or false – rather they are simply more or less useful.” 
(Rogers et al., 1977: 61-62; in Godin, 2015: 573) 
Certainly, when analysing business model theory, there is a tendency to look at the model as a 
manipulative device (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002), a communication device (Magretta, 
2000), and a linking device (Zott et al., 2011).  
Lastly, when defining business models, researchers have attempted to draw a line, or show 
relation, between strategy and product/technology innovation. When comparing business 
models with strategies, it is generally articulated that strategy focuses principally on competitive 
positioning reflecting choices about the conceptualization of a business (Shafer et al., 2005) and 
“how all the elements of what a company does fit together” (Porter, 2001:71). Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom (2002) articulate two features that distinguish business models from strategies. 
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Firstly, business models have an outside-in approach, focusing on methods for creating and 
delivering value to customers, while the sustainability of how value is delivered is understood to 
be strategy. Secondly, the financial side of the business and the creation of value for 
stakeholders is not part of the business model discussion. They also refer to corporate venturing 
and diversification as the antecedents of the business model concept, indicating that the focus on 
the notion of growth and how managers deal with additional businesses in their corporations 
refers to “how managers could leverage the resources of the organizations beyond the 
organization’s current business” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002:531). They ground their 
arguments in the work of Penrose (1959), Teece (1982), and Prahalad and Bettis (1986). 
Regardless of the thin line between these two concepts, Teece (2010) argues the benefits of a 
strong fit between them to maintain competitive advantage.  
An additional manner by which researchers attempt to create understanding about business 
models, is by defining the relationship between product/technology and business models. 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) explain that business models bring technology to life. 
Conversely, Baden-Fuller and Haefliger (2013) argue that the relationship between business 
models and technology is reciprocal, because they interact: not only do technologies dictate the 
needs associated with new business models, but the choice of which technology to develop is 
defined by the business model. Companies find themselves involved in either shaping new 
business models to keep pace with technology, or reshaping existing business models to capture 
the value inherent in an emergent technology. 
Almost fifteen years ago, Porter argued: “the definition of the business model is murky at best. 
Most often, it seems to refer to a loose conception on how a company does business and 
generates revenues. Yet simply having a business model is an exceedingly low bar to set for 
building a company.” Despite the large body of research conducted, there are still conceptual 
dilemmas surrounding the term (Wirtz et al., 2015). Foss and Saebi (2015:2) argue:  
“In spite of such massive resonance, in academic as well as practitioner community, 
much, and perhaps most, of the extended literature on business models and the innovation 
thereof suffers from deep-seated conceptual problems, little cumulative theorizing, and a 
lack of sustained data collection and analysis. (…) However, these are typical 
characteristics of an emerging field.” 
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Literature reviews concerning both business models and BMI (Zott et al., 2011; Schneider and 
Spieth, 2013; Wirtz et al., 2015) confirm this statement, and further emphasize the need for a 
procedural and cognitive perspective when understanding business models, as a complement to 
existing theoretical approaches. The following section analyse what business model innovation 
is, and it is followed by a discussion of the differences between the main theoretical perspectives 
employed in business model literature.  
 
 
2.2.1 What is business model innovation?  
 
Behind every successful organization is a business model that in its time was 
revolutionary. (…) Creating a new business model is not unlike writing a new story. 
At some levels, all new stories are variations on old ones, reworkings of the 
universal themes that underlines human experience. Similarly, new business models 
are all variations on the universal value chain that underlines all businesses 
(Magretta, 2002:48-49). 
The idea of “business model innovation” is an important area that academics are exploring to 
generate understanding (Amit and Zott, 2001; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Magretta, 
2002; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Markides, 2006; Björkdahl, 2007; 2009a; Zott et al., 2011; 
Chesbrough, 2011; Markides, 2015, Martins et al., 2015; Foss and Saebi, 2015). Researchers are 
analysing business models as drivers for innovation, that can “shape innovations in product, 
process and position” (Francis and Bessant, 2005:178), and as “subject to innovation” 
(Schneider and Spieth, 2013:2), expressing a general belief that BMI is “key to firm 
performance” (Zott et al., 2011:1033). Magretta (2002) explained that the Internet boom has 
highlighted the “temporality” of business models, meaning they are at first “revolutionary,” and 
then stable for a time, until unavoidable exogenous factors disrupt them. Wirtz (2011:191) 
referred to this as the idea of the life cycle of a business model. As with product development, a 
business model would identify an introductory period during which it illustrates its feasibility, 
before moving towards growth, which is when expectations concentrate on profit generation, 
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maturity, where stagnation happens, and finally decline. In the latter stage, managers should 
either reshape the existing model, or innovate it. Research to date reveals reluctance from 
members of management to admit that business models have a life cycle; this is especially true 
in established companies (Chesbrough, 2010). Therefore, there is a need to explicate the 
processes and value of BMI in order to overcome this fear.  
Numerous studies have offered definitions of BMI, including: 
 “The discovery of a fundamentally different business model in an existing business. To 
qualify as an innovation, the new business model must enlarge the existing economic pie, 
either by attracting new customers into the market or by encouraging existing customers 
to consume more” (Markides, 2006:20). 
 “Process of designing a new, or modifying the firm’s extant activity system” (Amit and 
Zott, 2010:2). 
 “BMI occurs when firm adopts a novel approach to commercializing its underlying 
assets” (Gambardella and McGahan, 2010:263). 
 “BMI is a type of organizational innovation in which firms identify and adopt novel 
opportunities portfolios” (Bock et al., 2012:281).  
 “CEOs perceive a BMI as a fundamental rethinking of a firm’s value proposition in the 
context of new opportunities” (Bock et al., 2012:290).  
 “A new integrated logic of how the firm creates value for its customers (and users) and 
how it captures value. In this view, a BMI is not a ‘mere’ product or service innovation, 
nor is it a process innovation” (Bjork and Holmen, 2013: 215). 
These definitions reveal that business model innovation depends principally on a firm’s ability 
to reassign existing resources by being inventive and taking risks to access new opportunities. 
This is a process, involving the discovery of new methods of trading and building new 
relationships with customers.  
An important debate within the literature surrounds the factors that trigger the innovation of a 
business model. Researchers have emphasized how different types of innovation strategies 
affect a company’s business model, and the time required to innovate it. Strategies such as 
servitization (Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988; Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003; Kindstrom 2010; 
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Chesbrough, 2011; Maglio & Spohrer, 2013; Visnjic et al., 2014), open innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2006), sustainability and green production (Birkin et al, 2009, Esty and Winston, 
2009; Lubin and Esty, 2010; Stubbs and Cocklin, 2010; Sommer, 2010), and social businesses 
(Yunus et al., 2010) are those most frequently encountered in the literature.  
Expressing a view that confirms my own observations, Zott et al. (2011) has observed that BMI 
literature is developed in “isolated silos”. In this respect, the literature attempts to answer 
questions such as, how is BMI different and similar to product innovation (Habtay, 2012; 
Bucherer et al., 2012;), why is there a need for BMI (Chesbrough and Rosembloom, 2002; Amit 
and Zott, 2010; Gassmann et al., 2014); what are the barriers to BMI (Christensen and Raynor, 
2003; Chesbrough, 2010); what are the enablers of BMI (McGrath, 2010; Smith et al., 2010; 
Demil and Lecocq, 2010; Sosna el al, 2010; Aspara et al., 2013); what capabilities are needed 
for BMI (Bjorkdahl and Holmen, 2013); what is the role of artefacts in BMI (Eppler et al, 2011),  
how does it relate to the auditing of business models (Björkdahl and Holmen, 2015). To 
understand how to innovate a business model, researchers have considered emulating existing 
product innovation processes. Yet, as Chesbrough (2010:356) also states: “companies have 
many more processes, and a much stronger shared sense of how to innovate technology, than 
they do about how to innovate business models”. 
The “isolated silos” (Zott et al, 2011) have been explained in the literature by the presence of 
difference theoretical perspectives taken by researchers when analysing business models (Teece, 
2010; Bock et al, 2011, Schneider and Spieth, 2013). The next section is analysing these 
perspectives, to show their different positions on BMI. 
 
2.3 Business Models Innovation: Existing theoretical perspectives 
 
In 2001, Amit and Zott have defined business models as transactional and they have grounded 
their concept in transaction cost theory, a resource based-view, value chain, Schumpeterian 
innovation, and strategic network theory (Amit and Zott, 2001:511), pursuing an integrative 
theoretical approach to value creation. Therefore, business models rely on Schumpeterian notion 
of innovation as it implies the creation of new exchange mechanisms with potential to disturb 
 38 
industries. They therefore also draw on Porter’s value chain framework, as the idea of processes 
is central to business models, and build on resource based-view as explaining the value of a 
business model according to the unique resources and capabilities embedded in it. In addition, 
strategic network theory assisted in integrating the network as the “locus of value creation,” 
expressing the multitude of collaborations a company can instigate with suppliers, customers, 
and other providers, offering a customer-centric business model. Alternatively, a business model 
can draw on transaction cost theory emphasizing that “value can be created through any 
combination of transactions within a firm and through the market” (Amit and Zott, 2001:511-
513). Therefore, “a business model depicts the content, structure, and governance of transactions 
designed to create value through the exploitation of business opportunities” (Amit and Zott, 
2001:511), and it is specific to a particular firm. 
Ten years later, Zott et al. (2011) defines the existing theoretical foundation of business models 
as divided into silos, predetermined by the researcher’s field and interest. By using “silos”, 
authors have tried to stabilize the meaning of the concept, however, frequently they do not build 
on previous definitions, but introduce new definitions and methods for theorizing business 
model innovation (Da Silva and Trkman, 2014; Martins, 2015). Casprini et al. (2014:173) agree 
with Zott et al. (2011), acknowledging that the concept has been linked to several theories such 
as the following: configuration theories, transaction cost economics, resource-based perspective, 
relational view. Furthermore, they argue that “academics have also considered related topics, 
such as dynamic capabilities, absorptive capacity, value (co-) creation mechanisms, 
complementary assets, and knowledge sharing” Casprini et al. (2014:173), while taking a 
dynamic/ evolutionary perspective.  
In their attempt to cluster the existing theoretical foundations of business models, Doganova-
Eyquem Renault (2009) divided the literature into three perspectives, essentialist, functionalist 
and pragmatic. The essentialist view depicts business models as “representations of a reality 
that exist beyond it: the firm” (Doganova-Eyquem Renault, 2009:1560), implying that the model 
gives a precise description of how value is created and captured. Critics of this perspective point 
out “the issue of truthfulness of the description made by the model,” (Doganova-Eyquem 
Renault, 2009:1560), and the lack of applicability of a definition like this in entrepreneurship, 
where models are prospective. The next perspective is functionalist, where the focus shifts from 
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describing a firm, towards modelling means of value creation. This raises questions of “the 
usefulness of the model for planning the future and the profitability” (Doganova-Eyquem 
Renault, 2009:1561). The pragmatic approach defined business models as “market and 
calculative devices” (Callon et al., 2007), mediating the relationship between the agents 
involved. Business models are also seen as boundary objects with different materiality, and 
unconfined by time.  
More recently, Schneider and Spieth (2013) provided an alternative classification. They 
identified three perspectives, namely resources-based view, dynamic capability, and strategic 
entrepreneurship, by taking into consideration “the individual firm perspective” only (Schneider 
and Spieth, 2013:15). The resource-based view focuses on unique resources that assure a 
company’s competitive advantage (Ketchen et al, 2007). It specifically highlights that business 
models have the propriety “to mobilize and coordinate firm’s resources” and to answer the 
question of “How to employ extant resources and competences” (Schneider and Spieth, 
2013:14). A dynamic capability proposes the combination and recombination of resources as a 
response to the environment, and this was initially proposed in conjunction with a resource-
based view. The last view proposed was strategic entrepreneurship, which pivots around 
opportunity seeking, addressing the question of “How to explore and exploit opportunities” 
(Schneider and Spieth, 2013:19). Interestingly, the article emphasizes that the strategic 
entrepreneurship approach concerns business model innovation, as “BMI demands a firm to 
consider the uncertainty within its environment as potential source of opportunities that need to 
be explore and exploited” (Schneider and Spieth, 2013:21), whereas the alternative perspective 
provides a theoretical foundation for business model development.  
Martins (2015), inspired by the core theoretical foundations of strategy, identified three 
perspectives, namely the rational positioning school, the evolutionary learning school, and the 
cognitive school. The rational school examines the “concrete choices” made by “rational 
managers,” whereas business models optimize activity systems (Martins, 2015:101). 
Furthermore, the evolutionary view acknowledges the role of experimentation, and incremental 
steps in both generating and transforming business models, while the cognitive school 
underlines the role of managerial cognition and sensemaking in BMI. The article argues that, in 
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comparison with the cognitive view, both the rational and evolutional perspective “give primacy 
to the external context as the driver of business model innovation” (Martins, 2015:102).  
When conducting the literature review, five perspectives were distinguished, based on the 
authors positioning of their work. These perspectives were: activity systems, dynamic 
capabilities, discovery-driven, cognitive and actor network theory. Given that dynamic 
capability is rooted in resource-based view (Katkalo et al., 2010), it can be seen to have merged 
into a single perspective. These perspectives vary from a rational/instrumental approach to 
analysing business models as objects, to an interpretative one in which models are subjects 
(Bakir and Todorovic, 2010).  
The most employed approaches are the discovery driven approach, as coined by McGrath 
(2010), and dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2010), while the newest perspectives to emerge are the 
cognitive one and studies using actor network theory. Research under discovery driven and 
cognitive perspective as the ones pointing towards the need of sensemaking theory, to 
understand the enactment of business models.  
The following sections analyse how business model innovation is conceptualized in each of the 
five perspectives.   
 
2.3.1 Activity System Perspective 
 
Zott and Amit (2001, 2007, 2008, 2010) have conceptualized business models as an activity 
system, underlying the boundary spanning nature of the concept, where a manager’s role is to 
connect the internal with the external activities of the focal firm.  
“We conceptualize a firm’s business model as a system of interdependent activities that 
transcends the focal firm and spans its boundaries” (Zott and Amit, 2010:2016).  
“Business model innovation can occur in a number of ways: by adding novel activities 
(through forward or backward integration), by linking activities in novel ways, by changes 
one or more parties that perform any of the activities” (Amit and Zott, 2012:44). 
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Zott and Amit (2010:220) call the business model “a template of how firms conduct businesses” 
where the focus is the manner the activities are linked to each other, and, even more, in what 
sequence. The authors explain that business model design is about managers answering the 
questions: “What activities should be performed? ? How should they be linked and sequenced? 
Who should perform them, and Where?” (Zott and Amit, 2010:222). Furthermore, they argue 
for the idea of a “purposeful design” (Zott and Amit, 2010:218) conducted by managers who 
need to create the interdependencies between activities. It is a deliberate choice, where 
managers take decisions on all parameters, “often simultaneously.” 
As part of a system, companies should rely on third- party resources and activities to fulfil their 
promised value propositions (Zott and Amit, 2010:2019). This implies that an examination of 
the internal resources and capabilities of a firm does not explain its business model (Makrides 
and Sosa, 2013:2). Wirtz et al. (2010:274) explained that models “reflect the operational and 
output system of a company, and as such captures the way the firm functions and creates value.” 
Therefore, managers would be advised to consider the company as part of a network of 
suppliers, competitors, and customers, all of which are strongly interconnected. The concept of 
open business model (Chesbrugh, 2003, 2006, 2007), lead users on innovation processes having 
the ability to enlarge the network, thus adding new types of complementaries (Hienerth et al., 
2011), co-creation for BM (Pynnonen et al., 2012) mirrors this type of thinking. Being part of a 
network, the environment becomes an important external trigger for innovating a business 
model, as changes in the environment would generate internal changes.  
Interestingly, Wirtz (2011) observed the tendency of reducing business models to either a 
functional or a teleological aspect, arguing instead for a synthesized approach, whereby the 
business model represents the main activities conducted by the firm. Depending on the activities 
in focus, business models can target different levels, such as the industry level, the company, 
business unit, or product level (see Figure 2.2), and multiple utilities. For example, it can 
include market strategy, give a sense of identity to a single business unit within a corporation, or 
ensure a company’s position at industry level taking into consideration the corporate 
environment. These levels “build upon one another and consequently explain the structure of 
industries and companies as a whole” (Wirtz, 2011:66). 
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Figure 2. 2 Business model levels. Source: Wirtz (2011:67) 
 
Managers play a role in designing and thereby determining these interdependencies, and “such 
purposeful design- within and across firm boundaries- is the essence of the business model” 
(Zott and Amit, 2010:218). Thus, chosen value propositions would determine the type of 
revenue model and pricing strategies, as well as the level of complexity for the entire value 
chain. The business model has the role to secure the positioning taken by the company inside a 
certain value chain, and the decision to move up or down the value chain would raise BMI and 
redesign reflections. Considering this information, managers can take decisions about the type 
of activities they would need to perform, how those activities might be linked and the 
governance of those activities (Zott and Amit, 2010:220). Furthermore, the authors have 
observed the most common procedures when designing new business models, such as: novelty, 
when new activities or new manners to link activities are found, lock-in, developing 
mechanisms to keep third parties active in the business model, complementaries, building 
activities within a system, and efficiency, reducing transaction costs. Interestingly, when 
debating the process of BMI, the language for discussing business model “innovation” has been 
borrowed from established concepts of product innovation theory (Bucherer et al., 2012). Thus, 
the literature discusses incremental and radical business models (Chesbrough, 2010), and while 
some researchers find BMI radical (Markides, 2006) others classify it into semi-radical or semi-
incremental (Davila et al., 2006);  business model portfolios (Sabatier et al., 2010), and front-
end and back-end innovative processes in BMI (Gunzel and Holm, 2013). In addition, 
differences have been identified in the origins, processes and degree of innovation, as well as 
the level of organizational implementation and responsibility (Bucherer et al., 2012:194), as 
shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2. 1 Similarities and differences between product and business model innovation. Source: Bucherer et 
al., (2012:194) 
 
Taking into considerations these variables shown in table 2.1, BMI can be triggered in the same 
manner as product innovation, via both internal (technology push or inside-out) and external 
(market pull or outside-in) opportunities and threats (Bucherer et al., 2012:190). On the other 
hand, innovation processes are more formal and structured in cases of product innovation, for 
example using Cooper’s (1990) stage-gate model, were studies are proposing analysis, design, 
implementation and control (Bucherer et al., 2012:190). As a business model’s formation 
comprises several elements, some phases of innovation are expected to last longer than others, 
or may never be mobilized. These deviations are difficult to manage, mainly in cases of radical 
innovation. Furthermore, one of the main differences between products and BMI is the 
managerial perception associated with them. Thus, there are special departments, for example 
R&D allocated to product development, which is not the case of BMI. In some cases, the task of 
BMI falls within the remit of a market manager or business development department, but it is 
never a stand-alone function; the rationality is that “BMI rarely occurs” (Bucherer et al., 
2012:193). The tendency in this case is to have a CEO, or top manager taking responsibility for 
BMI decisions. The reluctance of top managers concerning BMI is a consequence of this, as 
they must usually become involved in changes to target customers, the value chain position, 
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revenue models and pricing strategies. Furthermore, the new business model is not necessarily 
better than the existing one in the case of incumbent companies, meaning a detailed cost-benefit 
analysis should be conducted (Markides, 2006). BMI would then only be adopted in certain 
situations, such as when entering a new market, and there is a need to break existing rules when 
facing a crisis, or if a radical product innovation demands a new business model (Markides, 
2006:22).  
Another aspect borrowed from product development literature is the need to try to structure and 
map the innovation process of a business model. In this regard, Gunzel and Holm (2013), 
inspired by the product development literature, took the business model canvas developed by 
Osterwald et al. (2010) and divided it in two parts, namely front –end and back –end. By 
examining the Danish newspaper industry’s business model, they discovered that innovating the 
front-end side of a business model is more of a chaotic trial-and-error process, while 
approaching the back-end, where key resources and activities are situated, tends to result in a 
linear innovation process. Gunzel and Holm (2013) explain that there are two different patterns 
clarifying how BMI is seen in the literature: organic flexibility - “a messy process,” and 
structured rigidity – a controlled process focused on implementing a new business model 
systematically. Another manner to bring structure to the process of BMI was suggested to be the 
road mapping. DeReuver et al. (2013:2) explain "business model road mapping makes the link 
from the strategic level (...) to the more operational and tactical level."  
The activity system perspective assumes rational choices made my managers would result in an 
“optimal design for value creation or capture within a given context” (Martins et al., 2015:101). 
The notion of a “rational choice” or the “right choice” for optimizing to innovate “the right 
business model” (Chesbrough, 2010:358), has been addressed by Afuah and Tucci (2003), 
Hedman and Kalling (2003), Markides (2008), Osterwalder et al. (2010), Massa and Tucci 
(2013), Velu, (2015). Casadesus-Masanel and Ricard (2010: 198) have also emphasized that 
business models refer to “concrete choices made by managers about how the organization must 
operate and the consequences of these choices”, defining them as an “objective (real) entity.”   
Considering the performativity of models implies an understanding of them as objects, as 
“something real” that can predict the competitive advantage of a technology, coupled with a 
certain model (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013:419). This includes the option of seeing 
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business models as objects that open doors with the aim of equating BMI with the idea of 
progress and the possibility of measuring that progress (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013). 
The value of a business model is reflected in the firm’s financial performance and the return for 
stakeholders (Hedman & Kalling, 2003:52), and in “the right choice of interdependent 
activities” (Markides and Sosa, 2013:2). Furthermore, BMI has a contingent role in terms of a 
company’s existence (Zott and Amit, 2008:19) and Velu’s (2015) study has shown a correlation 
between the degree of BMI and a company’s survival. A high degree of BMI is favourable, and 
a medium degree of innovation usually results in poorer performance. As a variable, over 
collaborating has a negative effect on a company’s survival rate as the degree of business 
innovation increases. To support this argument, Velu (2015:1) offers a definition of what a 
business model entails, comparative to product and process innovation:  
“BMI involves a more systemic change than product or process innovation because it 
involves changes to the customer value proposition, value creation and value capture. 
Hence, the degree of BMI could have a different effect on firm survival compared to 
product or process innovation.” 
In relation to the strategy employed, business models are understood to be a means of 
implementation (Zott and Amit, 2008, 2010; Velu, 2015), “the reflection of the firm’s realized 
strategy” (2010:195).  
In conclusion, Zott and Amit (2010:223) argue that an activity system perspective is beneficial 
to researchers and practitioners concerned with business models, because they “encourage firms 
in systemic and holistic thinking when designing its business model, instead of concentrating on 
isolated, individual choices.”  
 
2.3.2 Dynamic Capability Perspective 
 
In comparison with an activity system perspective, dynamic capability focuses on creating 
internal capabilities, which allow companies to maintain their position in the industry for longer, 
while making imitation challenging for competitors. To achieve this, companies must prove 
their flexibility to answer environmental challenges quickly (Teece and Pissno, 1994, Teece, 
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2007). Thus, top management plays a crucial role, as its decision-making shapes a company’s 
values and routines, and permits creation of dynamic capabilities. Dynamic capabilities combine 
quantifiable meta-routines, such as operational and strategic decisions, and qualitative factors, 
e.g. human action (Katkalo et al., 2010:1179).  
The specificity of dynamic capabilities is the fact that they need to be created, “they must be 
built” (Katkalo et al., 2010:1178), and cannot be bought. Therefore, this perspective emphasizes 
the importance of managers as able to foresee possible market opportunities based on three 
types of managerial activity: sensing, seizing and transforming. All three components are 
significant for creating and capturing value, as the focus is on identifying opportunities and 
being able to recognize the need for continual renewal within a company. As underlined by Leih 
et al. (cited in Foss and Saebi, 2015), all three features directly relate to business model 
innovation, development and implementation. Sensing focuses on identifying new needs, 
seizing recognizes the needs and type of capabilities companies needs to build, and finally, 
transforming involves “reinventing the business in response to the new opportunities” (Leih et 
al. cited in Foss and Saebi, 2015:33). 
 
Table 2. 2 Activities conducted to create and capture value, organized by clusters of dynamic capabilities. 
Source: Katkalo et al., (2010:1180) 
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Smith et al. (2010:450) define business models as: 
“The design by which the organization converts a given set of strategic choices – about 
markets, customers, value propositions- into value, and uses a particular organizational 
architecture- of people, competencies, process, culture and measurement systems - in 
order to create and capture this value.” 
In consensus, Teece (2010) affirms that the essence of a business model is to deliver value to the 
customer, while seizing value for the company. By analysing the concept from the perspective 
of dynamic capability, Teece draws attention to two important limitations:  
a. Business models are easily emulated (Teece, 2010:173); therefore, developing 
capabilities to create value propositions and revenue models for each segment, as 
suggested by Osterwalder et al. (2010), and coupling business models with strategy, as 
noted by Magretta (2002) and Makrides (2006), is important. Further studies tackling 
this issue, Gambardella and McGahan (2010), Desyllas and Sako (2013) who argues 
about possibilities, to a certain extent, on IP protection on business models, but also 
argue for imitation of business models as being the basic strategy for entering new 
markets (Casadesus-Masanell and Feng, 2013).  
b. They are provisional (Teece, 2010:187), McGrath (2010) and Chesbrough (2010) 
confirm this, asserting that business models need to adapt and respond to market 
requirements.  
Moreover, Teece (2010) explains that the key role of a business model is to capture value from 
innovation. By offering the example of Thomas Edison, he claims that technology in the 
absence of a business model would yield no value.  
The fear of creating capabilities, which are easy to be copied, has been in focus of several 
studies (Enkel and Mezle, 2013, Abdelkafi et al., 2013, Desyllas and Sako, 2013).  Enkel and 
Mezle (2013) have observed a trend in the cross-industry imitation practiced by companies. 
Their study shows how imitation can serve as a method to identify new business models in the 
early stages of BMI. Companies might never adopt full business models, but would rather 
transfer specific components to generate a leap in their value proposition, using a process of 
abstraction, analogy identification and adaptation. The authors propose using analogical 
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imitations on a systematic basis to innovate business models. Pursuing the same line of thought, 
Abdelkafi et al. (2013) show in their case study of electric mobility, that transferability of 
business models from other industries can be a rich source for BMI. Transferability is possible 
given the difficulty to have IP protection on business models (Desyllas and Sako, 2013:101). 
However, their study shows that there are possibilities to protect parts of the model, as different 
kinds of IP protection complement each other and cover different aspects of a business model, 
such as, for example, licensing agreements, which enable active collaboration between partners, 
and therefore transfer of tacit knowledge. In their study, Gambardella and McGahan (2010) 
have shown that business model based on applications of Information and Communication 
Technology is accredited for IP protection. In the same line of thoughts, Bucherer et al. (2012) 
argue that product and service innovation are easier to copy than a business model:  
“New business models are difficult for competitors to follow, not only because they 
require considerable time and effort to simultaneously change various elements, but also 
because the business model has to fit a company’s long- term strategy, corporate culture 
and core competencies.” (Bucherer et al., 2012:183) 
In consensus with Teece (2010), Demil and Lecocq (2010:227) distinguish between the static 
representation of business models, as “blueprint for the coherence between the core business 
model components” and transformational ones, where the business model is “a tool to address 
change”, which is rarely discovered immediately, requiring “progressive refinement to create 
internal consistency and /or to adapt to its environment” (Demil and Lecocq, 2010:228). Based 
on Penrose’s notion of growth, which articulates the interaction between the resources in an 
organization, the authors have built a business model framework comprised of 
resources/capabilities, an organizational structure and a value proposition. According to their 
view, the resources accumulated by a company over time continuously react to each other to 
create uniqueness, thus managers need to consider how to combine the current resources to 
generate new value propositions. They argue that it is an “ongoing interaction between and 
within the core components of a business model” (Demil and Lecocq, 2010:234), and these 
interactions are influencing the choice of what type of value proposition can be offered. For 
example, changes in the value network would generate changes in the resources available, thus 
in what can be put forward to the market. Furthermore, the changes within the components are 
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referring to the cause-effect relation between the sub-elements of the same component. In 
building their argument that a business model is continuously evolving, whether deliberately 
altered or reframed by the environment, Demil and Lecocq (2010:235) discuss the signs of this 
evolution that managers should be able to observe. These include a change in revenue and cost 
structures, adapting different organizational processes and externalizing parts of the value chain. 
Therefore, given these properties, business models are in a “permanent state of transitory 
disequilibrium” (p.240), fixed by managerial decisions for a short period only.  
From a dynamic capability perspective, organizational design holds a central position, as 
managers need to make choices about how to organize their capabilities to effectively create and 
capture value. Katkalo et al. (2010) explain that sensing and seizing are highly related to 
exploitation and exploration as posited by O’Reilly and Tushman (2004). In ambidextrous 
organizations, managers need to create space for both exploitation and exploration to allow new 
business models to emerge alongside the corporate model, in the case of complex organizations 
multiple models (Smith et al., 2010; Dunford et al., 2010). Managers need to have the ability to 
make decisions dynamically and implement different matrixes of success to explicate the 
explorative and exploitative side of the business model; achieving learning at multiple levels, 
encouraging conflicts and managing contradictions, and allowing a leader centric or team 
centric structure that is committed to a goal (Smith et al., 2010). Along the same line of 
thoughts, when taking a resource and capability perspective, McNamara et al. (2013) argue that 
multiple, even competing business models can co-exist in competitive markets generating 
different value creations and value appropriation outcomes. Interestingly, the authors 
demonstrate through a cross-sectional analysis of the English Premier League that it is possible 
to shift from one business model to another, although it involves “an uncertain transitional state 
business model”, a “valley of death” (McNamara et al., 2013:476), with high probability of 
leading to a decline in profits. If a firm succeeds in managing risks, then it can move towards 
another stable business model to increase value creation for its customers, but not necessarily 
yielding profits for the firm (McNamara et al., 2013:476). Therefore, there is no connection 
between a changing business model and increased profitability.  
In relation with strategy, Da Silva and Trkman (2014:383) explain “strategy shapes the 
development of capabilities that can alter current business models in the future.” Business 
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models, when seen from present or short-term perspectives, are bound by the dynamic 
capabilities created by a strategy, which is defined as a long-term perspective. In offering 
Amazon as an example for moving towards cloud computing and building dynamic capabilities 
for a shift, DaSilva and Trkman (2014:383) affirm: “the development of excessive dynamic 
capabilities represented a strategic decision to move away from its initial business model.” For 
example, when the strategy has decided to shift towards servitization new types of capabilities 
need to be built (Willemstein et al., 2007; Wooder, and Baker, 2012; Velamuri et al., 2013; 
Maglio and Spohrer, 2013; Visnjic et al., 2014). However, not only strategy influences the 
innovation of a business model, but the acceptance of a new technology as well (Bond and 
Houston, 2003; O’Connor and Rice, 2013). Therefore, researchers have studied “how the 
characteristics of technology affect the selection of business models” (Pries and Guild, 
2011:151); and the dynamics between technology and business models, especially in cases 
where radical technological innovation prompts incumbents to face business model dilemmas 
(Tongur and Engwall, 2014). Furthermore, Cavalcante’s (2011, 2013) studies demonstrate that 
companies use technology to extend their business model, however they never use a business 
model perspective to analyse the types of change needed to be adopted when a new product or 
service is sold to customers. The author indicates that well-known strategy tools, such as 
PESTEL or SWOT, tend to be used for analysing the commercial potential of a technology, but 
never a business model. 
In the literature, there was also a tendency to combine theories. For example, Achtenhagen et al. 
(2013:429) aim to illustrate types of “capabilities and activities that are critical to support value 
creation over time”, aiming to drive BMI by combining dynamic capability perspective with 
strategy as practice. Dynamic capability has helped authors to theorize business models by 
explaining sources which drive firm success over time and “difficult to replicate capabilities,” 
while strategy as practice has provided an opportunity to observe micro-processes that construct 
strategies. The authors believed that a dynamic capability perspective does not explain the 
micro-foundations of activities that shape capabilities. Thei research concludes that strategizing 
action and critical capabilities are complementary, and so managers need to reinforce this 
complementarity to sustain consistent business model change. Furthermore, leadership, 
employment commitment, and organizational culture are crucial to business model change. 
Another interesting coupling of theories was put forward by Da Silva and Trkman (2014), who 
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affirmed that business models are rooted in a resource-based view and transaction-cost 
economics. They explained, “resources per se do not bring value to customers, but the manner 
that they are transacted,” and formulated a new definition for a business model: “ BM is a 
specific combination of resources which through transactions generate value for both customers 
and the organization” (Da Silva and Trkman, 2014:382). The authors define an organization as a 
bundle of resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991), and articulate that strategy involves dealing 
with building dynamic capabilities, while business models are about resource configurations.  
 
2.3.3 Discovery Driven Perspective 
 
“In reality new business models rarely work the first time around, since decision makers 
face difficulties at both exploratory and implementation stages. (…) An emerging dynamic 
perspective sees business model development as an initial experiment followed by constant 
revision, adaptation and fine-tuning based on trial-and-error learning” (Sosna et al., 
2010:384). 
From this stance, BMI is seen as a key driver for success (Sosna et al., 2010, Chesbrough, 
2010), as demonstrated by companies applying BMI, such as Apple, Nestle. Even though 
examples have proven successful, BMI requires openness to experimentation and a trial and 
error mind-set, as “new business models rarely work the first time around” (Sosna et al., 
2010:384). A discovery-driven perspective focuses on the significance of trial and error in the 
context of business models, suggesting an experimental approach (Magretta, 2002; McGrath, 
2010; Chesbrugh, 2010; Yunus et al., 2010; Doz and Kosonen, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010; Bock et 
al., 2012, Andries and Debackere, 2013, Gudiksen, 2015). From this perspective, scholars agree 
“strategies engage in local search, in response to specific problems or opportunities” (Martins et 
al., 2015: 101); thus, strategies are more discovery driven, than plan driven (McGrath, 2010), 
and business model development is characterized “as an initial experiment followed by constant 
fine-tuning based on trial-and- error learning” (Sosna et al., 2010: 384). 
From a similar viewpoint, Magretta (2002:46) defines business models as “a set of assumptions 
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about how an organization will perform,” and a “story of how an enterprise works.” She 
positions the term within the discipline of management, explaining that the need to use a term 
such as “business model” emerged from the need to model scenarios to test how change to 
certain elements of a system might influence the rest of it. McGrath (2010:248) states that 
“model” implies “experimentation, prototyping (…) gives a sense of firm in action,” which is 
essential to understanding BMI. Therefore, when concentrating on experimentation, McGrath 
(2010:248) explains that neither an industry positioning view (resource –based view), relating to 
finding a place in an industry and defending it; nor a dynamic capability view, which 
emphasizes creating difficult to copy resources, can explain business model development. The 
author argues that the need for a dynamic perspective is determined by the characteristics of 
certain business models, which force managers to have an outside in, rather than an inside out 
approach to their businesses. This implies that customers, and not core competence thinking, 
combined with experimentation, are central to innovating business models. Furthermore, the 
design of a business model cannot be “fully anticipated in advance” McGrath (2010:248) and 
neither can the success of the model. Therefore, Chesbrough (2010) confirms McGrath’s (2010) 
perspective, stating that companies need to develop capabilities for BMI, because “it is not a 
matter of superior foresight ex ante- rather, it requires significant trial and error, and quite a bit 
of adaptation ex post” (Chesbrough, 2010: 356). When these capabilities are missing, conflicts 
emerge between existing technologies and new ones, which often results in a need for a new 
business model. In these scenarios, confusion and obstruction (Chesbrough, 2010:359) emerge 
and halt innovation.  
Scholars working under this perspective consider leadership (Chesbrough, 2010; McGrath, 
2010; Doz and Kosonen, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010) as the main driver of innovation. There is a 
fear and high tendency to resist BMI, especially among established companies. McGrath (2010: 
257) quotes Clayton Christensen to explaining this: “new models are often designed for 
customer that an incumbent doesn’t serve, at price points they would consider unattractive, and 
builds on resources that they don’t have: from the perspective of an established firm, new 
models can look positively unattractive.” McGrath (2010:256) proposes a solution based on 
small investments, in opposition to one “black hole” and a onetime significant investment with 
“unlimited downside risk.” Doz and Kosonen (2010) argue that lack of leadership can be one of 
the most important barriers to innovation, given the fact that managers become trapped in their 
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own “rigidity”. Furthermore, the authors affirm that “business models tend also to be naturally 
stable, and hard to change,” and this stability is given by managers’ engagement in a continuous 
search for efficiency and predictability (Doz and Kosonen, 2010:370). Therefore, commitment 
and a high level of resilience is critical for conducting experiments with business models, as 
changes in this area demand both the internal validation of stakeholders, and the external 
validation of customers (Sosna et al., 2010:385). The process is acknowledged as more complex 
in established companies, where fear of failure is high:  
“Changing business models is seen as an iterative, trial-and-error process, which is 
especially challenging for established firms that cannot afford to make mistakes when 
redesigning business model because of the potential negative effects on their existing 
business.” (Hienerth et al., 2011:345) 
In these conditions, the role of leadership in creating sufficient strategic flexibility to allow BMI 
is essential. Studies have shown that creative cultures and loosely coupled organizations reduce 
resistance to change and allow modular thinking (Bock et al., 2012). Furthermore, the 
organizational design in large firms, which were previously considered to be result from 
rigorous planning, are now understood to be dynamic and emergent. CEOs are urged to maintain 
high flexibility, to account for uncertainty in markets, products, macroeconomics, and 
technological change. Managers must also optimize extant operations, while preparing the same 
functions for rapid and discontinuous change (Bock et al., 2012:301). 
 
2.3.4 Cognitive Perspective 
 
Doz and Kosonen (2010) argue that business models can be defined as either objects or subjects. 
As an object, a business model is a set of interdependent operations, embedded in tacit routines; 
whereas, as a subject, a business model represents cognitive structure and beliefs about a firm’s 
boundary and value creation activities: 
“Business models can be defined both objectively and subjectively. Objectively, they are 
sets of structured and interdependent operational relationships between a firm and its 
customers, supplier, complementors, partners and other stakeholders, and among its 
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internal units and departments (functions, stuff, operating units, etc.). But for the firm’s 
management, business models also function as a subjective representation of these 
mechanisms, delineating how it believes the firm relates to its environment. So business 
models stand as cognitive structures providing a theory of how to set boundaries to the 
firm, of how to create value, and how to organize its internal structure and governance.” 
(Doz and Kosonen, 2010:370-371) 
The objective view defines business models as stable constructs, and hard to change, while the 
subjective manner of defining a business model sculpts the novel cognitive perspective of 
analysing a concept putting managerial mental models in focus (Furnari, 2015; Martins et al., 
2015, Mikhalkina, and Cabantous, 2015). The mirage of a stable business model is created by 
the need for efficiency and predictability (Doz and Kosonen, 2010:371), but this only locks 
companies in rigid and inflexible routines.  
Considered the most challenging and interesting agenda when studying business models, Baden-
Fuller and Haefliger (2013:418) argue, “This perspective sees them not just as ‘real phenomena’ 
but as cognitive instruments that embody important understanding of causal links between 
traditional elements in the firm and those outside.” Managers’ visions shape organizations and 
influence the type of technology developed or accepted, based on cause and effect beliefs about 
whom the customer should be and how value is created for them.  Agreeing with this statement, 
Aversa et al. (2015:153) argue that these models should be employed as “manipulable 
instruments (instruments that can be voluntarily shaped and changed to gather insight).” When 
envisioning models as “manipulable,” the action of “modelling” becomes possible, and thus, the 
authors introduce modularization as a method to innovate business models. 
This “cognitive bias” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Chesbrough, 2010) is more obvious 
in established companies, where managers use existing models to filter innovative practices. 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002:531) explain there is a trend toward abandoning 
innovations that require change in business models. They link their argument with Prahalad and 
Bettis’ (1986) notion of a dominant logic, which is a “set of heuristic rules, norms and beliefs 
that managers create to guide their actions.” Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002:531) explain 
that technology managers need to “make sense” (Weick, 1993) of both new technology and new 
markets dedicated to that technology, as both elements are defined by uncertainty. Meaning 
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needs to be created, to allow adaptation to the new information and possibilities that challenge 
existing business logic. Therefore, Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) define business models 
as differing from strategy, as they convey a set of hypotheses on how to deliver value to 
customers, and how to adapt continuously to market changes. A business model is a “proto 
strategy,” because it is based on information “cognitively limited and biased by the earlier 
success of the firm,” whereas a strategy is assumed to rely on more “reliable information 
available” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002: 535). 
Martins et al. (2015:102) explain that in comparison with other perspectives, in which the focus 
is on creating optimal business models in response to various exogenous sources of distress, and 
where managers are taking rational decisions to link the components of business models with 
optimal result, the cognitive perspective aims to explain business model creation, development 
and innovation according to managerial cognition and schemas. The existing schemas at a 
certain point in time inform the organizational knowledge of the company. Business models 
schemas are defined as “cognitive structures that consist of concepts and relations among them 
that organize managerial understandings about the design of activities and exchanges that reflect 
the critical interdependencies and value- creation relations in their firms’ exchange networks” 
(Martins et al., 2015:105). This results in business models being viewed as cognitive constructs, 
not environmental ones, meaning: “business models schemas can be understood as vehicles for 
enactment of environments” (Martins et al., 2015:105). Moreover, the authors articulate that 
business model schemas function as design logics “that guide how managers structure relations 
among attributes, even when they change specific attributes or links” (Martins et al., 2015:105), 
while strategy schemas are frames for decision making.  
From this perspective, for business models innovation to occur, managers need to develop 
strategic agilities (Doz and Kosonen, 2010:371). These include three ‘meta-capabilities:’ 
strategic sensitivity, which allows the firm to observe when it is time to transform the existing 
model; leadership unity, which denotes collective commitment for difficult decisions and 
adaptive leadership; and resource fluidity, whereby resources are made available for 
redeployment to fulfil new opportunities. Seeking to contribute to the cognitive perspective, 
Martins et al. (2015) propose two cognitive processes, namely analogical reasoning and 
conceptual combination, to change schemas actively.  
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Several scholars have adopted a cognitive perspective from which to analyse business models. 
Tikkanen et al. (2005) consider Magretta’s (2002) statement that a business model is composed 
of aspects drawn from both cognitive and material facets of the firm, and focus their research on 
understanding how the material aspect of the business model, here they include the “company’s 
business strategy, business network, operations, and finance and accounting” (Tikkanen et al., 
2005:790), merges with managerial cognition, meaning the company’s belief system. To 
highlight this, the business model is conceptualized as “the sum of material, objectively existing 
structures and processes as well as intangible, cognitive meaning structures at the level of a 
business organization” (Tikkanen et al., 2005:790). The belief system is formed by industry 
recipes (rules of the game in a certain industry); reputational ranking (evaluation of the firm’s 
performance in comparison with its competitors), boundary beliefs (beliefs that inform identity), 
and product ontology (cognitive representations of the relationship between offering and market 
need) (Tikkanen et al., 2005:792). The authors affirm that “managerial actions shape business 
models in time” and indicate the evolutionary perspective, as BMI is a “process of imitation and 
mutation,” influenced by social context, competitors and potential customers (Tikkanen et al., 
2005:802). Therefore, the authors have emphasized that the business model in practice relates to 
the management of human resources and perceptions; as business model deal with “pragmatic 
sensemaking” issues (Tikkanen et al., 2005:805). Aspara et al. (2013) have analysed how 
executive cognitive processes sustain a company’s development of its business model. More 
specifically, they studied business model transformation over time, using Nokia’s development 
as case study. They define a corporate business model as something that,  
“Resides primarily in the mind-sets of the corporation’s top management or top 
management team members-essentially, it is the corporate top managers’ perceived logic 
of how value is created by the corporations, especially regarding value- creating links 
between the corporation’s portfolio of businesses.” (Aspara et al., 2013:460) 
The corporate business model is typically characterized as a conceptual tool connecting the 
business logic with business units. Here, business unit is affected by: “the business unit 
manager’s perceived logic of how the unit in question functions and creates value, in connection 
with both its market environment and within the corporation” (Aspara et al., 2013:460). The 
study revealed that a business model works as the manager intends, meaning that the core 
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elements of the business and the link between them correspond with top management perception 
about both elements. Therefore, the authors propose studying perceived managerial logic at two 
moments in time, for witnessing the transformation of business models over time. Their results 
show certain elements, those considered successful, were recycled in the new models, and that 
total transformation of a business model was very rare. Therefore, the prime limitation on the 
cognitive perspective is the bounded rationality of the manager (Porac and Tschang, 2013).  
Scholars adopting a cognitive perspective to understand business models affirm that managerial 
sensemaking require empirical review. Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002:536) explain that 
constructing business models in highly complex environments shares much with Weick’s (1993: 
636) notion of sensemaking: “Sensemaking is about contextual rationality. It is built out of 
vague questions, muddy answers, and negotiated agreements that attempt to reduce confusion.” 
Thus, sensemaking processes can be defined and shaped by dominant logic: “the filtering 
process within a successful established firm is likely to preclude identification of models that 
differ substantially from the firm’s current business model.” Furthermore, Chesbrough 
(2010:359) shows that the main barriers to innovating a business model are obstruction and 
confusion. He explains, managers need to understand the cognitive role of business models, and 
move away from the belief that the right business model for a certain technology is known from 
the outset. He underlines the importance of leadership, experimentation and effectuation as tools 
to overcome “cognitive blindness” (Baden-Fullar and Mangematin, 2013: 423) as managers act 
on contextual rationality and meaning follows action (Weick, 1995).  
 
2.3.5 Actor Network Theory 
 
A newly emerging perspective for studying business models and their innovation process is 
actor network theory. Doganova and Eyquem-Renault (2009) explores the evolutions of 
business models from the beginning until full development by looking at their materiality, 
power point presentations, business plans etc. In an entrepreneurial environment, business 
models become boundary objects that travel in time and space. Thus, in the study of Doganova 
and Eyquem-Renault (2009), the business model evolves as the network that allows the 
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technology to reach the market increases. In this way, a business model becomes both a 
“narrative and a calculative device.”  
In an historical study of the business model development conducted using ANT, Mason and 
Spring (2011:1038) affirm “business models can be understood as a framing device for 
influencing and shaping collective and individual action.” Furthermore, the study agrees with 
Doganova and Eyquem-Renault (2009) in affirming that business models act as framing devices 
when embedded in artefacts such as business plants, power points slides, reports, and the have a 
certain “performative power to shape and influence the action of others” (Mason and Spring, 
2011:1038).  
Using the same perspective, Demil and Lecocq (2015:32) study the “micro-processes leading to 
a business model emergence” and define business models “an artefact that creates 
commensurability” and “a network of multiple artefacts” (Demil and Lecocq, 2015:35).  ANT 
assumes that everything is and emerges from a web of relationships and the question is how to 
make that network stable.  
When studying business models through ANT, it facilitates an understanding of “how things are 
agglomerated and assembled to create new realities” (Demil and Lecocq, 2015:37). 
Furthermore, the study affirms that a pure cognitive reasoning of business model is not 
expressing the complexity of creating a model, and “the advantages and benefits of a given 
business model are generally only identified and become obvious after its implementation” 
(Demil and Lecocq, 2015:53). Interestingly, the same study shows that the artefacts used for the 
creation of each business model element were different, and they were used as sensemaking 
devices to managers.  
 
2.3.6 Conclusions  
 
Analysing the five perspectives, an attempt can be observed to answer the same type of 
questions: what a business model is and what the processes of business model innovation are, 
how does the company interact with the environment and how is this interaction influencing the 
internal innovation processes, what can be noticed as triggering innovation of business models, 
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what is the relation between business model and strategy, and what is the role of the manager in 
this process. These themes are summarized in table 2.3: 
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2.5 Conclusions and an emerging perspective: Enactment  
 
The five perspectives put forward, as seen in table 2.3, range from objective, rational decision 
making, to subjective perceptions of business model innovation influenced by managerial 
cognition. The five schools agree that managers need to direct the process of BMI; however, 
they admit that different levels of rationality might shape the company, the environment and 
even the model itself. Furthermore, all the perspectives put forward acknowledge the 
contingency effect from business model innovation on companies’ survival, although they differ 
in accepting the same triggers and manners of acting. An activity system considers the 
connections between internal/external activities of the focal business, while dynamic capabilities 
reflect on the way imitation is avoided when preparing to adopt a competitive position in an 
industry. In an activity system perspective, the design of linkages between the elements of the 
business models are vital, while in a dynamic capability the linkages are influenced by the 
resources available and they are both between and within components.  
There are strong similarities between discovery-driven and cognitive perspectives, as both 
emphasize the need for a trial and error approach, admitting that business models are not 
generated from the first try-out, but that a number of factors intervene, ranging from inertia and 
fear of failure to fear of the considerable investments potentially required. However, the 
cognitive perspective argues for BMI as managerially motivated, rather than illustrating external 
sources or internal financial crises, discussing how the model enacts the features of the 
surrounding environment and not the reverse. Beyond this, managers are sensemakers and 
enactors. The streams of research involved in assessing business model innovation focus on 
either internal resources or rational plans made by top management about how those resources 
are to be used, or on experimentation and prototyping to use resources differently. These 
perspectives neglect the enactment steps taken by employees involved in the creation of the new 
model. BMI is regarded as being mainly a senior management task, and the implementation of it 
is typically a top-down initiative, driven by ideas about optimizing existing resources and 
capabilities.  
 65 
More than ten years ago, Chesbrough and Rosembloom (2002) defined business model as a 
mediation construct between technological input and economic output. In their paper, the 
authors argued that the development of a business model was a greater challenge for mature 
companies than start-ups, because established routines generate reluctance among managers to 
adopt new technology and practices that do not fit the existing business model. They referenced 
sensemaking and Weick (1995) to explain that the construction of business models not only 
concerned resources and how they are linked, but also the cognitive characteristics of the actors 
involved in the decision-making process. Furthermore, Chesbrough (2010) identified two 
explanations for the barriers to business model development: obstruction and confusion. 
Researchers that accept the obstruction perspective, such as Amit and Zott (2001) work as cited 
by Chesbrough (2010), believe that managers are convinced from the outset about the right 
business model for a certain technology. By contrast, the confusion, as proposed by Chesbrough 
(2010), suggests that managers do not control this information, as humans act on context 
rationality (Weick 1995), in which meaning follows action. Pursuing the same argument, Demil 
and Lecocq (2010) explain that common methods of studying business models, which involve 
developing normative frameworks that reduce businesses to their value creation and value 
capture mechanisms, fail to reveal the “how” behind the process of the creation of a business 
model. George and Bock (2011:89) emphasize the need for discovering the mechanisms and 
processes of business model innovation, and explain that narrative sensemaking is a possible 
theoretical lens through which to examine this. Magretta (2002) argues that business models 
comprise both material/economic and narrative facets, while Tikkanen et al. (2005) claim that 
managerial cognition and sensemaking activities are additional and important sides of any 
business model. These studies reveal a need for a new conceptualization of the term business 
model, which extends beyond the resource-driven view, to allow us to understand the creation of 
a business model through enactment processes possible in mature organizations.  
Therefore, the next chapter introduce sensemaking, with focus on enactment theory (Weick, 
1979) as the theoretical lens I employ in this thesis for understanding the processes behind the 
emergence of new business model inside an established company.  
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Chapter III: Sensemaking and enactment theory 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces Weick’s (1995) sensemaking theory, with focus on enactment (Weick, 
1979) as a perspective for understanding the processes involved in the creation of business 
models in incumbent companies. In the first section of the chapter, the traditional sensemaking 
framework, focusing on the seven sensemaking proprieties is introduced, followed by triggers 
that prompt actors to enter a sensemaking process. The next section analyses the centrality of 
enactment to sensemaking, and introduces the analytical framework derived from the theory, 
which is to be use in this research.  
 
3.2 What is Sensemaking? 
 
Originating in the field of organizational studies, sensemaking describes how people create 
meaning when an unexpected event interrupts the anticipated flow of ongoing situations. 
Sensemaking aims to understand how people “construct what they construct, why, and with 
what effects” (Weick, 1995: 4), beginning with the question “is the situation the same or 
different?” If it is found to be different, people begin to retrospectively notice cues, interpret 
those cues and respond by trying to enact new plausible meanings (Weick et al., 2005).   
The term was coined by Karl Weick in 1995, and it is defined as:  
[Literally […] the making of sense […] it is the sensemaking mechanism that 
organizational members use to attribute meaning to events, mechanisms that includes the 
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standards and rules for perceiving, interpreting, believing, and acting that are typically 
used in a giving cultural setting (Weick, 1995:4-5).  
Sensemaking is a response to failed expectations, when surprises appear, “sensemaking enables 
people to integrate what is known with what is conjectured, to connect what is observed with 
what is inferred. Sensemaking is a deliberated effort to understand efforts” (Klein et al, in 
Holmen, 2007:114) 
“Sense” refers to meaning and “making” refers to the activity of creating something (Weick, 
1995:7). Therefore, sensemaking exposes how constructions are enacted through the everyday 
actions of actors, underlining that actions precede meanings. In simple terms, sensemaking takes 
place to answer two questions: what is going on here? / what is the story? and what am I going 
to do next? (Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005), and consists of three elements: 
a frame, a cue, and a connection. Sensemaking involves placing stimuli into a framework, and a 
meaning arises when a link is made between the frame and a cue. Weick (1995:110) explains 
that the frame represents “the past moments of socialization”, while cues are “present moments 
of experience”. When these two moments are connected, meaning is created. Therefore, it is 
central to sensemaking to understand what people “draw on” (Weick, 1995:109) when 
interpreting objects. People function within certain frames that serve to determine which cues 
they notice and extract. This process of connecting and, therefore, creating order, i.e., 
“structuring the unknown”, is at the core of sensemaking.  
Sensemaking is also about communication, interactive talk, and language. Talk materializes and 
brings a situation into existence through articulation, thus it is “the social process by which the 
tacit knowledge is made more explicit and usable” (Weick et al., 2005:413). When it is noticed 
that something does not fit and somebody articulates this, a new object is created. In this way, 
speech brackets actions and gives them meaning. However, there is also a “fallacy” (Weick, 
1995:4), which arises when an event is not articulated despite being observed for its 
unfamiliarity. Unfamiliarity can only be explained within the boundaries of known vocabulary, 
which is influenced by a certain context. Understanding the context, especially in an 
organization, is important because “it binds people to action that they then must justify, it affects 
the saliency of information, and it provides norms and expectations that constrain explanations. 
(…) People in organizations are in different locations and are familiar with different domains, 
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which means they have different interpretations of common events” (Weick, 1995:53).  Thus, 
people drawn on context, on “perceptual frameworks” (p.109), on frame which “enable people 
to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences in their lives and worlds” (Weick, 1995:109), 
and “frames can organize relationships that are special, causal, temporal, functional scripts” 
(Klein et al, in Holmen, 2007:119). Therefore, the identification of cue and how meaning is 
created depends both on background experience and the frame one is a part of. For arguing this 
sensemaking feature, Klein et al, in Holmen (2007) gives the example of an experience climb 
holder in comparison with a novice one. While the experienced one would look for different 
places for holders and have more frames to rely on provided by experience, the “beginner would 
look for what can and cannot be achieved and what can be used as a hold” Klein et al, in 
Holmen (2007: pp. 129-130). Thus, context, and especially social context is very important for 
sensemaking. It has the power of both determining the type of cues one would extract, and how 
this cue is going to be interpreted (Weick, 1995:51). Social context “binds people to action that 
they then must justify, it affects the saliency of information, and it provides norms and 
expectations that constrains explanations” (Weick, 1995:53).  This is especially important in 
organizations, as people are working in different departments, which implies that they interpret 
events differently, which might determine conflicts and power struggles. Based on this 
argument, Weick (1995) refers to the different kinds of vocabularies actors draw on when trying 
to make sense, meaning to connect a cue with the frame, emphasizing the idea that people use 
different vocabularies. Weick (1995:111) explains that frames tend to be “past moments of 
socializations”, while cues are the experiences of the present. When looking at frames, they 
make take the form of vocabularies of ideologies, third-order control, paradigms, theories of 
actions, traditions, and stories.  
Ideologies, which are defined by Trice and Bayer (1993) as “shared, relatively coherently 
interrelated set of emotionally charged beliefs, values, and norms that bind some people together 
and help them to make sense of their worlds” (in Weick, 1995:111). Ideologies point towards 
certain expectations in terms of outcomes, behaviour, cause-effect relations, and it is an 
“alternate source of organizational structure” (Weick, 1995:113).  Ideologies are “translated into 
action” (Weick, 1995:117), especially when managers are facing non-routines technologies, 
through third –order controls, which are “assumptions and definitions that are taken as given, 
and are called ‘premises control’ because they influence the premises people use when they 
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diagnose situates and make decisions” (Weick, 1995:117). Weick (1995:118) defines 
paradigms, in comparison with ideologies and third-order control, stating that they “are more 
self-contained systems, capable of serving as alternate realities, and/or a subjective point of 
view that determines what a person perceives, conceives, and enacts” (Martin and Meyerson, 
1988:93, in Weick, 1995:188). Furthermore, paradigms have been defined as “set of 
assumptions, usually implicit, about what sorts of things make up the world, how they act, how 
they hang together, and how they may be known” (Brown, 1978:373, in Weick, 1995:118). 
Theories of actions are built on stimulus-response and trial and error sequencing, while 
traditions are “patterns that have been transmitted at least twice over generations” (Weick, 
1995:124). Lastly, stories, which are vocabularies of sequence and experience, add value to 
sensemaking by building on lived experiences that serve to guide future actions.  
 
Weick (1995) emphasizes that sensemaking is about the creation of order and the achievement 
of plausible stability when encountering the unexpected and the unfamiliar, such as when 
surprise disrupts organizational routines. The gap between the new situation and the former 
expectation, i.e., between the prediction about the future and the new reality, triggers novel 
questions, struggles, and negotiations, to create meaning to comprehend the new situation. The 
new discrepancy prompts a need for an explanation, and frequently the result is that several 
meanings are given to the same event (Mills and Mills, 2010). Thus, sensemaking occurs when 
the flow of actions becomes unintelligible, because a disruption of expectations has occurred 
(Weick et al., 2005:409). To understand what has happened “people look first for reasons that 
will enable them to resume the interrupted activity and stay in action; these reasons are taken 
from frameworks such as institutional constrains, organizational premises, plans, expectations, 
acceptable justifications, and traditions inherited from predecessors” (Weick et al., 2005:409). 
Once the “surprise” (Weick, 1995, 2005) has been reframed as “normal,” the sense making 
process is stabilized. For example, this arises when a new technology is no longer perceived as 
new because the adaptation process is complete, thereby signifying that the process of creating 
meaning around the technology has been stabilized (Seligman, 2006). 
Sensemaking transpires at both the individual and the collective level. Like individuals, 
organizations seek to define their identity and create collective meaning, to assure resilience, as 
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“it doesn’t take much to stop being an organization” (Weick, 1993). Weick (1993) explains that 
resilient organizations can lose momentum if they fail to understand that sensemaking is about 
contextual and not strategic rationality. Hence, sensemaking is not about pragmatic questions 
that point towards solutions, rather it is built on “vague questions, muddy answers, and 
negotiated agreements that attempt to reduce confusion” (Weick, 1993:9). During the Mann 
Gulch disaster, the firemen, facing a situation they had never encountered before, were not 
seeking a strategy, but an understanding of who they were in that situation, given the lack of 
past experiences with which to bracket, label, and determine ongoing action. Organizations can 
collapse because the identity question remains unanswered where there is an absence of 
“someone able to create order with whatever at hand” (Weick, 1993:9). Leadership is needed in 
the form of a sensegiver (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991), essentially a map provider. Weick stated 
that any map is better than no map, as it can create a space for generic subjectivity, in which 
“roles and rules exist, and that enables individuals to be interchanged” (Weick, 1993:5), thus it 
functions as a frame for ongoing action and social interaction.  
Weick refers to Wiley’s (1988) argument that there are three macro levels when discussing 
sensemaking, which are “above” (Weick, 1995:70) the level of the individual. These are 
intersubjective, the generic subjective, and the extrasubjective. Intersubjective is attained when, 
through communication, the “I” becomes “we” (Weick, 1995:71). Intersubjectivity is a 
reference to “interaction, mutually reinforcing interpretations and beliefs, values, and 
assumptions” (Weick, 1995:73), where “face-to-face social interaction in real time” (Weick, 
1995:72) allows innovation to emerge from an “intimate contact.” This state is relevant until 
structures, artefacts, and management technology are in place and recognized by everyone. At 
this point, the need for a person to occupy a certain role is no longer important, although their 
function endures; “concrete human beings, subjects, are no longer presents; selves are left 
behind at the interactive levels” (Weick, 1995:71), so generic subjectivity arises. Nevertheless, 
in times of change, for example when adopting a new technology, Weick (1995) argues that 
generic subjectivity dissolves, as people step back to formulate understanding and 
intersubjectivity in response to the new situation of uncertainty. Generic subjectivity represents 
control, and management needs to negotiate the transition from innovation (intersubjectivity) to 
control (generic subjectivity). Bridging these two is at the core of sensemaking: “organizations 
are adaptive social forms; as intersubjective forms, they create, preserve, and implement the 
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innovations that arise from intimate contact. As forms of generic subjectivity, they focus and 
control the energies of that intimacy” (Weick, 1995:72-73). Weick (1995) argues that in this 
context, where organizations are defined as “a set of interactions and entities that are moving 
continuously between INTER and GENERIC” (Weick, 1995:73), the focus should be on 
answering the question: “how does action become coordinated in the world of multiple 
realities?” as information is lost in the transition from one condition to another. Furthermore, 
the goal of organizations, when viewed as sensemaking systems, “is to create and identify 
events that recur to stabilize their environment and make them more predictable” (Weick, 
1995:170), in response to the ongoing pressure to develop generic subjectivity to assure control.  
Sandberg et al. (2015:11) offers a comprehensive literature review of how researchers have 
utilized sensemaking perspective. In their work, the authors identified that sensemaking has five 
components: (i) it is made of specific episodes; (ii) it is triggered by ambiguous events; (iii) it 
happens through specific processes, (iv) it generates an outcome, and (v) it is influenced by 
“specific situational factors”.  
i) Made of specific episodes: Sandberg et al. (2015:11) affirm: “perhaps the most 
distinctive constituent of sensemaking, in its fully developed form, is the 
conceptualization of ‘sensemaking’ as something confined to the specific episodes that 
occur from the moment some ongoing organizational activities are interrupted until they 
are satisfactorily restored (or in some cases permanently interrupted).” For example, 
sensemaking typically focuses on specific events, such as crises, disasters, and 
restructuration.  
ii) Triggered by ambiguous events: These episodes are triggered by specific events, by “an 
equivocal event that interrupts actors’ ongoing activities” Sandberg et al. (2015:12). The 
authors identified a tendency in the literature to study major planned events and 
unplanned ones, such as disasters, that have suffered interruptions, to determine the 
initiation of the sensemaking process. Furthermore, minimal attention has been paid to 
the minor planned or unplanned events that interrupt the everyday activity of 
organizations. Major planned events, in the form of meetings, are still more commonly 
the subject of sensemaking studies, with minor unplanned events, such as “small 
misunderstandings between actors” (which might result in a detour from the daily 
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routine or even grow into a major unplanned event) being largely neglected.  
iii) Happens through specific processes: “making of sense” or the restoration of the 
interrupted ongoing flow is constituted by three interconnected processes: creation, 
interpretation and enactment. These three elements are defined as follows:  
 Creation is a “process which involves bracketing, noticing, and extracting cues from 
our lived experience of the interrupted situation – creating an initial sense of the 
interrupted situation, which people then start interpreting” (Weick, 1995: 35); 
 Interpretation “involves fleshing out the initial sense generated in the creation 
process and developing it into a more complete and narratively organized sense of 
the interrupted situation” (Sandberg et al., 2015:14); and 
 Enactment “involves acting on a more complete sense made of the interrupted 
situation, in order to see to what extent it restores the interrupted activity” (Sandberg 
et al., 2015:14). 
iv) Generates an outcome: there is always an outcome from a process, whether actors 
manage to make sense of an interruption or not.  
v) Influenced by specific situational factors: sensemaking does not happen in insolation, 
and it is represented by situational factors, such as context, language identity, cognitive 
frameworks, emotion, politics and technology (Sandberg et al., 2015:16).  
To conclude and summarize this information, the authors produced figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3. 1 Major constituents of the sensemaking perspective. Source: Sandberg et al., (2015:12) 
 
Apart from these components, Weick (1995) talks about seven proprieties of sensemaking that 
distinguish it from other processes such as interpretations, for example. In the following section, 
the seven properties, according to Weick (1995), are analysed.   
 
3.3 Seven Properties of Sensemaking  
 
Weick (1995:18) discusses the seven characteristics of sensemaking with the aim of showing 
“what it is, how it works and where it can fail.” These are all interrelated and as following: 
grounded in identity construction, retrospective, enactment of sensible environments, social, 
ongoing (ongoing events), focused on extracted cues, driven by plausibility.  
Grounded in Identity Construction 
“Depending on who I am, my definition of what is out there will change […] Once I know who 
I am, then I know what is out there” (Weick, 1995: 20). The sensemaking process is self-
referential and begins with the sensemaker and the sensemaker’s need to understand her/his 
identity and role in the organization. Without an understanding of their own identity, an actor, 
individual or collective, would not know how to act, and would then not be able to create sense. 
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This is explained by Weick et al. (2005) thus, “From the perspective of sensemaking, who we 
think we are (identity) as organizational actors shape what we enact and how we interpret, 
which affects what outsiders think we are (image) and how they treat us, which stabilizes or 
destabilizes our identity” (416).  
Retrospective 
“How can I know what I think until I see what I say?” (Weick, 1995: 18). The sensemaking 
perspective accepts that each of us interprets the world per our own cognitive map, and our own 
framework, that is created by past patterns of actions and proofs of success or failure: 
“Sensemaking is the process of constructing a link between future actions and past experiences, 
providing the decision maker with guidelines of when not to act, and how and when to act” 
(Conrad and Poole, 1998). Making sense of a new situation pushes sensemakers to reach out 
retrospectively for patterns to facilitate the interpretation of a new situation to deliver clarity, by 
bracketing. The problem that arises, according to Weick (1995:24), is “confusion, not 
ignorance,” as there are too many meanings present at the time reflection takes place. 
Furthermore, sensemaking is about how people generate what they interpret, as actions precede 
meanings and our actions are unknown to us until they have been completed: “man has 
discovered that his perceived world is in reality a past world” (Weick, 1995:24). 
 Enactment of Sensible Environments 
“People create, shape, and change the environment they are part of: we are neither master or 
slave of our environments. We cannot command and the environment obey, but also we cannot, 
if we would speak with greatest accuracy, say that the organism adjust itself to environments” 
(Weick, 1995:32). If we accept Weick’s view, people enact the reality they are a part of, and this 
process becomes a source of stimuli for action. A response to environmental stimuli would 
result in either opportunities or constraints being placed on future enactment processes.  
Social 
An “organization is a network of intersubjectively shared meanings that are sustained through 
the development and use of a common language and everyday social interactions” (Weick, 
1995:40). Intersubjectivity creates a collective cognition, demonstrating that sensemaking is a 
collective act. Hence, sensemaking requires attention to language, talks, discussions and 
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conversation, to understand how social contracts are mediated in specific environments. 
Directing greater attention toward prototypes, stereotypes and roles would enable the 
understanding of sensemaking, “especially because of the organization’s tendency to drift 
towards an architecture of simplicity” (Weick, 1995:20). 
Ongoing  
“To understand sensemaking is to be sensitive to the way in which people chop moments of 
continuous flows and extract cue from those moments” (Weick, 1995:43). Sensemaking never 
stops, and is continuously made and remade. The interruptions of flow are important for 
sensemaking, as the shock that occurs when people encounter ambiguity and uncertainty, 
prompt them to reflect on what has happened and what should be the next step. Organizations 
are continuously becoming, and managers need to create meanings that allow this becoming to 
happen.   
 Focus on Extracted Cues 
Weick (1995:50) explains “extracted cues are simple, familiar structures that are seeds from 
which people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring (…) therefore the control over 
which cue will serve as a point of reference is an important source of power in organizations.” 
Furthermore, Weick (1995: 55) argues that cue exaction is about noticing and classification, as it 
involves comparison of what is noticed to what is understood: “once people begin to act 
(enactment), they generate tangible outcomes (cues) in some context (social), and this helps 
them discover (retrospect) what is occurring (ongoing), what needs to be explained 
(plausibility), and what should be done next (identity enhancement).” Guided by our cognitive 
map, we choose what to see in any given situation, and this then determines what sense we 
make. The belief that we can see everything is naïve, as is the suggestion that different people 
looking at the same situation will extract same cues. Furthermore, when people have chosen 
what to believe in, they “see” only factors that reinforce their beliefs, creating almost negative 
tones on the believes that were left outside.  
Driven by Plausibility rather than Accuracy 
Weick (1995) quotes Fiske’s (1992: 879) statement that sensemaking “takes a relative approach 
to truth, predicting that people will believe what can account for sensory experience but what is 
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also interesting, attractive, emotionally appealing, and goal relevant”. The preference for 
plausibility demonstrates that sense is created by understanding what could have happened, i.e., 
a plausible belief. Sensemaking it is about “redrafting an emerging story, so that it becomes 
more comprehensive, incorporates more of the observed data, and is more resilient in the face of 
criticism” (Weick et al, 2005:415), and not about the truth. The result is that things remain in 
motion, and action is core to sensemaking: “action-taking generates new data and creates 
opportunities for dialogue, bargaining, negotiation, and persuasion that enriches the sense of 
what is going on” (Sutcliffe, 2000:197). Accuracy could become a sensemaking issue, but only 
in situations with large time constrains. Managers in organizations, under conditions of time 
pressure, would choose the most plausible/justifiable explanation to speed the decision-making. 
“I need to know enough about what I think to get on with my projects, but no more, which 
means sufficiency and plausibility take precedence over accuracy” (Weick, 1995:57). 
Furthermore, due to our interpretations and manners of extracting cues, we can only understand 
what is plausible, and sensemaking is about paying attention to the filters used when 
determining plausibility, why certain aspects are chosen and what is being filtered out (Weick, 
1995:57).  
 
3.4 What Triggers Sensemaking? 
 
There are several conditions under which sensemaking is initiated, all of which begin with 
certain “shocks that stimulate people’s action thresholds to pay attention and initiate novel 
action” (Weick, 1995:86), causing an interruption to the ongoing flow. The interruption of 
routine provokes breakdowns in the system, regardless if these are significant disasters, such as 
Mann Gulch (Weick, 1993), or small interruptions. In such conditions, actors question their 
identity, struggling to comprehend why their usual approach to solving problems no longer 
delivers results. These shocks, differ from inherent breaks, and are characterized by information 
overload, complexity, and turbulence (Weick, 1995:86). In situations where there is information 
overload, tolerance to error rises, as people punctuate the flow in predictable way. Complexity 
generates a different reaction, as it provokes uncertainty, leading people to see only the routine 
they are accustomed to: “seeing what one believes and not seeing that for which one has no 
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beliefs are central to sensemaking- this means that the variety in a firm repertory of beliefs 
should affect the amount of time it spends consciously struggling to make sense” (Weick, 1995: 
87). To exemplify complexity, Weick refers to when a new technology is brought into an 
environment in which there is limited experience, resulting in incomprehensibility and 
associated events.  
Continuing, Weick (1995) relates the effects of turbulence. Turbulence is presented as a 
combination of instability and randomness, which determines whether organizations rely more 
on heuristics and imitation. However, for a shock to be perceived as a shock, it must be labelled 
accordingly, thus, Weick explains that when something is labelled a problem, it becomes one. 
Perceived as an occasion for sensemaking, the term problem arises when there is gap between 
how things are and what they should be, as goals evolve during actions. Nevertheless, this gap 
can be seen as a cue if there are two conditions fulfilled: 
The gap must be difficult to close, and secondly, the gap must matter: If novelty is open to 
a variety of labels, then one could also say things like that is an issue, manage it, that is a 
dilemma, reframe it, that is a paradox, accept it; a conflict, synthetize it, an opportunity, 
take it. To label a novelty a problem is a consequential act! Once something is labelled a 
problem, that is when the problem start”(Weick, 1995: 88).  
Organizations are facing two types of shocks: ambiguity, which is the shock of confusion, and 
uncertainty, the shock of ignorance (Idem, p.92). Ambiguity arises when “the assumptions 
necessary for rational decision making are not met” and actors are confused due to abundant 
information that gives way to multiple interpretations. On the other hand, uncertainty is caused 
by lack of knowledge, which can be resolved by inputting new information into an organization. 
To reduce ambiguity, which creates confusion, Weick (1995) proposes face-to-face interactions 
as means to construct information and determine multiple cues. Interactions allow mobilizing a 
certain kind of language intended to create a common meaning.  
According to Weick “managers organize cues and messages to create meaning through their 
discussion and join interpretations (…) To resolve confusion, people need mechanism that 
enable debate, clarification, and enactment more than simply provide large amounts of data” 
(1995: 99). Weick (1995:92) also refers to uncertainty, created by the shock of ignorance. 
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Uncertainty is caused by lack of knowledge, which can be resolved by imparting new 
information to the organization. The shock of uncertainty arises from “imprecisions in estimates 
of future consequences conditional on present actions” (March, 1994:174, in Weick, 1995:95), 
and results from the limited availability of interpretations and the “individual’s perceived 
inability to predict something accurately” (Milliken, 1990; in Weick, 1995:95); individuals often 
lack information regarding the outcomes of their actions. In response to uncertainty, 
organizations become “concerned with news that gives some cues about how things might turn 
out (…) and it implies that uncertainty is reduced by the earliest available information that will 
show what direction the actor ought to be going” (Stinchcombe, 1990, in Weick, 1995:96). The 
author argues that once uncertainty reduces, “the residual uncertainty is transformed into risk 
and people make their bets.” Thus, in organizations that suffer from large amounts of residual 
uncertainty, the risks taken are greater; therefore, there is a greater probability of failure (Weick, 
1995:97). 
To manage uncertainty, actors bracket activities, as the first step in their search to create 
meaning (Weick et al., 2005:411). Weick et al. (2005) offered the example of a nurse, who, 
based on her experience, has noticed and could bracket signs indicating a sick baby. Bracketing 
cues allowed an initial understanding of the interruption to the norm, it thus “simplified the 
world” and permitted her to label the situation. Labelling and categorizing situations based on 
previous events, permits the sensemaker to make “shock” manageable and easier to control, 
while creating a “common ground of understanding for everyone, reducing the ignorance 
differences between actors” (Weick et al., 2005). By being created retrospectively, all categories 
have plasticity, meaning that they can be shaped and reshaped readily according to their social 
context.  
Therefore, to understand sensemaking it is necessary to understand how people cope with 
interruptions and how they react. This could either refer to when a new event that does not fit 
into the environment happens, or when an expected event, such as a prophecy, does not occur. 
In both cases, ongoing cognitive activity is interrupted and “coping, problem solving and 
learning activities take place” (Weick, 1995:100). 
Weick (1995) speaks about beliefs and actions as drivers for sensemaking underlining the belief 
that sensemaking is always initiated by action (Weick, 1995). Therefore, belief-driven 
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sensemaking begins with argument and expectation, while action-driven sensemaking is a 
consequence of conscious manipulation. Sensemaking processes are shaped by self-fulfilling 
prophecies, which can become so strong, that “believing is seeing”. These prophecies are tools 
for talking about the future, and relate to the creation of certain expectations. Furthermore, 
different beliefs would determine arguments, as people would try to minimize the number of 
beliefs surrounding an issue, to reach a common understanding. On the other hand, action-
driven sensemaking allows “focus on explaining behaviours for which people are responsible” 
and manipulation “stabilizing an otherwise unstable set of events so that it is easier to explain 
them, it is an oversimplification of the world” (Weick, 1995: 135). With the aim of creating 
meaning, people use four approaches to frame ongoing flows, and Weick (1995:135) explains 
that relating the two elements of belief and action, is central to the sensemaking process. 
Lastly, Weick (1995, 2005) explains that sensemaking processes frequently fail, especially in 
cases when frameworks are strong enough to influence the ability of people to shift 
representations. Strong beliefs give rise to blind selection criteria, which overlook data that is 
incompatible with the existing frame. Sensemakers are “seeing” only information that match 
and confirm their frameworks. The so-called inertia, can “give people a false sense of security, 
while they hold on to out-dated frameworks” (Sharma, 2010), meaning that they fail to 
acknowledge the unpredictability of the environment. Weick (1995) suggests that improving 
people-to-people interaction, by creating space for arguing, negotiating and updating, will 
positively affect the sensemaking process. In the context of an organization, loosely coupled 
systems are considered more appropriate as means to keep the core of the organization intact by 
responding to environmental stimuli. 
 
3.5 Enactment Theory  
 
Once triggers have initiated the sensemaking process, the next factor comes into play, namely 
the “actual making of sense occurs through specific processes that actors are engaged in when 
trying to restore their interrupted activities” (Sandberg et al., 2015:14). We are not passive 
inhabitants of our environment; we enact it. People act out and real-ize their environment 
80 
(Weick, 2001:187) and afterwards, it influences our choices (Weick, 1979, 1988, 1995, 2001, 
2009). In the venture of making sense of equivocality, actors bracket, punctuate and negotiate 
among themselves regarding which “nouns and verbs should be imposed on the flow” and how 
they might be connected (Weick, 2001). In doing so, they enact the “raw data” involved in 
sensemaking (Weick, 1979: 130).  
In 1979, in his book The Social Psychology of Organizing, Weick introduces enactment as part 
of the organizing process, whereby ecological change, enactment, selection and retention are 
four elements interconnected to form a cyclical loop, as in figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3. 2 The organizing process. Source: Weick (1979:134) 
 
In figure 3.2, Weick (1979: 134) illustrates the causal link between enactment and selection and 
that between selection and retention, which affects both selection and enactment either directly 
or inversely, “depending if the person decides to trust the past experience (+) or disbelieve it  
(-).” 
The important thing to realize is that there are numerous ESR sequences going on in the 
organization, they occur in several places, they are loosely coupled, and it is the total 
pattern of crediting and discrediting among these several simultaneous sequences that has 
a strong influence over whether the organization survives or disappears (Weick, 
1979:236). 
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Furthermore, Weick (1979) explains that in the statement: “How can I know what I think until I 
see what I say/do”, “say/do”, see fig.3.3, represents the enactment. In the model, selection 
denotes the process by which actors attach meaning to actions in order to discover the one that 
reduces equivocality. In doing so, causal maps that have proven to be operational on similar 
occasions are mobilized to assist in sensemaking in the new situation.  
 
 
Figure 3. 3 Enactment. Source Weick (1979:134) 
 
 In a later work, Weick (2001:189) clarifies that individual cognitive maps of this type represent 
the “knowledge of what one thinks,” the criteria that influence what is noticed versus what is 
ignored, and how one would act in response to the environment. The overlapping areas of the 
cognitive maps of individuals at the same organization mark the beginning of organizing and 
building collective sensemaking. The final component of the model, retention, involves “the 
straightforward storage of the products of successful sensemaking” (Weick, 1979: 131); it is the 
enacted environment. Here, things are retained permanently, or for a given period of time with 
the purpose of permitting things to move forwards, and not stop the ongoing flow. Retention is 
the “liability to recall” (Weick, 1979:207), meaning that if an experience is not remember and it 
is not available for further sensemaking processes, the experience was not retained: “the only 
way the sensemaking recipe works is if you can remember the things you have said, so that they 
are available for reflections” (Weick, 1979:207). 
Weick (1979) elaborated on the term and explained that while enactment is a form of 
bracketing, it also encompasses deviation amplification and self-fulfilling prophecies, and is 
thereby socially constructed. Enactment as bracketing refers to the fact that one extracts specific 
parts of the whole, when investigating and understanding that particular part. When discussing 
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bracketing, Weick (1979) refers to Neisser’s (1976) discourse on schemata. The cognitive 
schemata direct the exploration of objects, meaning that bracketing is influenced by the system 
of belief within which the actor operates.  
In addition to bracketing, enactment functions as a deviation amplification, meaning that “minor 
disturbances, when they are embedded in a deviance amplification loop, can grow into major 
happenings with major consequences” (Weick, 1979:157). Moreover, enactment is a self-
fulfilling prophecy, and here Weick (1979:160) argues that when confronting equivocality, 
managers operate on the presumption of logic, given their belief that they have a valid view of 
the world and the expectation that others would share it. Finally, enactment is a social 
construction of reality, and here Weick (1979) makes an interesting differentiation between an 
enacted and a “perceived” environment. A perceived environment is the “current personal 
definition of the situation” Weick (1979:166), while in an enacted environment emphasis is on 
the output, not the input, when organizing activities. This argument was elucidated further in his 
1995 work, when Weick added that enactment has “a touch of realism” in its emphasis on 
bracketing and punctuating. Through these processes, actors split the “duration” into tangible 
objects, categorizing them into manageable structures. The making of subjects into objects, 
collectively accepted objects is the process of enactment. What are considered “plausible events 
in sensemaking” (Weick, 1995:35), i.e., noticing, interpretations, manipulation and framing, are 
considered to produce an ontological shift, as they swing from subject to object and back. In 
developing this argument, Weick (1995:37) draws attention to the fact that acting is not only 
about producing meaning, as “there is no pre-given features to the word, but groundlessness is 
the very condition that shapes human experiences.”  
Given the importance of enactment to organizing processes, Weick (1979:168) refers to R.H. 
Hall’s (1977:61) study of power, which notes that the person and the position from which he 
executes enactment influence the shape of the enacted environment. People in different 
positions have different access to power, “which means that they have differential success in 
imposing their enactments on other people both inside and outside the organization” Weick 
(1979:168). Nonetheless, this is not only a hierarchical argument, as lower level participants can 
also exert influence, and studies in middle management sensemaking processes are evidence of 
that. Interestingly, Weick (1979:217) said of enactment as a choice: “if a person repeatedly 
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enacts and selects only those things that have been enacted and selected in the past, then this is a 
case where stability drives out flexibility. Adaptation becomes endangered.” 
In 1984, Daft and Weick spoke about organizations in which they observed enactment 
behaviour. They had proposed a model of organizational interpretation, and they analysed 
organizations taking into consideration two dimensions: “management’s belief about the 
analysability of the external environment, and the extent to which organizations intrudes into the 
environment until they understand it” (Daft and Weick, 1984:287). Assumptions about the 
environment were found to range from perceiving it as “concrete” and “measurable,” whereby 
managers could gather information through formal and rational means, towards an unanalysable 
environment shaped by managerial interpretations and intentions. In the latter case, the decision-
making was based on more ad-hoc, non-linear manners of gathering information. Moreover, the 
perception of facing an “analysable environment” arose as a consequence of previous 
experiences. Organizational intrusiveness was defined as the extent to which organizations 
actively intervene in the search for information; in some cases, organizations allocate resources 
for research, forecasting, and planning; while others “may leap before they look, perform trial 
and error to learn what an error is, and discover what is feasible” (p. 288). Daft and Weick’s 
(1984) model split organizations into four categories, as shown in the following figure:  
 
Figure 3. 4 Relations between the Interpretation Modes and Organizational Processes. Source: Daft and 
Weick (1984:291) 
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In this figure, enactment behaviour was generated by organizations that were characteristically 
highly intrusive, active, and which assumed the environment was not analysable; thus, they 
constructed the markets. Furthermore, in comparison with alternative types, managers in 
enacting organizations were manipulating the environment, as their shareholders were 
attempting, through a prospector strategy, to always develop something new (Daft and Weick, 
1984). 
The term was explained once again in 1988, when Weick (1988:306) argued that enactment 
involved the synthesis of four lines of thought: self-fulfilment prophecies, retrospective 
sensemaking, commitment, and social information processes. The concept explained that people 
act events and structures into existence and “set them in motion” (Weick, 1988:306). Actors’ 
actions result in the creation of either constraints or opportunities that were not there before, 
therefore enactment involves both a process: enactment and a product: an enacted environment. 
Weick (1988:307) formulates a definition of enactment, stating that it is “the social process by 
which a ‘material and a symbolic record of actions’ is laid down”, and that the process 
encompasses two steps: firstly, parts of the field are brought to attention through bracketing, 
based on preconceptions; and secondly, actions tend to confirm preconceptions. 
When defining an enacted environment, Weick used the phrase: “the residuum of changes 
produced by enactment” (1988:307) to mean that enactment has significant results, which 
cannot be overlooked. The author revisits the idea presented in 1979, which states that every 
action has a consequence, producing a causal map, an “if-then” manner of thinking. Therefore, 
organizations and their environments are formulated in the minds of actors who make sense of 
new experiences through previous encounters, which influence the causal map. Interestingly, 
Weick (1988:307) explained that an enacted environment has two facades: a public one, visible 
to everyone, and a private one, in which actions are related to outcomes, “expectations about 
what will happen in the future”. Furthermore, he explains that commitment (actions made public 
are harder to undo), capacity (“people see those events they feel they have the capacity to do 
something about”), and expectations (self-fulfilling prophecy), are crucial to enactment.  
Triggering events (Weick, 1988:308) determine the actions and “spontaneous reactions” of 
different stakeholders. People enact the environment they face, and were they to act differently, 
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or not act at all; a different environment would confront them. Therefore, enactment is a 
reference to the “making” element of sensemaking (Weick, 1995:31). Explaining triggering 
events, enactment means, “to stumble” into something that is not familiar, and so requires the 
creation of meaning to understand it. The enactment process begins by bracketing portions of 
what is seen and then punctuating and connecting this in “an effort to transform the raw data 
into information” (Weick, 2001:186). Weick continues that one might require additional 
attempts at punctuation before a causal connection/consequence is found, and different 
punctuation can result in different conclusions: “enactment processes generate and bracket the 
raw data, punctuation and connection processes transform the raw data into information and the 
result was the enacted environment” (Weick, 2001:187).  
To demonstrate the process of enactment, Weick (1979; 2001:199), offers the example of an 
experiment conducted with two orchestral organizations, each receiving the same composition, 
but each was then told it was written by a different composer, one more famous than the other. 
As a result of this twist, the environments created were very different; the orchestra believing 
that they were rehearsing a piece by a famous composer put more effort into learning it, 
developing a very low tolerance for failure, while the other orchestra put in only sufficient effort 
to learn it adequately. The musicians did not react to the environment; they enacted the 
environment, “once they have enacted the environment, they are punctuating or breaking that 
environment into discrete events that are available for relating” (Weick, 2001: 199). 
In 2009, Weick added the notion of consequence, positing that enactment extends beyond 
action, as implied when looking at both agency and consequences: “we do something and the 
situation forever changes, and those changes affect us” (Weick, 2009:190). Furthermore, the 
author cites Westwood and Clegg (2003:184, in Weick, 2009:190), affirming, “enactment 
theory appears to provide a more complete explanation of the internal worlds and cognitive 
understanding of the intra-organizational members of the inter-organizational systems.” Weick 
(2009:195) also elucidates that enactment was first mentioned in 1960, and situated in the 
“Zeitgeist”- spirit of time- as a part the social-psychological research, where a common theme 
was of the action defining cognition, existence precedes essence, and rationality has a 
“demonstrable retrospective core.” People create their own fate, as organizations produce their 
own environment, with the result that we are responsible for our own problems. As enactment 
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was first debated in the 1960s and the 1970s, Weick (2009) more recently asked if the term still 
applies. He answered that it does, commenting that learning by trial and error is still part of an 
organization’s reality, although, “the content is different. But the forms through which the 
content flows remain pretty much the same” (Weick, 2009:196).  
To conclude, Weick (1979, 1984, 1988, 1995, 2009) iterates that a sensemaking process needs 
to be triggered by an event that interrupts perceived normalcy and flow. In the moment of 
interruption, the urge to “make” sense of the new situation emerges. Actors begin to look 
retrospectively to see if they can bracket previous experiences, label the new situation, enact on 
plausible rationality, and the result is a new enacted environment. If the latter is not perceived as 
being collectively accepted, reaching a level of intersubjectivity, it can be perceived as an 
interruption per se, thus generating a new enactment process. Furthermore, as Weick (1995) 
argues, what would be perceived as an interruption is dependent on the frame and the 
vocabularies employed in the frame, as seen in figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3. 5 Enactment process. Own creation 
 
Figure 3.5 depicts a synthesis of the way enactment has been theorized, by bracketing the most 
significant points in the theory, namely: trigger of sensemaking – interruptions, acting to 
creating meaning of the interruption based on bracketing and labelling, and enacting a new 
environment. These steps correspond with Weick (1979:134) model, where ‘interruption’ is the 
ecological change, ‘enactment’ includes the selection process, and the ‘enacted environment’ 
refers to retention.    
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As shown, the process is non-linear, and it underlines the managerial cognition events when a 
shock needs to be overcome to act out, and “real-ize” (Weick, 2001:187) the environment.  
As the framework of the seven characteristics of sensemaking proposed by Weick (1995) does 
not explain the process, whereas enactment theory elucidates the processes involved when 
meaning is created, figure 3.5 is compiled with the purpose of being the theoretical framework 
for conducting the analysis in this thesis.  
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Chapter IV: Research Design  
 
But, as ever, we are working with trade-offs- of time, of coherence, and of the 
story which, as researchers want to tell about those we have collected (Sally 
Mailties, 2012:508).  
 
This chapter explores how the research was conducted and the decisions made at the design 
stage. As Sally Mailties (2012) argues, the choices we make as researchers open certain doors to 
some opportunities while simultaneously closing others. Therefore, this chapter is concerned 
with the appropriacy of conducting an ethnographic study to answer the research questions 
posed, and explaining my experience in the field, how the data was collected and analysed.  
By using Karl Weick’s sensemaking theory, explained in Chapter three, as the lens through 
which to study the enactment processes involved in creating a new business model, this research 
is situated within the social constructivist paradigm. According to Weick (1995), reality is an 
ongoing process involving the negotiation and construction of meaning, defining how actors 
enact their reality, in line with this paradigm. Hernes (2008:115) states that sensemaking 
belongs to the domain of social constructivism, claiming, “social constructivism places the 
experience with social actors in the centre, who, through interactions commonly mediated 
through language, enact their reality.” Weick (1995:7), however, is careful to distinguish 
sensemaking from interpretation, presuming that an external reality exists, awaiting actors to 
discover it. However, Weick (1995:34) argues for the normality to oscillate between ontologies 
when studying sensemaking, as people enact their actions, which result most of the time in self-
fulfilling prophecies.  
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“People who study sensemaking oscillate ontologically because that is what helps them 
understand the actions of people in everyday life who could care less about ontology. Noticing 
(Starbuck and Milliken, 1988), manipulation (Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck, 1976), 
interpretation (Isabella, 1990), and framing (Goffman, 1974) are all plausible events in 
sensemaking, even though they represent different combinations of subjective/objective as 
assumptions about the nature of social science and change/regulation as assumptions about the 
nature of society” (Weick, 1995:35).   
 
4.1 Ethnographic Method  
The aim of my study is to further the understanding about the sensemaking processes involved 
in the emergence process of a new business model. My intentions were to study how established 
companies made sense of and develop new business models in contexts where there are pre-
existing strongly embedded ideologies and paradigms (Weick, 1995), and in situations where 
innovations are neither needed nor planned. An ethnographic method is appropriate here 
because the objective is not to analyse an existing model and its development or stagnation over 
time (as for example Aspara et al.’s (2013) case study of Nokia), or the evolution of a model and 
the factors causing change (as for example, Demil and Lecoq’s (2010) case study of Arsenal 
FC), but rather to investigate the processes that allowed a model to arise from intersubjective 
interactions (Weick, 1995) within a company.  
“Ethnography is first and foremost a social practice concerned with the study and 
representation of culture (with a distinctly small c these days). It is an interpretive craft, focused 
more on ‘how’ and ‘why’ than on ‘how much’ or ‘how many’ (Van Maanen, 2011:219). It 
maintains an “obsessive focus on empirics” (Van Maanen, 2006:18) and requires a researcher to 
embed herself in the field to observe, hear and experience how processes unfold. An 
ethnographer “does not study organizations, but they study in organizations” (Van Maanen, 
2011:221); therefore, she must be in the field and be accepted by the natives, in order to 
understand their culture. An ethnographer should not only hear the “native’s” words, but also try 
to “get inside their heads” (Van Maanen, 2011:227), to follow their actions and their reactions to 
their own actions. Van Maanen (2011:228) explains that an ethnographer seeks “to penetrate 
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their (native’s) subjectivity,” to capture the creation of meaning and formulate an interpretation 
of that meaning. 
Brewet (in Cassell and Symon, 2004:312) explains that ethnography is: 
“The study of people in naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by means of methods which 
capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving the researcher participating 
directly in the setting, if not also the activities, in order to collect data in a systematic 
manner but without meaning being imposed on them externally.” 
Furthermore, Brewet (in Cassell and Symon, 2004) explains that ethnography affords the 
possibility of exploiting a variety of data gathering techniques, ranging from different kinds of 
interviews, to participant observations, and visual recording methods. Therefore, “ethnography 
routinely builds in triangulation of method because it involves the use of multiple methods of 
data collection” (Brewet, in Cassell and Symon, 2004:312).  
I began this thesis with the intention of conducting a longitudinal case study (Flyvbjer, 2006; 
Yin, 2008). However, through interactions with the field, it became apparent that it was 
necessary for me to develop a more intimate approach with the ‘natives’, to fully witness the 
manifestations of ideologies and paradigms at the company (Weick, 1995). Additionally, I 
entered the field in the middle of the creation of Woodstock, the subject of my study that is 
explained further in this chapter, which made possible for me to witness the sensemaking 
processes allowing this creation for more than one hear and a half.  Thus, an ethnographic 
approach enabled me to explore beyond protocols (Eisenhardt, 1989:537) and to follow the 
actors as they endeavoured to enact a new business model. Therefore, I not only engaged in 
interviewing the actors involved in the processes of enactment, but also followed their formal 
and informal meetings, summer and Christmas parties, and the celebrations of small, but 
important, successes organized in the private households of the team members. I also undertook 
factory visits to observe both successful and unsuccessful development attempts, lunches, coffee 
breaks, and Friday morning departmental breakfasts. Whilst at the company, I held occasional 
discussions with people passing by my desk who stopped to talk about my research. In this way, 
I made myself available for multiple encounters in various scenarios during my stay in the case 
company. 
 91 
Moreover, taking an ethnographic stance allowed me to witness the “ongoing flow of events” 
(Weick, 1995:2) that characterized the development of Woodstock’s business model. My focus 
was on the interruptions and the resultant selection and retention choices made to overcome 
these “shocks” (Weick, 1995:84), as explained in Chapter 3. This was crucial, as my principal 
aim was to understand processes, not structures (Weick, 1995), specifically how people achieve 
collective intersubjectivity (Weick, 1995) and create meaning when devising a new business 
model. Thus, I employed an ethnomethodology “to examine management sensemaking and the 
social construction of organizations” (Gephart, 1993: 1467), which “allows investigations of the 
practices through which an intersubjective world is produced and maintained” (Gephart, 
1993:1469). Gephart quotes Heap (1975:1469), who affirmed, “ethnomethodology is the science 
of sensemaking” and allows the researcher to comprehend the ongoing process of meaning 
creation and the “how” behind it. Furthermore, ethnomethodology is concerned with the 
everyday interactions of actors in their institutional setting, reviewing their actions and the 
“methods they deploy in their everyday lives” to create sense (Pollner and Emerson, 2001). 
Weick (1995) argues that interruptions proceeding from pre-existing norms would compel 
managers to act, and that their responses would determine the trajectory of the interruption. In 
the emergence process of Woodstock, i.e., when taking it from an idea to market, several 
“shocks” had to be overcome to allow the development process. Each of these “shocks” was 
identified and analysed. For example, the industry Woodstock was designated for required the 
implementation of high liability measures, which the company had never needed to do before. 
This was perceived as a “problem” (Interview project manager); however, the approach taken 
was to learn what offering a warranty implied for both the company, and the product, to then act 
based on an understanding of this, to be able to emulate current practices within the industry.  
On my field trips, I spent time with managers who were encountering situations in which they 
actively had to devise meanings for a new product with very different production requirements 
and settings from those they knew about, to service a new market, a new supply chain, and a 
new revenue model mechanism. Van Maanen (2006:18) underlines this by observing: “surprise, 
frame breaking, and exceptions to the norm shape the analytic domain of ethnography.”  
 
 92 
4.2 Gaining access to the field  
“You’re not an engineer, so you can stay!” 
Van Maanen (2006, 2011a, 2011b) explains that the most important step when planning an 
ethnographic study is to ensure the researcher gains entrance to the field. Organizational 
fieldwork provides the opportunity to understand managers’ struggles and claims, and to see 
how meanings are created out of inspirational eureka moments, frustrating long meetings, or 
informal chats at the coffee machine. 
After months of reading about companies’ endeavours to understand what a business model is 
and how it is created, I decided to leave my “ivory tower” and enter the field (Van Maanen, 
2011:219). My supervisor and I had frequently discussed the case of Pinta Inc., and their attempt 
to produce a solution to help window manufacturers fulfil the new EU 2020 requirements 
regarding thermal insulation. Although the company had never supplied this industry before, the 
vice-president of innovation believed strongly that the proposed idea would succeed. All he 
needed to do was create a business plan and convince the group’s management to invest, even 
though the company’s portfolio was stable and there was no articulated need to embark on a 
new line of business (VP R&D, 2013). We concluded, that this would be an excellent case study 
setting in which to answer my research question, as it offered an opportunity to study new 
model development in an established company, and so we arranged a meeting with the vice-
president.  
Despite his reservations about the relevance of my project, the vice-president agreed to meet me, 
as he was very accustomed to students using Pinta Inc. as a case study. Ultimately, as I am not 
an engineer, and so would not understand the technical issues involved in the product 
development and would not be in a position to take secrets outside the company’s walls, it was 
agreed that I could conduct the study. The logistics were then solved very quickly. I received a 
non-disclosure contract to sign, a secure entry card, a desk close to the vice-president’s desk and 
access to the intranet and share point, on which all the documents were shared. My access was 
restricted to group development, material classified as R&D, and Woodstock, the focus of my 
study, documents only. A couple of days later an announcement was made on the intranet that 
“a new Ph.D. student from CBS has started in the company, with focus on the innovation 
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processes.” The company did not hire me, but as I had to be registered on the internal system, to 
access Pinta Inc. mail, it was decided to categorize me as an external consultant.  
Once inside the company, I was allowed to network my way in, and I soon came to realize that 
Woodstock was at the intersection of two cultural paradigms (Weick, 1995) and I needed to gain 
acceptance from both: the team developing Woodstock (called R&D team in my study; not to be 
confused with the entire R&D department) and Business Unit (the business unit owner of 
Woodstock).  
Entering R&D in Pinta Inc. was like arriving at a playground where ideas were circulating 
freely. Proudly, people spoke passionately to me about their inventions, and it was never enough 
to talk about projects: “you really need to see this!” And I saw it: dozen of prototypes on the 
shelf, each with their own story and waiting to be taken “above the radar” (common practice in 
the innovation strategy of Pinta Inc., where ideas could be developed under the radar, and once 
it gained enough credibility, would be moved above the radar and considered a project, practice 
brought it by the company’s new R&D vice-president) and eventually to market. Nobody knew 
when the “right moment” would come, one of the engineers explained to me. The atmosphere 
was welcoming in R&D, and people were eager to speak to me. I was grateful for the ease with 
which I was integrated into the group and I soon learnt that I needed to “look like an engineer.” 
In my early days at the company, I had a formal interview with the business director of Business 
Unit 4. I had chosen formal, business attire for the day. I was at the company at 8.30 and my 
interview was scheduled at 14.00 in the afternoon. I remember that as a special day, as people 
looked at me differently and asked me why I had decided to be so formal. One of the young 
engineers approached me with some advice: “I just hope you have a pair of jeans in your bag, 
for after the interview, or at least some other shoes. People are looking weirdly at you.” I did, I 
changed my high heels for a pair of converse shoes to conform, and people began smiling at me 
again.  
I was seen as part of the team, and as such, I got invited to all their informal events, including 
summer parties, Christmas parties, celebration of Woodstock’s success, team-building exercises. 
At one of the team building sessions, I received a diploma saying: “For being our fly on the 
wall,” see figure 4.1. That diploma is still in my office.  
 
 94 
 
 
Figure 4. 1 'Fly on the wall.' Field trip document 
 
An important factor informing the atmosphere among the development team at Woodstock was 
the Business Unit (BU), as represented by the business developer and business director of the 
unit. Even though not in the same building, as they are situated in The Netherlands, BU was 
very present and always at the back of people’s minds when decisions were being taken. As BU 
were the owners of Woodstock, the development team sought to create cues that would 
convince them of the potential of their product. I was told several times, “They are very different 
in their mind-set; they are really business people”. Business Unit played a pivotal role in the 
emergence process of Woodstock’s business model, and, consequently, I needed to understand 
their meaning as well. I had my first meeting with the business development direct of BU, 
engineer, being in Pinta Inc. for more than seventeen years. At my first meeting with him, I was 
welcomed with a very high level of suspicion and not allowed to record our discussion, in spite 
of repeatedly assuring him of my confidentiality. “I don’t like what you are doing here” he told 
me while looking straight into my eyes. I listened to his argument that my research was neither 
“tangible” nor “needed”, and I responded to his comments using the ‘business model canvas’ 
(Osterwalder et al., 2010), to explain the logic behind having a business model approach instead 
of a product innovation approach. I have used mainly the arguments underlined by Bucherer et 
al. (2012) in their study. He liked my drawing and began to discuss it with me. The canvas 
helped him to acquire the “tangibility” he had felt that the term “business model” from my 
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discourse was lacking. I also learnt at the meeting that he had never worked with the term 
himself. From that time forward, I always had the canvas with me, to use if necessary. His 
position remained hostile during my entire stay at Pinta Inc., and the information I gathered 
from Business Unit was all subjected to his review for approval.  
I entered the field in April 2013 and I left in January 2015, as shown in table 4.3, when 
Woodstock was officially declared closed in the R&D department, being moved to BU. 
 
 
4.3 Data Collection 
    “Being our fly on the wall” 
Ethnography offers the researcher the prospect of witnessing the lives of those being studied 
closely; furthermore, the longer the time a researcher spends in the field, the deeper the level of 
knowledge and understanding acquired. Data can be collected via both formal and informal 
interviews and recordings, all kind of data, documents, and artefacts can be gathered to build an 
understanding of the studied culture (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:7). Van Maanen 
(2011:229) explains that ethnography helps researchers to see beyond the words and statements 
made by people, because they are able to see what they actually do. Gradually, the community 
studied forgets it is being observed, and people remove their masks.  
From my first day in Pinta Inc., the inventor of Woodstock showed a particular interest in 
speaking to me. His eagerness to tell me the story of Woodstock, and how it had begun helped 
me to draw a map of the actors involved and to become acquainted with the chronology of the 
events. I understood that I needed to pay special attention to discovering what happened during 
the first three years of development. Therefore, I accessed all the documents available on share 
point; including the minutes of project meetings, gate meetings, steering meetings, and 
conclusions reached over the years, as evidenced in project proposals, and power point 
presentations. In total, 197 documents were available on share points as per April 2013, when I 
entered the company. Furthermore, during 2013, 2014 and the first month of 2015 a further 120 
files were generated, resulting in a total of 317 internal documents, approximately 1300 pages to 
be analysed. Table 4.2 presents a breakdown of the number of documents, per type of meeting, 
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each year. The “other documents” section of the table comprises documents for other meetings 
outside those mentioned, including budgets, excel files, and proposals for organizational 
structures.  
 
Year/type of 
meeting 
(End) 2009-
2010 
2011 2012 2013 2014- 
(beginning) 
2015 
Project Meetings 9 41 41 43 46 
Steering Meetings 0 13 7 22 17 
Gate Meetings 1 0 3 0 3 
Other documents  16 8 11 7 29 
Total internal documents: 317 (ca. 1300 pages) 
Table 4. 1 Total of internal documents analysed 
 
Aside from internal documents, I was a “fly on the wall” at eighteen project meetings, eight 
steering meetings and two strategy meetings. Furthermore, I conducted 31 formal (Van Maneen, 
2011), semi-structured interviews, including feedback sessions with the vice-president of 
innovation, portfolio manager, and project manager, in order to validate my understanding of 
development steps. The interviews took place with employees at different managerial levels: 
a. Senior managerial level, with the aim of understanding the company’s corporate 
business model, and context in which Woodstock was developed; Weick (1995) talks 
about the importance of knowing “what is the story?” first.  The purpose of these 
interviews was to understand the type of vocabularies they were drawing on in their 
arguments. People were talking both about the company per se, in terms of what was 
perceived as being “Pinta Inc.’s way of doing things” or “Pinta Inc.’s DNA,” and the 
difference in mind-sets between business units. I have localized Pinta Inc.’s DNA as 
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being the ideology, namely the social context of the company (Weick, 1995), while the 
difference between departments, as paradigms/ vocabularies of work.  
b. Project development team and middle management involved in the creation of 
Woodstock, with the aim of understanding how the identity of the project came into 
being. Weick (1995:77) affirms, “Who am I and once a tentative answer is formulated, 
sensemaking has just started, because answers need to be re-accomplished, returned, and 
sometimes even rebuilt.”  
Table 4.3 summarizes the formal interactions I had in the field. The recordings were between 45 
minutes and three hours; 58 interactions had been recorded, 1 interaction resulted in notes 
because recording was not allowed, 50 were transcribed and analysed with Nvivo. The nine files 
that were not transcribed were project meetings held in Danish. However, I worked with those 
files as well. The transcriptions totalled approximately 2000 pages.  
 
Table 4. 2 Formal interactions within the field 
 
The informal meetings (Van Maneen, 2011) I attended played an important role in helping me to 
understand the frame (Weick, 1995). As outlined above, I integrated very quickly into the 
development team. People were curious about my role, my research, my background, and I was 
considered “exotic”, as I am Romanian and speak Danish at an acceptable level. Answering 
questions about my home country and my relocation to Denmark were often a very good 
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icebreaker. I was honest in my answers, and in exchange received the same level of honesty 
back. People shared with me their life stories, pictures of their families, their struggles, and their 
hopes. Often, even in the setting of a formal interview, after I closed the door to the room, the 
interviewee would begin sharing a painful point or express his/her frustrations, with no fear of 
the recorder. I was seen as a neutral listener, and I assured them of confidentiality. I attended 
organized social gatherings and received private invitations to visit people’s homes. I recorded 
all these interactions, together with my reflections, in a field journal in as much detail as 
possible after the event, as I did not want to make notes at the time and lose eye contact. I was in 
the field twice a week, sometimes three times, depending on meetings, with breaks in holidays. 
In the last four months, before the handover of the project to the business unit, I only been ones 
a week for the project meetings, and attended the last three steering meetings.  
As mentioned above, the inventor of Woodstock frequently looked for opportunities to speak 
with me, to share his ideas, and show me his inventions. He also asked me about my opinions 
and my understanding of Pinta Inc., saying: “you are not an engineer, so tell me what you 
think?” We had numerous fruitful conversations, and I introduced him to Abbie Griffin’s book, 
Serial Innovators. He later proudly told me “I could recognize myself in that”, identifying in 
himself the characteristics of an innovator who sees solutions and opportunities where others do 
not. At the end of the study, I offered him the book to reflect my gratitude for all the interesting 
discussions we had had. 
An exciting resource for learning about Pinta Inc. history and its developments was the Pinta 
Inc. museum, located at headquarters. The museum was in a long hallway and a room with walls 
covered with pictures telling the story of the company, which I visited as a field trip one day. 
This visit allowed me to add numerous pictures to my data collection process and attain a better 
understanding of the almost eighty-years old company I was studying.  
I had to exit the field in January 2015, when Woodstock was officially closed in R&D and took 
over by its business unit. I still had access to the intranet, as a remote consultant. I went back to 
my ivory tower and used the remainder of the time left to write up the study.  
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4.4 Data Analysis 
Saldana (2011) explains that coding can be used to analyse qualitative data, and that it is the first 
step in a rigorous analysis. Saldana (2011) continues to explain that coding begins in the field, 
when the researcher applies certain theoretical filters to see the answers to her questions. 
Furthermore, he argues that coding is cyclical, as data usually requires multiple rounds of 
coding. Miles and Huberman (1994:57) advise researchers to embark on coding from the 
moment they begin data collection. By doing so, this ensures “chunks” of data can be organized 
and readily clustered into different themes.  
I coded and analysed the data collected at Pinta Inc. with the help of Nvivo software. For the 
first level of coding I used a filter (Saldana, 2011), devised based on the theory of business 
models, as “one could not pick up rocks without some sort of theory to guide them” (Van 
Maanen 2011: 222). I had predefined codes (Miles and Huberman, 1994:58) from Chesbrough 
and Rosembloom (2002) based on their definition of the functions of a business model. This 
step has resulted into dividing my data into seven categories: value proposition, customer 
(market), value chain, cost, profit (pricing related talks), value network, and competitive 
strategy. The second level of coding involved a longitudinal type of coding (Saldana, 2011: 236) 
during which the focus was on reviewing the data through the enactment conceptual framework 
(Weick, 1995), discussed in chapter 3.  In this phase I was searching for interruptions (Weick, 
1995), which were perceived interruptions by the actors involved in Woodstock project, and 
identified as such in the actors’ own words. Therefore, events defined as being “shock,” 
“surprise”, “showstopper”,” crisis”, “conflict”, “problem”, and “major risk,” were classified as 
an interruption. A total number of 197 interruptions, dispersed across all seven elements were 
identified. As noticed that several interruptions were related to the same event, most of them 
could be grouped further, and it resulted in a number of 30 events, perceived as interruptions 
that required an enactment process. See figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4. 2 Identified interruptions per business model element. First and second round of coding 
 
Furthermore, market and customer strategy were brought together under the same interruptions, 
and cost was only related to the production costs as part of the value chain. The interruptions of 
revenue models were related to the lack of knowledge on how to price a premium product as 
Woodstock.  
After writing chapter six, where the enactment processes of every element of the business model 
was analysed, a new theme emerged. The elements were links together in different moments of 
time, into a cause-effect relation. Therefore, the data resulted from the second round of coding 
was coded again looking after cause-effect relation between elements. These are analysed in 
chapter VII.  
The approach taken when theorizing from the empirical material was an abductive one, as the 
purpose of my study is to “problematize and re-think the dominating ideas and theories” 
(Alvesson and Karreman, 2011:57) of business models. When building the argument for 
abductive research, Alvesson and Karreman (2011:57) quote Weick (1989) to explain that 
abduction assists researchers in uncovering new relationships not previously known. In this way, 
the researcher can develop theory, instead of simply validating earlier theories.  
“The contribution of social science does not lie in validated knowledge, but rather in the 
suggestions of relationships and connections that had not previously been suspected, 
relationships that change actions and perspectives” Weick (1989:524). 
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4.5 Writing up! 
 
“How can I know what I think until I see what I say?”  asks Weick (1995: 18), and I have asked 
myself several times while writing up this monograph “How can I know what I think until I see 
what I write?”  
I was in a field where the phenomenon I was studying was unfolding in front of my eyes, even 
by event. Many of these events had roots in a recent past, and I had to “go back in time to events 
that might have later given rise to understanding (or confusion)” (Van Maanen, 2011:105).  
It was a learning process for me to witness their learning process in enacting Woodstock’ 
business model. In writing, I had to create meaning out of the thousands of pages of empirical 
material, in such a way that I would show respect to that learning process, both mine, and 
especially theirs. Therefore, both an impressionist and realist style (Van Maanen, 2011) has 
guided my writing.  
The impressionist style (Van Maanen, 2011:101) has helped me in “converting the temporal 
nature of the fieldwork into the spatial organization for the text” (Van Maanen, 2011:106). I 
used this style for writing about my interaction with the field, about the events and 
conversations I have witnessed, from mid-2013 until end 2014. Furthermore, it guided me in 
creating a flow of the events I analysed in chapter six. However, while having focus on bringing 
forward the most “exceptional (events), as we learn more from them” (Van Maanen, 2011:108), 
I have also tried to keep as accurate as possible the chronological order of these interruptions.   
A realist style (Van Maanen, 2011:45) was employed for describing the beginnings of 
Woodstock, generation 1 and first years of generation 3, as related in the internal documents. 
Furthermore, in this style, I have put in my text accurate quotations to show “authentic and 
representative remarks transcribed straight from the horse’s mouth” (Van Maanen, 2011:49).  
This oscillation is in alignment with sensemaking theory, as Weick (1995:35) argues: “People 
who study sensemaking oscillate ontologically because that is what helps them understand the 
actions of people in everyday life” 
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Lastly, along the analysis conducted in chapter five, six and seven, I have used the vocabulary 
brought forward by sensemaking theory, in chapter three.   
The next chapters, five, six, and seven represent my analysis.  
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CHAPTER V: Analysis of Context for Sensemaking 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to provide an analysis of the empirical case study, to detail the situation that 
triggered sensemaking processes, leading to the emergence of a new business model inside an 
established company. Weick (1995:110) explains that sensemaking consist of three main 
elements: a frame, a cue and a connection. Sense is made of a new situation when the cue, 
which is the perceived stimulus, gets connected with the frame, namely the existing context. 
Therefore, the scope of this chapter is to introduce the cue, which is the discovery of a new 
technology, and the frame where this has happened, the case company. Additionally, the 
connection between the cue and the frame is addressed in Chapter six, through Weick’s 1979 
enactment theory.  
This sequence cue, frame, connection, dictates the structure of this chapter. Therefore, the 
chapter first introduces Woodstock by explaining its peculiarities and why it was perceived of as 
a stimulus for the sensemaking process. This section is followed by an analysis of the frame, 
thus the company where the innovation process took place. In this section the focus is on 
company’s history, its business models and manner how the expression ‘business model’ is 
employed. Further, the main actors involved in Woodstock’s creation and their relation is 
analysed.  
This chapter is closed with conclusions and an answer to the research question that has guided 
the chapter:  
What frame did managers draw on when developing Woodstock and why was Woodstock 
perceived as a sensemaking trigger? 
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As presented in Chapter 1, the company will be addressed as Pinta Inc., and the name of the 
project is Woodstock. Woodstock was created as a high thermal insulating product intended to 
supply the window industry, an industry never served before by Pinta Inc. The project evolved 
over time, advancing from generation 1 (G1 hereafter) insulation placed inside the frame of a 
window, see fig. 5.1 (the thin line inside the wood frame), to a solution applied on the outside of 
the window frame, named Generation 3 (G3 hereafter), see fig. 5.2 (the entire black cover of the 
window frame).   
Originating within the context of an incumbent company, the development of Woodstock’s 
business model from idea to market passed through different stages, encountering numerous 
interruptions and critical moments along the way, resulting in interesting approaches to enacting 
solutions that ultimately allowed Woodstock to survive and reach the marketplace, provides the 
focus of this study.  
                                  
Figure 5. 1 Woodstock Generation 1                                 Figure 5. 2 Woodstock Generation 3 
 
 
5.2 Analysis of the cue: Woodstock 
 
When I entered the company, Pinta Inc. A/S had had the same CEO for more than ten years. 
Serving in the company for more than seventeen years at that time, he had held various 
managerial positions, on his way up to the top. This type of advancement up the ranks of the 
company was a practice I witnessed often at Pinta. Proudly speaking about the company, the 
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CEO (Interview, 2013) explained that Pinta Inc. A/S was known as one of the world’s leading 
producers of stone wool, a product made from both natural stone and recycled slag. He told me, 
the company operates in more than 35 countries and has circa 11, 000 employees. It was 
founded in 1909, as a family business, manufacturing tiles and extracting marl, gravel and coal. 
From 1937 onwards, it began to focus on “melting stone and creating insulation material that 
cannot burn”, to attain a competitive advantage (CEO, Interview 2013).   
In 2009, the idea of becoming a supplier to the window industry, a market never served before, 
was born. It would question Pinta’s innovation routines, manner of productions, and its 
approach to constructing “routes to market”- this was the manner CEO (2013) defined a 
business model.  This project was named Woodstock, and it was intended as a solution for 
window manufacturers, faced by regulations formulated as part of the EU 2020 agenda. The 
latter required the former to increase the insulation proprieties of their products, as 40% of 
building heat is lost through the frame of a window (Industry report, 2013).  These requirements 
were labelled as “an opportunity” for the company, since its new strategy, developed in the 
same time frame, would be to make it possible to produce a “building envelope, being able to 
insulate an entire façade of a building” (Vice president, R&D, 2013). Considering this strategy, 
offering an insulation solution for the window industry was perceived as aligned with the values 
of the company. Therefore, the first documents released internally describing the project, 
underline both its fit within the company and the important business potential of expanding into 
formerly unknown markets: 
“There is a need for better insulated windows, including the frames; requirements are 
increasing and new standards are under way. Windows are an integrated part of the 
building envelope; our strategic target is energy efficiency. Contributing to energy 
efficient houses by supplying materials for windows fits our brand and values. The market 
is significant and thus poses a significant potential turnover and profit. There are today 
several solutions on the market, but we will bring a competitive product both cost and 
performance wise.” (Internal document, Vice President, R&D, 2009) 
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“This is the part that shall develop the aerogel composites further, and also explore new 
business models in markets currently unknown to us; like window frames, doors etc.” 
(Internal document, Senior Project Manager, 2009) 
This external cues arising from the EU2020 strategy coincided with the research and 
development department (R&D hereafter) at Pinta Inc.’s development of a new technology that 
would allow their stone wool fibre to raise thermal capture properties to a very high level (CEO, 
interview 2013).  The management team believed in the new technology and began the process 
of bringing it to market; initially by investing in it and building a new factory to serve the 
project. Unfortunately, the technology proved to be too expensive, and the project was halted, 
resulting in a significant stock of finalized products, as there had been significant investment in 
a new factory, now empty, and the development of a new technology, now unexploited (CEO, 
interview 2013). After R&D shelved this project, they began seeking alternative applications. In 
the meantime, a new Vice President (VP R&D hereafter) for innovation was named. Having a 
long career in the windows industry, VP R&D was familiar with the struggles faced by it. 
Therefore, he proposed the new technology to be employed to solve EU2020 demands imposed 
on the windows industry. This idea was received with enthusiasm by the group’s management 
and the Woodstock project was born, without any notion of the disruptive effect it would have 
on the company. 
The conflicts that arose during Woodstock’s development were associated with the initial 
financial and temporal expectations defined internally. In term of temporal expectations, 
Woodstock was labelled as “fast” (Internal document, 2009) and was expected to move from 
development to market in less than two years. However, it had gone through numerous changes 
as it evolved from generations 1 to 3, and it was under development for approximately six years. 
When comparing it to a spin off project, which was brought to market in less than one year, with 
registered profits, one of the senior project managers affirmed: “That is considered a success in 
Pinta Inc., while Woodstock is struggling and management is wondering why so many 
investments are needed after so many years” (Senior Project Manager, Interview 2013). In terms 
of financial expectations, the project has exceeded the initial plans considerably, as it had a 
development process of six years, with a major changed of scope, when going to generation 3.  
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In was a generally expressed opinion that the project represented a challenge to the company, as 
the product differed from its previous portfolio, especially given the fine manner in which the 
stone fibres process was conducted for obtaining the final binder. The quality of the binder, 
which had never been questioned before, was questioned now by Woodstock, as it was a vital 
feature to the success of the product. Words like “very different from everything we have done 
before” (Engineer, 2013) were employed frequently when describing the product and explaining 
the slow development process for both the technology and business model. Furthermore, the 
vice-president of innovation had tried to convey the message that the company had not the skills 
and competencies for developing such as product: 
“Our organization today does not possess the skills/experience (at all levels) in 
introducing this kind of product, and that there is a significant risk of underestimating the 
complexity of all the issues outside the pure technical performance. These elements must 
receive extra attention” (Internal document, 2011).  
The project was perceived thus in contrasting manners, as being either “just a small component” 
or a disruptive innovation for the market to serve:  
 “Woodstock is not a bulk product, as we are used to, and requires special attention” 
(Project meeting minutes, March, 2012) 
 “A project that wants to establish Pinta Inc.in the global market for windows based on a 
new composite” (Senior project manager, 2013) 
 “A small project, that challenges us a bit. I am not sure it is well run, as we have spent 
too much money on it. I think it would probably end up being somewhere in between 
mediocre and too expensive to stop” (CEO, 2013) 
  “It is going to disturb the window industry! I’m sure some in the windows industry will 
perceive our product as a highly disruptive technology coming into the industry. 
Because they do not know what it is and it will make a huge impact! I’m sure we’ll 
create some confusion in the industry, and that is quite exciting to watch!  (VP, R&D, 
2013) 
 “We have never used customer co-creation before as in Woodstock and that made a huge 
difference for the development process” (Program Director, 2013) 
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 It is a product with features where services are needed, and, in my view, that is a simple 
business model, route to market. You can choose another route to market and ask why 
aren’t we a total windows frame? We have chosen not to do that based on complexity, 
the market is pretty complex, it is not such an easy market! Maybe it is too complex for 
us; maybe we are too stupid for it (System Division Director, 2014). 
 “It is a project where we are bound to go back and improve the quality of our binders 
for the first time. It is not important for our products that go inside walls and you never 
see them, but it is imperative for Woodstock. Woodstock is visible. That is why it needs a 
different kind of production process” (People Process manager, 2014) 
 “A very small component of a window, so why do we need to produce everything 
inside?” (Business Director, 2014) 
 “Why do we continue spending money on and developing something that's not the core 
business?” (Group Management, 2014) 
 
Mapping out the actors involved in the project and the role played by them in developing 
Woodstock technology and business model, I observed the following: 
 A team was formed from inside R&D, which will be referred to as R&D hereafter (not to 
be confused with the entire R&D department), conceived the project. The team 
comprised of a project manager, a portfolio manager, three technical engineers, and a 
production manager. As Woodstock became more complex, the team expanded with 
experts in paint, stuff for production, and several interns assisting with tasks. In 2013 a 
shift in the project management position happened. The initial project manager of 
Woodstock, which was the inventor of it, was changed with another one based on the 
argument that “from now on we need someone more process oriented, capable in 
finishing things. The discovery period is done” (VP, R&D, Interview 2013); signalling 
the evolution of Woodstock.  
However, increasing the number of people in the team was a slow process, showing a 
certain resistance to change. “We have hired a paint specialist in R&D?  This is 
ridiculous! When have we ever needed one?” asked one of the engineers during an 
interview.   
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 The Business unit (BU hereafter), was the pointed business unit in charge of taking 
ownership of the business development of the product and its route to market. Thus, BU 
was the internal customer for Woodstock. In the BU, two actors were involved during in 
the entire process, the director of the unit and a senior business developer, both of them 
being at Pinta Inc. for approximately twenty years. In the last six months towards the 
handover of Woodstock from R&D to BU, the business unit has gotten a new director, as 
the previous one has retired. The new director has been in Pinta Inc. for seventeen years. 
Moreover, a key account manager was hired in the last year of development.  
 Customer co-creator (Co-creator hereafter): Woodstock had from the outset a strong 
partnership with a windows producer. This became a strong partnership, offering a co-
creation role for Woodstock, while teaching Pinta Inc. new ways to engage in innovation 
activities.  
 Vice-president of innovation: the person who became both the convergent point and the 
mediator in negotiations and conflict instances between BU and R&D team, and the 
defender of Woodstock in front of group management. 
 Other actors who became involved in the project at important moments were the newly 
created marketing group, group management, and the CEO. Furthermore, the production 
factory for Woodstock boards, situated abroad, as well as the suppliers for different 
components of the product, which were considered development partners, played a 
significant role. Their impact is analysed in Chapter six.  
As evidenced in chapter six, interruptions in Woodstock’s development arose from inside the 
company, and they resulted especially from the interactions between these different actors and 
their expectations, driven by own retrospective sensemaking.  
In terms of sequence of the events3, see fig. 5.3, Woodstock began with Generation 1, as a 
laminated inside component of a window frame. As this version proved to result in an overly 
expensive business model, the decision was taken to move to a Generation 2 model. G2, referred 
to an internal laminated component, but with a visible part, so the Woodstock components 
would require painting. Again, this was not a financially viable option and was short-lived. 
Thus, G3 was proposed, and the decision made to change the design completely and move 
                                                     
3 A timeline can be drawn to a certain extent, as many of the activities have overlapped  
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Woodstock to the front of the window frame. Fig. 5.3 gives a snapshot of the events that have 
marked Woodstock’s development until the moment of handover to its business owner.
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The identification of these events was done together with both the project managers and 
portfolio manager, who were asked to pinpoint key moments, positive and negative, in 
Woodstock development. Fig. 5.3 attempts to order them chronologically, and makes the 
difference between events that have had an impact and been present during the entire period, 
such as the co-creation partnership, the building of a pilot plant at Pinta Inc. premises, and one-
time events such as missing launching campaigns, or having a very successful one, firing and 
hiring a new CEO, hiring further skills. All the events are analysed further in Chapter six.  
In terms of the organizational chart, Woodstock was established as a project inside R&D and 
planned to be anchored in BU organization according to the rationale that Woodstock was not 
an autonomous entity. Therefore, BU was responsible for the business development and sale of 
the product from the G1 phase, while the plan in the long term was that BU would take over the 
entire project from R&D (Steering meeting minutes, May, 2011).  
To understand why Woodstock was considered the trigger for a long sensemaking process, it is 
important to understand the frame, the context, as Weick (1995) suggests. Therefore, the next 
section analyses the parent company, Pinta Inc. 
 
 
5.3 Analysis of the context: Pinta Inc. A/S 
 
Without a supplied context, objects and events have equivocal or multiple 
meanings. (Weick, 1995:52) 
Chapter three explains that sensemaking involves placing a stimulus into a framework, a “frame 
of reference” to direct interpretation (Weick, 1995:4) according to a context that determines 
which cues would be noticed, and which actions taken. The context of this thesis was Pinta Inc., 
a company being on the market for more that eighty years! During these years, certain types of 
“beliefs about cause-effect, preferences for certain outcomes, and expectations of appropriate 
behaviours” (Weick, 1995:111) have been developed inside the company, which I localized it in 
the vocabularies of society, namely ideology (Weick, 1995:111). The ideology was drawn on 
every time someone wanted to underline that Woodstock was different, and a challenge, not 
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only for the R&D team or its business unit, but also for the company per se.  In this light, 
Woodstock was defined as: “very unusual for us to do that” (CEO, 2013), “we have no such 
reasoning in Pinta Inc., why would we dilute our brand?” (CEO, 2013); “it is not in our DNA, 
and that provokes people” (VP, R&D, 2014).  
As presented above, Pinta Inc., a family business, was a global player in the insulation industry, 
present in more than 35 countries, having significant success on the market. The fact that Pinta 
Inc. is characterized as a “family business,” was emphasized several times by management, in 
order to explain that decisions need to go through an extra filter, “the family”: “Thinking about 
being the CEO, now it is about the chemistry with the board, and with the shareholders, and in 
this case that is the family” (Managing Director Business Unit, 2014). The family, which 
created Pinta Inc. Foundation owns 23% of the share capital, the remainder being divided 
among the General Meeting of Shareholders, the Boards of Directors and the Group 
Management.  
Reflecting on history of Pinta Inc., several important milestones can be observed to have shifted 
the trajectory of the business. Firstly, in 1935 Pinta Inc. bought the rights to produce and sell 
stone wool to insulate buildings in Scandinavia. Just a couple of years later, the company had 
changed its name and registered the Pinta Inc. trademark, which is considered “one of the 
largest assets in the Pinta Inc. Group, […] well protected and defended by us throughout the 
world” (Pinta Inc., Annual report, 2015).  Secondly, over the years, Pinta Inc. underwent several 
changes in response to exogenous events such as World War II and the oil crisis in the 1970s, 
which took the company in the direction of diversification of its value proposition to include a 
larger range of products based on stone wool technology. To expand beyond insulation, Pinta 
Inc. started to create partitions for floors, ceilings and walls, acoustic products, and soil, 
substituting water-absorbing mineral wool products. This change in the business model 
determined the division of Pinta Inc. into two major business divisions: insulation (77%) and 
systems (23%) (Pinta Inc. Annual Report 2014), bringing a turnover of about €2,000 million in 
2014 (Annual report, 2014). Since 2010, Pinta Inc. has registered steady growth, and its forecast 
for 2016 pinpoints to EBIT above €170 million (see Table 5. 1 for the financial evolution of 
Pinta Inc. for 2011-2015). 
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Table 5. 1 Five-year summary for the financial evolution of Pinta Inc. Source: Pinta Inc. Annual Report, 
2015 
 
The final exogenous factor that prompted the CEO to affirm that it was time for change in the 
company was the recent financial crisis. When hit by the crisis in 2008 the CEO proposed a new 
strategy, asking the company to shift from its traditional manner of doing business, “pushing 
everything into our distributing channels” (CEO, 2013), moving towards “changing our model 
into putting system together” (CEO, 2013). The company was, at that point in time, coming 
from the very privileged situation of achieving very high returns despite minimal effort on 
marketing (CEO, 2013).  However, the crisis made the Group realized that they needed to be 
more market oriented.  
 
Unfortunately, at the beginning of 2000, the company was in the situation that they could 
sell everything they had, which made no sense in having a customer driven strategy. 
Whatever kilogram of stone wool we could squeeze out of the machine, the customers 
would be screaming to get it. In 2007, we could sell everything, but the crisis came and 
the building market was hit. (Managing Director Business Unit, 2014) 
The new strategy, which was revisited several times after its inception (VP, R&D), proposed 
challenging the ideology of Pinta Inc., such as:  
 115
 
a. Not having any interaction with the market and, therefore, with the customer:  
“We need to become customer centric and put customers at the centre of our decision 
making when innovating” (CEO, 2013) 
b. Customer-driven innovation needs to be coupled with a market strategy. Pinta Inc., 
because of its strategy, was to get a Group Marketing department for the first time in its 
history.  
c. Being more focused on system divisions and becoming a system provider. 
d. Having a decentralized structure was no longer the most efficient way of steering a 
global company like Pinta Inc. CEO began considering centralization with the aim of 
finding a solution to the issue of “how to avoid a silos type of thinking” and questions 
such as: “should we try to separate sales and production? Should we try to specialize 
the factories, so not all factories are doing everything because they are servicing a small 
market area?” (Managing Director, Business Unit, 2014). Thus, the divisions in Europe 
were merged into a single Europe Division.  
 
When explaining the challenges of implementing his new strategy, CEO talked about the 
disadvantages of being in a big established company, and about a certain type of mind-set that 
has been reinforced over the many years. He confirmed the most challenging part of his job was 
to shift managers’ mind-sets:  
 
“The challenge is between the ears of the people. We have trained them, brainwashed 
them, and indoctrinated them in the last forty years, into thinking in one direction. Moving 
the brains of people to think in another direction, and changing substantial parts of the 
organization because they do not fit with the new way of thinking, is very challenging” 
(CEO, 2013). 
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Nevertheless, the new strategy was criticized on many occasions, and was broadly considered 
“not quite a strategy, more of an action plan, very scattered” (Director Marketing Group, 2014), 
“a dream” (VP, R&D, 2014), “tried to change way too much, and people can’t cope and they 
are frustrated” (Division Managing Director, 2014), “what came out of this strategy is a bit 
difficult to conclude, as this business unit has always been like that” (Business Development 
Director, 2014).   
 
Interestingly, while different business units and internal departments were disappointed by the 
poor strategy and even considered that “there is still no strategy, and that’s confusing if you ask 
me. We are working on it” (Group Marketing Vice-president, interview 2013), the innovation 
department was labelling this as an opportunity, a time where their choices could not be 
constrained: 
“The beauty of not having a well-defined strategy is that we can do whatever we want. We have 
the freedom and we like this in R&D” (VP R&D, Interview 2013).   
 
End of 2014 brought the news that CEO has been replaced, with “someone who has a strong 
business background” (CFO, 2014).  
Going from strategy to business models, Pinta Inc. is perceived by its managers as having two 
different business models, while there has been a short period when operating with three. 
Interestingly, when asking about the company’s business model, the expression “business 
model” has created moments of uncertainty, which is analysed in section 5.3.2. 
 
5.3.1. Pinta Inc.’s Business Models  
 
A combination of secondary data with interviews reveal that Pinta Inc. was operating two types 
of business models, namely insulation and system division. The insulation area (77% of net 
revenue), was encompassed of building insulation, industrial and technical insulation, marine 
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and offshore insulation, sandwich panels, solutions for industrial manufacturers; and the system 
division (23% of net revenue).  The latter encompasses: 
 Business unit 1: integrated ceiling solutions that improve acoustic performance, design 
of buildings, and indoor environment;  
 Business unit 2: solutions for cultivation of crops in greenhouses based on hydroponics 
systems, independent of soil;  
 Business unit 3: decorative boards for various applications on the facades of buildings, 
used for detailing or partial cladding of facades;  
 Business unit 4: intelligent fibbers for reinforcement,  
 Business unit 5: solutions for controlling vibrations from railway tracks and noise from 
roads. 
 
The insulation business is defined in Pinta Inc. as having its own production settings and its 
customers are Builder Merchants. Thus, the company never knows where its products finally 
end up. On the other side, the systems division is known for its close collaboration with 
customers, a complex value chain and, also, dependency on the production and R&D settings of 
the insulation business. The five business areas that comprise the Systems division share a focus 
on international marketing and sales, and they do not own any production facilities (Internal 
document), except for Business Unit 2. In other words, unlike the Insulation division, the 
Systems division outsources production. The reasoning behind this business decision relates to 
the difference in the value chain, and consequently a different route to market. In many cases 
addressed to niche markets, Systems’ solutions capitalize on specialist expertise, thus there is 
little focus on production meanings. According to Systems Division Managing Director 
(Interview, 2013), this influences its relationship to its customers, which is stronger and closer 
when compared with insulation business. Contrasting the two business models, the following 
differences has been affirmed by Pinta Inc. managers:  
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 INSULATION SYSTEM DIVISION 
Customers Intermediaries: Do it Yourself 
stores, Builder’s Merchants and   
Segmentation takes place locally. 
They know nothing about the 
product (VP R&D, 2014). 
  
Big distance between the end user 
and the manufacturer (Portfolio 
manager, 2013). 
 
Customers are interested in integrated 
solutions and the focus is on 
customization based on standard 
solutions (VP R&D, 2014). 
 
We need to know more about the 
customer and go out and talk to 
customers directly and tell him about 
this technical stuff (Business 
Development Director, 2014). 
 
Value proposition Selling on insulation performance 
thousands of different standard 
insulation products, both building 
and technical (Portfolio manager, 
2013). 
 
Commodity asset oriented, 
traditional manufacturing business 
model (CEO, 2014). 
 
Keep the factories occupied 
(Portfolio manager, 2013). 
 
Business scope is defined globally and 
the focus is on offering systems 
solutions, the full package. We never 
sell on insulation proprieties (Business 
Development Director, 2014). 
 
Based on segmentation, and 
demand/customer driven business 
model. And there is a high demand on 
documentation (VP R&D, 2014). 
Here we do technical sales; we don’t 
just sell to Builder Merchants shelves. We 
need to go out and talk to the end 
customer directly, to understand how 
our products fit his needs (Group 
Marketing Director, 2014). 
 
Value chain  One product program per country- 
each country has a sales 
organization (Portfolio manager, 
2013). 
 
Complex Value chain, depending on the 
business unit. There is no production, 
logistic or HR. These are bought from 
Pinta Inc. International and Insulation 
(Portfolio manager, 2013). 
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Simple value chain: selling directly 
to intermediaries - production and 
sales & marketing is not split (VP 
R&D, 2014). 
 
 
We push our stuff through 
distribution (CEO, 2014). 
 
 
System division is made of sales and 
marketing business units only, except 
business unit 2- have their own R&D 
(VP R&D, 2014). 
Specialized value chains: one value 
chain per application – unique route to 
markets; specialized sales force- 
considered crucial (VP R&D, 2014). 
One of the strategies for building 
systems is making acquisitions of parts 
that help building systems (Business 
Development Director, 2014). 
 
Revenue model Bulk selling, therefore low 
contribution margins (VP R&D, 
2014). 
Selling solutions and working with big 
contribution margins (Portfolio 
manager, 2013). 
“Each of the businesses has a price 
premium strategy” (Group Marketing 
Director, 2014) 
Table 5. 2 Perceived differences between Pinta Inc. Business Models. Source: Author's own 
 
Group Marketing Director furthermore affirmed, “we have these two different ways to do 
business, but I am not sure if it is the right approach. We are discussing now quite a lot if this is 
really necessary and how could we integrate them, so we would have only systems and the 
insulation part would be the common production platform? It’s one of the scenarios at least!” 
(Interview, 2014). The same opinion was affirmed by the division management director, part of 
Pinta Inc.’s board.  
Interestingly, the company had utilized three business models for a short period, when it tried to 
offer various consultancy services comprising policy and climate change, in a business unit 
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called Build Desk. The unit was a service provider only, and it was intended not to be associated 
with Pinta Inc. name: 
As a reliable and trustworthy sparring partner to, amongst others, architects and 
engineers, BuildDesk is there to advance energy efficiency, not to promote the Pinta Inc. 
brand (CEO, 2005, Pinta Inc. Newsletter 2005).  
When I had the idea, I wanted it as a separate business and a different name. Maybe I was 
wrong. (CEO, Interview, 2013) 
The business was not a success; it has been closed quietly, without many being willing to talk 
about it. At the headquarters, there were still signs of Build Desk, yet, when asked, nobody 
knew where it was or what happened to it (Field notes, 2013). Interestingly, the Vice-President 
of R&D affirmed: “it was the CEO’s project and it didn’t work out, so we just let it go. We don’t 
like to talk about failures at Pinta Inc.” (VP R&D, 2013).  I came to hear this sentence a couple 
of times during my field study. CEO explained the closure by being a product that the market 
was not ready for, plus the link between product and Pinta Inc. was missing: 
It just turned out that Build Desk, which was a bit of a holistic view, with a lot of 
calculation and software. It missed the link to our normal business. So, the link was 
missing between our products, what kind of systems or solutions does the person in 
question want, and then, if certain calculation methods are required, then we can supply 
that. So we were in A, we when to C and we were missing B, which has turned out to be 
much more important than C (CEO, 2013). 
The former business developer of Build Desk believed that the reason for not succeeding was 
twofold: lacking the skills, being very different from Pinta Inc.,’ main business, and not having 
clear goals:  
“You can have all the ideas in the world, but if you don’t have the people, forget about! 
And then we didn’t have the goal, so we kept having milestones and we keep just dragging 
on compromising all over the place, and we didn’t deliver” (Business director, Interview 
2014). 
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As Build Desk failed, the last business that Pinta Inc. has developed was with “more than 
twenty-five almost thirty years ago” (VP R&D, interview 2013). This was an important element 
in development of Woodstock, as the R&D team and its business unit were drawing on this fact 
many times when talking about their challenges of creating Woodstock, as they were lacking 
internal reference points.  
“It’s been a long time ago we have built a business, so we don’t remember how to do it. 
No one knows how to do it, so we need to figure it out by ourselves” (Portfolio manager, 
2013). 
When asked about the company’s business models, the CEO of Pinta Inc. defined the model as 
being a very traditional one, focus on low costs and production, keeping factories busy and 
pushing everything down the distribution channels. He further explained that it was a need for a 
change, and his new strategy was trying to implement a more customer centred approach:    
“I think if you look at the traditional business model of insulation industry, including 
ourselves, it is very much commodity oriented, very asset oriented. You have the factories 
built for the next 150 years and you can’t move them, so you better keep them occupied, if 
you don’t you lose the game! This means that you push your stuff through distribution. We 
believe that this is not the model of the future; we believe that this industry has reached 
the end of its technological capabilities, so we do not see anything happening that would 
change completely the landscape of the company and the environment of the industry. So 
either we stay where we are and doing what we’ve been doing for the last thirty years or 
we change our model into putting systems together, and we are not going to push our stuff 
through the distribution, but we are going to create the demand. And, of course, this is not 
going from day to night or from night to day, but if we take it on the overall perspective, 
this is our strategy since 2010 and we are also shown that we are taking it seriously, 
because we are doing a lot of thinking and we make a lot of acquisitions, which show that 
we walk the talk” (CEO, interview, 2013) 
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Interestingly, he would not agree with the distinction between the system and insulation models, 
and affirmed that Pinta Inc. was operating with only one model, which was the traditional one 
mentioned. Yet, he admitted the existence of a “silos type of thinking, which I don’t know how to 
fight against. Let me know if you have any ideas” (CEO, interview, 2013).  
 
I did encounter this types of thinking often in the company, as the words “them and us” were 
employed frequently, especially in two internally declared dichotomies: system division and 
insulation business, as analysed above, and R&D and business development unit, analysed in 
section 5.3.3. The latter was the element with the highest impact effect on Woodstock 
development, as resulted from the analysis of Chapter six.  
 
5.3.2 “What do you mean by a business model?” 
 
Finding out how the term “business model” is used in the company was something of a 
challenge. Managers would try to formulate a hypothesis about it when being asked, but I never 
encountered the expression used actively in any of the meetings I attended during my entire stay 
in Pinta Inc. See table 4.3 for further information. 
When I asked the CEO and the business directors of different units - including the BU’s director 
- about the business models the company was operating under, my question was received 
sceptically, as I was constantly asked, “What do you mean by business model?” Since I never 
jumped into giving an answer, but deliberately waited for their reflection, my question was 
followed by a suggested definition, including: 
“Do you mean the route to market?” (Division Managing Director, 2014) 
“It is something about value streams and routes to market.” (VP R&D, 2013) 
“I would say that is the supply chain positioning” (Program Director, 2013) 
“We want to make the easiest possible to work with ceiling for our target group, so we have 
 123
chosen a more human-centric communication, or call it a business model, if you want” (Group 
Marketing and Business Development Director, Business Unit 1, 2013) 
“A business model is very much related to how you justify the price premium, that’s the core of 
it” (Group Marketing Director, 2014) 
“I think you are too theoretical. I don’t care if my people know what a business model is and if it 
is the same with product development.” (CEO, 2013) 
“I know what a business model is, but you can also see that nobody uses terms as business 
models or customer or manners to reach customers. We talk products.” (Senior project manager, 
2013) 
Looking through internal documents and annual reports, the term was not employed until the 
2014 annual report, also the first report given by the new CEO, where it was affirmed that “The 
high operational leverage of our business model is linked to the capital intensive nature of our 
factories – one new plant will often cost more (…) and must operate with sufficiently high 
capacity to pay back the investment.” (Annual report, 2014). The term was used again in the 
2015 report, in connection with the company’s new strategic goals, wherein there is the stated 
aim of having a “solid business model -with a broad market approach operating in 37 countries 
and the logistical advantage of being close to customers with flexible production units” (Annual 
report, 2015).  
In this context, when asking about Woodstock’s business model, the answer was that “it is a 
simple route to market, we are selling a product with features” (Business direct, business unit, 
Interview 2014). However, the word was not used in any of the project or steering meetings I 
attended, even though the term “business model” was used at the beginning of Woodstock 
development.  
In the first project description document, a picture that depicted the value chain and money flow 
inside that value chain was identified as Woodstock’s business model (see figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5. 4 Woodstock business model. Source: Internal document, 2010 
 
According to internal documents, a couple of months after the first project description with the 
purpose of creating a business plan, the question “What is the business model for Woodstock?” 
was discussed in three internal meetings. In this regard, five scenarios were created, known as 
“business models A, B, C, D and E” (Internal document, 2011), which were each compared 
against each other based on predetermined specifications. These were: 
“An evaluation of the most obvious business models will be made based on the following 
parameters: 
 Business potential 
 Product liability and risks 
 Long-term business potential 
 Resources and competences 
 Investments & cost 
The evaluation will focus on the business model already described and the alternative model, 
where we supply standard composite products.” (Internal document, March 2011) 
 
The scenarios were proposed by the newly formed marketing department, and included ideas 
about Woodstock such as:  
“A: sell the plates only  
 B: sell the cut and grinded materials 
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 C: sell finish profiles to windows producers 
 D: sell finished window frames 
 E: sell windows” (internal document, June, 2011).  
  
The option chosen was C, although the rationale behind the choice does not appear in the 
meeting minutes. In interviews conducted with the people who attended those meetings (i.e., the 
vice-president of innovation, the program director and the senior project manager), none could 
recall the reasons for choosing scenario C. The inventor of Woodstock could only remember 
that it was very important for him to create something new inside Pinta Inc., something that was 
very distant from a “bulk type of business”. He also noted that the scenario of building an entire 
window was not considered realistic:  
“I remember that I pushed for C, as A and B were bulk time of models. I didn’t want to make out 
of Woodstock just another bulk business. Then D and E were too far from our reality, and far 
too complex for what we could do, doing doors and windows is a completely different business.  
So C was the good one, as we could offer a system and we were in charge of the system, not our 
suppliers. But I can’t remember more than that” (Senior project manager, Inventor of 
Woodstock, Interview, 2013). 
Scenario C was integrated in a business plan in 2011, where it was stated “the business model 
chosen is direct sales through BU sales organization, selling directly to windows producers” 
(Woodstock Business plan, June 2011). In the same plan, the business model chosen was 
analysed against the above-mentioned predetermined specifications, as seen in table 5.3. The 
table underlines the considerations concerning the target customers, value proposition, 
competitors, and resources required to realize scenario C.  
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Business potential Product liability and 
risks 
Long-term 
business 
potential 
Resources and 
competences 
Investments & 
cost 
 EU legislation, 
 Keep window 
design alive 
 Keep small 
windows 
producer alive  
 Refurbishment 
 Wood suppliers 
 Tough 
competition 
with foam  
 (+) Cobranding 
 Product with 
warranty 10 years 
(minimum) 
 Wood suppliers 
 Lamination quality 
 Failure risk 
 Brand protection? 
 Tough competition 
with foam etc. – 
different 
possibilities 
Pinta Inc. 
window 
 
 Window energy 
design 
 Sales force 
 Optimal 
coordination 
wood-
composite-
-lamination 
 Small batch 
production 
 End customer 
service?  
 Investments in 
production 
lines 
  Energy design 
costs 
 Extended 
coordination 
with window 
producer 
 Order system 
Table 5. 3 Parameters for evaluating business models. Source: Woodstock business plan, 2011 
 
This was the last time Woodstock’s business model or business plan was evaluated and worked 
on, despite the R&D team and the VP R&D’s expectations from the BU to develop a new 
version of the business plan, since the project evolved significantly. Thus, the business unit has 
only promised but it has not delivered. In the latest project description released by the project 
manager in mid-2014 there are goals, deliverables and production costs as well as an empty 
power point slide containing the text: “The Business unit will provide the business case” 
(Internal document, Project Description for Woodstock G3, 2014). The most active agents in the 
development of Woodstock were the R&D team and the BU, who used different work 
vocabularies, namely paradigms (Weick, 1995: 118). This was a source of internal conflict, 
creating interruptions that impacted on the way Woodstock developed.  
 
5.3.3. R&D versus Business Development  
Woodstock was discovered and developed in the R&D department at Pinta Inc. R&D gained a 
new Vice President of Innovation immediately after the financial crisis, and he took credit for 
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being the one who reorganized the department into a matrix format. This made resources easier 
to attain, and people could work across-projects (Portfolio Manager, 2013). The new VP talked 
proudly that he introduced a new innovation strategy and has created the idea of a budget pool 
on which employees could experiment freely. The moment an idea received sufficient interest 
and was considered to have market potential, it was moved “above the radar” (VP R&D, 2013) 
for further development, with an official budget. Both the vice-president, and the inventor of 
Woodstock were having the vision of building something new in Pinta Inc.  
The Vice President’s background played a significant role in the realization of Woodstock, as he 
had previously worked in the window industry and was familiar with the needs and struggles 
within the industry. Therefore, when Woodstock technology was discovered, he favoured using 
it in the industry, and moving Pinta Inc. towards servicing the window industry, which would be 
a completely new area. This decision had many unintended consequences, as discussed in more 
detail in the next Chapter. However, one of the consequences was defined by the need to change 
core practices in Pinta Inc., such as production manner, business set up, and entering co-creation 
partnerships with customers. These facts where perceived as offering “great opportunities for 
development and learning” (R&D Portfolio Manager, 2013), still, this was not the case with the 
appointed business owner of the Woodstock, Business Unit, BU.  
BU, as a component of the insulation business, provided stone wool insulation solutions to 
industrial producers or transformers who then integrated the Pinta Inc. product into their own 
finished product. As Woodstock first generation was a product that was supposed to be 
integrated into a window frame, it was decided that BU would be the business owner and 
responsible for creating the business plan and go to market strategy.  
The collaboration between these two “very different types of working” (BU Business Director, 
2014) was perceived as “difficult and with many ups and downs” (Senior Project Manager, 
2014). While R&D had the vision to create something “revolutionary” (Senior Project Manager, 
2014) to serve both the company and the new industry they would enter, BU wanted to frame 
the project into “how things have always been done in BU, this is just a small component in a 
window frame” (BU Business Director, 2014). There was a clash between the linear way of 
thinking at BU, and the trial and error approach found in R&D, having different vocabularies of 
 128 
work (Weick, 1995:118). Therefore, in the interests of taking the product to market, R&D 
expended great effort into “speaking their language:” 
Pinta Inc. is a production organization and in production, many things are linear, and BU 
is the same. So when we communicate with them we need to speak their language. We 
know that we need to go back and learn, and we do a schedule, and all that. If we tell 
them how things really happen, they would get upset. Nothing goes from A to B, but this is 
how we communicate to them, because this is what they want to hear (Project Manager 
Woodstock, 2014). 
 
However, their interactions caused multiple internal conflicts, as R&D team was expected much 
more collaboration from the business unit, and even to take the ownership over Woodstock 
sooner. Yet, BU was waiting for the right cues to takeover, and those cues were finishing 
development process and having a product, which can be produced at the “right cost platform” 
(Business Director, BU). The feeling in R&D was that they need to build a product for the 
market and for their internal client, even though the business director and developer were part of 
the steering meetings, challenging the development process:  
“It was challenging to keep being motivated as many things needed to be proven over and 
over again and sometimes based on miscommunication” (Evaluation of Woodstock 
meeting, 2015).  
“They don’t understand the project; it feels that we compromise a lot of our ideas and 
visions. This makes things hard” (Senior Project Manager, 2014). 
 
In explaining the sometimes hostile and sceptic attitude of the business unit, the Portfolio 
manager affirmed in the last evaluation meeting: “We must remember that Business Unit were 
not asked if they wanted a new project, it was just given to them! This is a new business for 
which we had to find somebody to attach our great idea to. We pushed it down their throat and 
they couldn’t say no. They were forced to take it.” 
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At the end of the development process, Woodstock was received by the market in a very 
positive manner, being awarded in January 2015, at the European biggest construction fair, with 
“Global Insulation Product of the Year” award, for an “innovation for affordable sustainable 
design” (Internal document, January 2015). 
After receiving the award, the business director of BU was declared:  
“Window frames have been one of the Achilles heels for making sustainable buildings energy 
efficient in a cost-effective manner. To make this challenge manageable and affordable, our 
specialists have succeeded in taking our insulation technology one innovative step further. We 
have developed a weather-resistant profile, which insulates much better than wood or aluminum 
facing.” (Business Director, BU, January 2015) 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the context, namely the case company, where Woodstock 
developed. This helped in formulating an answer to the research question: What frame did 
managers draw on when developing Woodstock and why was Woodstock perceived as a 
sensemaking trigger? 
 
Woodstock was born as a company whose ideological vocabulary was centred on factories, the 
engineering of stone wool fibres, costs, and producing the raw material in the cheapest manner 
possible within the market. In recent times, there have been many changes in Pinta Inc.: a new 
vice-president of innovation, the financial crisis and the formulation of a new strategy, a new 
group marketing department, reflections on how many business models they have and should 
have, and finally a new CEO. They are a product-oriented company predominantly focused on 
technology, which was visible in their manner of explaining what a business model was. This 
was defined as being a “route to market”, how the product could be produced in the cheapest 
way, and the positioning in a value chain. When actively working with the business model, in 
the case of Woodstock, this became the definition of how money flowed inside the value chain, 
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that is, “what we sell.” Interestingly, a business model would be chosen based on its perceived 
business potential, its product liability and risks, its long-term business potential, its resources 
and competences, and the investments required by the company. Once the model is decided 
based on these preconditions, the business model becomes the objective to be achieved, as seen 
in the case of Woodstock. 
Woodstock, mainly Generation 3, was challenging the DNA (expression used frequently by the 
VP R&D) of the company. Woodstock’s initial business model was an attempt to connect the 
cue with the frame, and it was perceived as a fit. Yet, it grew into something that challenged the 
core of the company, ending up with a model combining elements from both the insulation and 
system division with new practices. Woodstock also developed at the intersection between two 
different paradigms / vocabularies of work, namely R&D - where the vision was to create a truly 
innovative product together with the business unit - and the Business Unit – which was willing 
to create something that resembled their normal business, being very focused on the first plan 
created. The difference between the paradigms, and the kind of expectations that each had of 
each other, became an important source of interruptions in the development of Woodstock’s 
business model. Interestingly, the ideology was present when the preconditions of making the 
choice of a model were defined, but the development of the model per se was a matter between 
the paradigms.  
 
Aside from being perceived as “different,” the development of Woodstock was considered a 
challenge due to a lack of retrospective possibilities. There was no organizational memory as to 
how to build a new business, given that the last business was built almost thirty years ago. The 
same situation was encountered in the development of Woodstock’s business model, given that 
nobody could recall how scenario C was chosen and based on which preconditions - they could 
only recall the target which needed to be achieved. The focus was on results rather than 
processes. Therefore, the R&D team and BU had to enact and accept a new business model for 
G3, which is analysed further in the next chapter. The way Woodstock’s business model was 
enacted is analysed, element by element, in Chapter six.  
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Chapter VI: Analysis of the enactment processes in the case company. 
Enacting business model elements 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
After setting the context in chapter five and explaining why Woodstock was perceived as a 
challenge for Pinta Inc. and the actors involved, this chapter unfolds the enactment processes 
that has contributed to the creation of Woodstock’s business model. This study utilized the 
business model framework provided by Chesbrough and Rosembloom (2002), consisting of six 
elements: market, value proposition, value chain, cost and profit, value network, competitive 
strategy. Each of the elements is analysed separately by using the enactment model discussed in 
chapter three, where the focus is on interruptions, enactment processes and retention/outcome of 
enactment (Weick, 1979). As explained in chapter three, interruptions are “perceived” and 
identified as such in the actors’ own words. Examples of this cover reactions like: “shock,” 
“surprise”, “showstopper”, “crisis”, “conflict”, “problem”, and “major risk.” 197 interruptions, 
dispersed across all six elements, were identified and then grouped further into 30 interruptions 
identified by the actors involved as being the most important. These are analysed further in the 
chapter and depict in tables 6.1-6.5. 
 The identification process for interruptions and the coding processes were explained in Chapter 
four.  
 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to answer the research question: 
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What are the enactment processes that enabled the creation of the elements of 
Woodstock’s business model and how do managers of Pinta Inc. made sense of the 
emergence of a new business model?   
Having this purpose, the chapter is structured as following: first five sections are analysing the 
elements of the business model, following Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002), followed by 
that last section of conclusions.  
 
6.2 Enacting components of a value proposition 
 
When questioned about Woodstock’s value proposition4 in generation 3 (G3), the Business 
Director of the BU (BU hereafter) responsible for the product, answered:  
“Insulation, wood aesthetic! For me wood is aesthetic, unlike aluminium. And then maintenance 
free; for any production changes for windows’ producers that want Woodstock there is support 
for the customer: advice about how to work with stone wool, and to glue profiles on the window. 
We sponsor their marketing costs. There you have the co-branding story. Industrial costs we 
don’t cover, we never do that. The value proposition is insulation, maintenance free, is that 
enough? Of course, it is not, but there was one step before this: the whole window industry 
received new legislation for windows to lose less energy. With our product, windows can easily 
meet the requirement of this new legislation. On top of that, we offer 10-years low maintenance, 
free window painting, and thirdly: it still looks like wood. A solution for 2020.” (Business 
Director, internal business owner, 2014) 
 
There were mixed feelings and some pride about having developed a “product that would 
disrupt the window industry” (VP, R&D). The doubt about whether what was being offered was 
“enough”, frequently arose when the actors involved in Woodstock’s development spoke about 
it. Creating value for a new industry proved to be more challenging than expected, especially 
                                                     
4 Value proposition: “the value created for users by the offering based on technology” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002:533)   
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given the lack of experience with developing new businesses (Portfolio Manager, 2013, 
interview) and the traditionalist window industry.  
 
In his statement, the Business Director enumerated multiple elements. These related to the 
product’s capacity to offer: insulation, aesthetic (looks like wood), free maintenance, support for 
customers about how to work with the special material, support with marketing, and a solution 
to meet new legislation for the windows industry. Interestingly, these ingredients of the 
proposition were not all present from the outset, they evolved over time with the change from 
generation 1 to 3, as seen in chapter 5, resulting from many episodes that pushed the team 
towards this form of product enactment.  
 
The vice president of innovation’s decision to take Woodstock above the radar, and by doing so, 
to initiate a new project inside R&D was received with great enthusiasm by the inventor of the 
concept. A team was formed and he was named Project Manager of Woodstock, gaining a 
reputation as “the visionary, the entrepreneur and the true engine of Woodstock” (interview, 
program direct, R&D, 2013), during the project development phase. He affirmed the initial 
value proposition for Woodstock G1 at the end of 2009, was to deliver a solution for the 
window industry, to help them comply with the new EU 2020 regulations. The market the 
product sought to supply was a new category of customer for Pinta Inc. Thus, the company 
decided to enter into a co-creation type of partnership with a window manufacturer. This kind of 
partnership was also a new approach for Pinta Inc. Its R&D department helped develop the idea 
of a window frame with stone wool inside (as seen in fig 5.1) and a window with very high 
insulation properties. 
According to internal documents, which depicted a very specific time line from ideation to 
implementation, the expectation was that Woodstock would be a “fast” project; meaning it was 
predicted to reach the market in a maximum of two years. Interestingly, in the documents, the 
word “fast” is underlined and the time line included focuses on ideation, business plan, and 
technical development, as illustrated in figure 6.1.  
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“At Woodstock, we want to enter the window market fast, by using the materials as a part of 
(inlays in) a window frame or sash. The most obvious segment is windows based on wood for 
“renovation” = replacement of old windows, but other segments may also come into 
consideration.” (Internal document, project description, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 6. 1 Woodstock G1, timeline. Source: Internal document, 2010 
 
This document was the first in which intentions and expectations for the project were identified, 
and the first attempt to define Woodstock’s value proposition. Interestingly, it was defined 
relative to the market it would serve; i.e., the renovation market, where there was a requirement 
for old wood windows to be replaced. This showed the link between value proposition and 
segmentation. Despite the stated intentions, Woodstock’s development took over five years, and 
several events created project delays, which ran counter to expectations. This was perceived as a 
“crisis” in the life of Woodstock, and interruptions triggered enactment processes throughout the 
years of development.  
 
At this early stage, R&D began collecting external cues about industry specifications, helping 
them to identify the properties of a window and label the essential unique selling points. This 
helped them to devise an internal agreement to focus on creating a window, as required by the 
EU2020 agenda, incorporating three-layer glass (Internal document, 2010). They also learnt 
about specific characteristics of the industry that might represent a challenge, not only to 
Woodstock’s development, but also to Pinta Inc. The first point identified as an interruption to 
the “fast” development process, was the discovery that the window industry requires provision 
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of a ten-year warranty on different features of the window. This requirement demanded a 
significant number of tests to prove resistance. Pinta Inc. had never offered liability for their 
products; thus, this element challenged the company’s ideology.  
 
“Risk and liability is something new for Pinta Inc. And we need to figure it out. For G1, it is 
important to clarify it in terms of: image; the replacement of windows, complaints, and possible 
implications.” (Internal document written by R&D Program Director, 2010) 
 
 “We have never given a warranty for our products. That was a whole new type of learning you 
needed to accumulate inside, and it was a big challenge.” (VP, R&D, 2013) 
 
A second point interrupting fast flow intentions, and leading management to question the long 
term financial success and viability of the product, was the discovery that the window industry 
is very fragmented; each national market imposes specific requirements and regulations for 
windows. As an insulation business, Pinta Inc.’s experience was in selling standardized 
products; thus, making customized products for a highly fragmented industry, led to a 
significant interruption. This aspect was a challenge for the internal business owner also, as it 
was perceived as a provocation for the paradigm. Therefore, although the initial aim of the 
business was to expand into parts of Europe, they came to realize that this step needed to be 
taken in a calculated manner. Hence, they began with the Danish market, to be followed by 
German market later. The R&D Program Director knew that presence in the Danish market 
alone would not equate to a successful business. Expansion was an indispensable aspect of the 
plan. However, the observation that the German window market was a very fragmented one 
created a moment of panic. The researchers learned that alternative designs and calculations 
were needed for foreign markets, so the decision was made to focus first on the home market 
exclusively. Interestingly, the main fear was that the penetration of a new market would require 
the same level of investment as penetration of the Danish market, where a long period of co-
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development with a window factory partner was needed. The BU was using the same kinds of 
cues to decipher the new market, but were expecting that the solution to be a standard one:  
 
“And one of the things, a thing that frightened us in the beginning, was that it seemed that there 
were a lot of very small players in the window industry in Germany. If you go to Germany the 
windows manufacturers are very small companies, so, there´s a huge number of them. And 
therefore, you could say this, the effort that we would have to do to get in contact with them and 
promote the product, seemed to be huge. So we had to consider this: how could we make that 
work? how could we get a sufficiently large partner, so that we could get the same kind of help, 
somebody helping us into the market in the same way as the CEO co-developer at home?” 
(Program Director, Interview, 2014) 
 
6.2.1 Woodstock generation 1 (G1) 
 
Under the conditions established by the R&D team, the first generation of Woodstock, G1, was 
to comprise a stone wool profile laminated with wood, creating a window frame. Woodstock 
was included inside the final product, not visible to the customer, resulting in a more insulating 
type of window, as shown in fig 5.1. In this case, insulation was the main sales point. The value 
proposition needed a value chain involving wood factories and special tools solutions for cutting 
wool. Thus, a wood factory would provide the wood for the laminating process, followed by 
sending the laminated profile to the window manufacturer. Due to the fact that the new window 
profile would contain a type of material, stone wool, which a window manufacturer has never 
worked before, Pinta Inc. would pledge the cutting tools. Furthermore, as the new type of 
window would need approval from the national institutes, Pinta Inc. and the window 
manufactures would share the responsibility of working on this task.  The value proposition for 
G1 was incorporated into the value chain, as depicted in figure 6.2.  
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Figure 6. 2 Woodstock's value chain, generation 1. Source: Internal document, 2010 
 
This step rendered the logistics very expensive; therefore, the final cost of the product was much 
higher than that of the other profiles on the market. Woodstock G1 was not a competitive 
product, regardless of its strong value proposition.  
 
Despite what was labelled internally as a “significant loss” and a “very expensive product” 
(Internal document, 2011), Pinta Inc. paid for the deficit of G1, against the backdrop of very 
positive feedback from the market, as their customers succeeded in selling windows with the 
new type of frame. In these conditions, VP R&D maintained a strong belief in the potential of 
the technology, convincing management to accept the enactment of a new design.  
 
“The final product was not very good. You have heard the story; it was a design problem and 
the value chain was way too complicated and expensive. But the technology and the value we 
offered… with that technology we had very high business potential, and we did manage to sell 
those windows! The co-developer loved our product, and they wanted to work with us and 
develop further.” (VP, R&D, Interview, 2013) 
 
“What allowed the project to continue was the VP R&D. He was a man with a vision and we 
believed in him, so we let him play.” (Program Director, Interview, 2014) 
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In the eyes of group management, Woodstock was the project of the innovation vice-president, 
and the person who defended Woodstock in the most difficult times.  
 
G1 was a breakthrough for the team, and was considered “a valuable learning” experience 
(Senior Project Manager, Interview, 2013). They managed to take a product onto the market and 
to sell it. When explaining the selection criteria that led to the demise of G1, the Senior Project 
Manager of Woodstock explained that the connection between the value proposition and the 
value chain and production costs was too weak when compared with other products on the 
market, but that, interestingly, was only apparent once the product was on the market:  
 
“I became more and more aware that this was not the right product (value proposition). I could 
see that we couldn’t make money on it; the costs were too high compared to the value created 
for the customer (cost- value proposition- customer). I could see that we had to charge more for 
it if we wanted to make money on it (profit). Any increased cost would then be higher than the 
customer was willing to pay, because we didn’t provide enough value. I could see very clearly 
that the price would not be paid. Windows are a very competitive market (competitive market).” 
(Senior Project Manager, Interview, 2013) 
 
“Because we could see that G1 worked fine for the customer, and we received no complaints, we 
pondered what we should do. We could also see that it would not be sustainable for more than 2 
years because we lost money selling it and we had to subsidize it; and it was clear that once we 
started to ask full price, it would be 3 times as expensive, and that would simply not fly.” (Senior 
Project Manager, Interview, 2013) 
 
G1 was followed by a trial and error phase to create G2, which comprised a frame only partly 
laminated with a section of Woodstock material visible. This solution was considered non-
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sustainable, and made space for G3, a solution in which the Woodstock would be painted and 
mounted onto the front of the window frame, becoming the visible part (see fig. 5.2). This was a 
critical decision; it eliminated the wood factory and the cutting tools providers, thereby 
simplifying the value chain, and ensuring the product could target a new market, the aluminium 
and wood-aluminium market. Interestingly, the new design advanced the value proposition from 
offering insulation only, adding maintenance free and aesthetic value. 
 
“We figured out this solution, G1 was too expensive for just a little more insulation. Then we 
figured out that we could move the wood to the outside, and then we were able to change the 
wooden window from a window that needs maintenance to a maintenance-free window, and at 
the same time improve the u value and energy performance of the window. That was the main 
idea.” (Senior Engineer, Interview, 2013)  
 
“We moved into another segment, because we could make a different surface, so we both made 
it insulating, and we made a different surface, so we could have made it maintenance free, and 
create a different look architecturally, we offered aesthetics, as the visual appearance of a 
window frame is very important to the windows industry.” (Program Director, Interview, 2014) 
 
Interestingly, the new design and the resultant new value proposition, triggered group 
management to question whether the positioning of the product relative to the building envelope 
strategy (as described in chapter 5) was still correct, in addition to the products positioning 
within the particular BU. The CEO considered it no longer part of a strategy, but “a badly run 
project”, and began questioning the resources used on Woodstock, and its aims. However, the 
feedback from the market, and the voice of the R&D Vice President meant that the project 
continued, to generation 3. 
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6.2.2 Woodstock generation 3 (G3) 
 
The value proposition for G3 was comprised of elements drawn from three different sources:  
A. The existing value proposition for Pinta Inc.: Given its origins, Woodstock would be 
able to offer, by default, the properties unique to any stone wool product: “insulation and 
thermal efficiency, fire safety, durability” (Senior Project Manager, 2013). These aspects 
of the value proposition were familiar to the company; they knew how to reflect them in 
a revenue model.  
B. Result of innovation processes: Woodstock technology was able to refine the stone wool 
fibre at a very high level, allowing the company to “offer aesthetics, and a maintenance 
free product” (Vice President innovation, 2013). However, this would push the company 
to seek understanding of the implications of offering “aesthetics.” 
C. Market cues: their only customer and co-development partner, a Danish window 
producer, asked to sign a co-branding partnership, as they considered the Pinta Inc. 
brand very powerful. “We could be as the Gorotex for clothes, we are Pinta Inc. Inside 
the window, therefore the window is energy efficient,” explained the VP R&D, one of the 
supporters of the idea. Furthermore, the new industry they were serving, the window 
industry, demanded a warranty, a practice never encountered by the company previously. 
These three sources of uncertainty, which challenged the company and demanded the 
managers of Woodstock look for cues to reduce the risk of failure, were the elements of 
co-branding, warranty and aesthetics. 
 
6.2.2.1 Creation of meaning for co-branding 
 
When the idea of co-branding was introduced at the company, one of the Marketing Managers 
asked for support. As explained in chapter 5, the group-marketing department had just been 
formed with a new strategy at the time when the Woodstock project began. The practice of co-
branding was new to Pinta Inc., but a potential customer had asked them to come with a model 
leveraging on the company’s brand. In discussions about this, the Project Manager and the 
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Marketing Manager, aware of the scepticism of group management, realized that in order for the 
idea to be accepted by group management, they needed to create a very precise definition and 
rules for this kind of partnership. They had to create a common understanding of the co-
branding label.  
 
“We haven’t had that practice before. It was completely new and this is why we needed to create 
a structure around this. We needed to formalize this; we needed to formalize how we co-brand 
with third party suppliers.” (Marketing Manager, 2013) 
 
“Very unusual for us to do that, because our brand, as we said before, it is very strong, so why 
dilute it? I think this thing with the small window producer; it is just a small thing. Plus, it was 
happening somewhere in an isolated part of the country, nobody knows about them. So I say, let 
them play! The CEO of this company, I visited him myself and he is an entrepreneur. He said: 
lets’ do a kind of an Intel inside thing, also a kind of trial. Again, it is in the north part of the 
country, let’s see how it works out. But it is not something that we want to do in general, and I 
doubt we’ll expand the practice.” (CEO Pinta Inc., Interview, 2014) 
 
This idea separated the company into two different camps; the development team and their vice 
president, together with some from the marketing department, believed in the idea and 
wondered why this strategy had not been used earlier. Conversely, the BU tasked to take over 
Woodstock and the CEO perceived it as a “waste of money and time, we’ll just do that with this 
company, because they are helping us” (Business Director, 2013) and as a “play” (CEO, 2014). 
Interestingly, the Co-creator insisted on the idea very strongly, as he acknowledged the power of 
the Pinta Inc.’s name among its customers. 
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“My sales of the Pinta window happened because of their name. They are huge in this country 
and everybody trusts their products and quality. It really boosted my sales.” (CEO, Co-creator 
window producer, Interview, 2014) 
 
Weick et al. (2005) explain that labelling is what makes “shock” manageable and easy to 
control, while also creating a “common ground of understanding for everyone, reducing the 
ignorance differences between actors”. By creating a formalized definition of co-branding, the 
development team were able to offer the definition as a cue to group management, who were 
against this new form of partnership: 
 
“The understanding of this is not that good…there has really been a fight to get the management 
guys to understand how important it is.” (Marketing Manager, 2013) 
 
The idea challenged both the ideology, and the business paradigms present in the company. 
Therefore, the development team’s efforts to convince top management were only partially 
successful, as the residual uncertainty surrounding the concept was significant and lacked the 
most important cue, the value appropriation of co-branding. Management agreed, signing the 
contract with the development partner as the company sought to capture value through value 
creation. Their customer would benefit in terms of awareness, while Woodstock would receive 
valuable input into producing a window. However, what was labelled and enacted as co-
branding lacked a pricing strategy, leaving management sceptical over the success and long-
term benefits of the decision, not even the business owner lobbied for this.  
 
“We don’t price it. It has not been possible for me to make calculations.” (Marketing Manager, 
2013) 
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“Co-branding is only specific to the Danish window manufacturer; we are not going to take it to 
other customers. They have helped us with co-development and we have a different agreement 
with them. It costs money and I don’t think it generates profits.” (Director of BU, 2014)  
 
“But this window producer, our co-developer now, can’t be the example to follow. We supported 
him a lot, almost gave him the product for free.” (Director of BU, 2014)  
 
Therefore, this element was a part of the value proposition for Woodstock in the Danish market 
only. It was also intended to be temporary. The BU was willing to compromise and accept this 
new model during the development phase, as a form of payment to the co-developer. This 
confirms Weick’s (1979) argument that what survives confrontation with ecological change are 
elements explained in pre-existing cause maps (Weick, 1979:187). Only the existence of a value 
capture mechanism would have convinced the BU to accept it, showing that revenue model 
legitimizes the existence of the value proposition.  
 
6.2.2.2 Creation of meaning for warranty 
 
Another important element comprising part of the value proposition was the warranty. The 
window industry offers liability to its customers, meaning that Pinta Inc. had to adopt the 
practice to become a supplier to this industry. For this reason, the warranty was part of the early 
version of Woodstock’s business plan, offered as a commitment to all the parts involved in the 
creation of this mandatory element. Compared with co-branding, where managers were able to 
evaluate necessity of adoption, a warranty was labelled as a “must” as part of the value 
proposition (internal document, 2010), an entry requirement for this industry. The strategy 
applied to understanding the concept and its applicability involved benchmarking against the 
aluminium profile, continuously looking for and defining reference points to attain or 
outperform them.  
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“We need to see what is the practice in this industry and what are our competitors doing? I 
think the main goal is to be as good or better than aluminium.” (Senior Project Manager, 2013) 
 
“What is the reference? We need a reference point. I just said it is important to stick to the 
agreement that aluminium is the standard, so if it does not pass certain standards, I think we 
could also accept not passing that standard.” (Vice President of Innovation, Steering meeting, 
2013) 
 
The integration and creation of a warranty for a product produced by the company involved 
different steps of growing complexity when transferring from G1 to G3. In the G1 phase, Pinta 
Inc. needed to assure its customers that the “Woodstock product should not crack, delaminate 
nor disintegrate if it is maintained to our rules” (Steering meeting, 2012), while for G3 the 
company had to assure the durability of their product in terms of colour and gloss as well. 
During the process of formulating the warranty, there were two major interruptions: the first 
involved an internal misalignment regarding what a warranty should cover, which determined a 
need to accept redefined targets, and the second, a lack of alignment with suppliers’ 
expectations.  
 
a. Change of targets: compromising  
 
The aim of Woodstock, as declared in Steering meetings was to create a window profile that 
would perform better than its competitors, namely aluminium windows providers. The 
development team, together with the BU had defined targets that turned out to be unrealistic, 
leading to a rise in conflicts. For example, in one of the gate meetings in 2013, the creation of a 
mandatory warranty was considered an outstanding issue, showing that the two sides had not 
reached agreement, or a common understanding of the implications of being liable.  
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“There is an outstanding issue regarding the warranty obligation towards our co-developer. He 
has been promised a warranty scheme ever since the project started, but the BU will not accept 
this as they think it is going too far. We therefore have a conflict about this that we need to 
resolve. We will discuss this issue with director of the BU to find out how to get around it. This 
outstanding issue is carried over into the next step.” (Portfolio Manager, Gate meeting minutes, 
2013) 
 
The creation of a warranty involved conducting multiple tests to prove the durability of the 
window frame under different weather conditions for a certain number of years. Pinta Inc. 
needed to accept to be liable for different aspects of the product, such as colour and gloss loss 
over time, the product’s reaction to time ageing, and delamination. The conflict escalated when 
the initial target number of testing hours, based on those set by the aluminium industry, were not 
reached. Furthermore, after studying their competitors more closely, they also realized that they 
had set targets that were too high for Woodstock, in their endeavour to create “the best window 
on the market, at least the same or best than aluminium profiles” (Business Developer, BU, 
Interview, 2013). In this situation, the retention decision to continue development was based on 
benchmarking the situation against, not only external practices, but other internal projects as 
well.  
“So I looked through all the homepages and looked at what are they actually promising their 
customers? I was looking, of course, especially at the aluminium windows, to see what I was up 
against.” (Senior Project Manager, Steering meeting, 2013) 
 
They discovered that aluminium runs tests on colour loss for 1000 hours to give a five-year 
warranty, while they had decided to run a test of 2000 hours to offer a ten-year warranty. As the 
tests failed, they needed to redefine their targets, after acknowledging that they lacked 
appropriate knowledge of the matter they broadened the focus of their research across the entire 
window industry, not only aluminium:  
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 “We tested for about 2000 hours, when actually aluminium is tested for 1000 hours. And we 
failed. (…) that was a target we set out in the absence of better understanding.” (Senior Project 
Manager, Interview, 2013) 
 
Furthermore, the vice president of innovation, pleaded for this not to be a showstopper, he made 
the Steering Group aware that they were operating with two different targets: an internal one, 
that of 2000 hours, and an external one, namely the industry standard, which they needed to gain 
more knowledgeable about.  
 
 “But this is not a showstopper, because it’s an internal standard, and it is the industry standard 
that is key to the market. So, we have to differentiate between these two different targets. We 
have two targets here, and we should be aware of this.” (Steering meeting, 2013) 
 
Despite this situation, the decision makers agreed to take the risk of offering the product to their 
customers without a warranty on the quality of the profiles until the situation was resolved. The 
decision was considered possible since they were operating with small volumes. In this manner, 
they could keep the project ongoing.  
 
“We realized that the first profiles to our customer had no ‘official’ warranty but the quantity is 
rather limited, so it will be on our account.” (Steering meeting, 2013) 
 
Interestingly, the interruption was a misalignment between two internal paradigms, the first of 
the BU, where accuracy was very important:  
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“What I hear is that we had a target at the beginning, and now you ask me to change it, and still 
continue with the project. And I don’t understand, we had some targets to fulfil and we failed, 
this is what I see. We said from the beginning that we would make a window that performs 
better than aluminium.” (Business Director, BU)  
 
The second was that of R&D, which was defined by a trial and error culture, where plausibility 
and equivocality was accepted. R&D tabled arguments to prove that the comparison was not 
just, due to the technical specifications of the paint system used in aluminium. Furthermore, the 
vice president of innovation, whom had played the role of the mediator between the two parties, 
had drawn on his experience in the windows industry to challenge the targets and show that the 
initial targets could be changed, with no major consequences for Woodstock: 
  
“One of the biggest window manufacturer has a standard of a 1000 hours’ rate globally, with 
no difference between regions. I had a feeling when you're talking about the standard; it's a 
kind of artificial standard. Nobody relates to it. That's how I feel. So you really should depend 
on using aluminium as a real standard I would say.” (VP, R&D, Steering meeting, 2013) 
 
Clearly, the targets needed to be redefined, which required the R&D team examine the industry 
they were planning to compete with more closely. By collating information from the industry, 
the team observed that the goals they had formulated at the beginning of the process were above 
the conditions imposed on other types of windows, not only aluminium. This “news” gave them 
an explication for the long-term duration of Woodstock’s development period, and types of 
misunderstandings that had informed the formulated targets.  
 
“As I said, one explanation as to why in the beginning we set this goal at 2000 hours was that 
we were not aware of all the rules for this business -- and after we discovered that in fact it is 
too much -- so why try to be more royal than the king?” (Business Director, Interview, 2014) 
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“Yes, I did a little study on warrantees also. We had the discussion that we were going to offer 
this ten-year warranty, and in Denmark we can witness a lot of companies offering a warranty 
for ten years. So I looked through all the homepages and looked at what they were actually 
promising their customers. I was looking, of course, especially at the aluminium windows to see 
what I was up against. There was absolutely nobody discussing or mentioning anything about 
gloss and colour. Aluminium standards did not mention it at all.” (Senior Project Manager, 
Interview, 2014) 
 
This interruption caused the team to pause to assess whether this attempt to apply the wrong 
specifications should be a “showstopper” – the word used in the Steering meeting by the 
Business Director. Ultimately, the decision to continue with the project was influenced by a 
process of internal benchmarking against other Pinta Inc. projects. The company had listed the 
internal practices and acknowledged that Woodstock was “different” (Business Developer, BU), 
observing that the same conditions that would have stopped another internal project were not 
applicable here. Labelling the situation as “different”, plus accepting a shift from “best window 
on the market” to “why try to be more royal than the king” guided the decision to continue with 
the project.  
 
“One thing was that our other BUs create external facades -- of course we are comparing with 
them a lot. I think we should keep on doing that. But we also must be clear on the following -- in 
their business, as such, they have no competition, because they have boards made of stone, and 
of course there is also, like we have, no industry standard. Therefore, they made their own 
industry standard. So, this is not for me a showstopper, we should go on.” (Business Director, 
Steering meeting, 2014) 
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The final decision was to redefine the targets for the Nordic market, leaving the south open to 
discussion, as they were starting to realize the complexity of the industry they were aiming to 
supply.  
 
b. Lack of alignment with suppliers 
 
Woodstock’s profile was comprised of three parts: the profile, the paint system and tape. Each 
of the parties involved and responsible for a component had to provide their own warranty. Only 
after each party had formulated their warranties, could Woodstock combine them all into a final 
warranty to the windows’ producers. This fact meant the creation of the value proposition was 
dependent on the value network supporting the product: 
 
“Before we can provide a warranty, we need a warranty from our (sub) suppliers.” (Senior 
Project Manager, 2013) 
A challenge arose from the supplier of the paint system (paint system hereafter). The paint 
system was only a supplier and co-developer of the system, and the decision of to use one 
supplier was intended to assist the warranty process (VP, R&D, 2014). However, paint system 
refused to give a warranty to meet the specifications that Pinta Inc. requested, resulting in a 
lengthy negotiation process, characterized by frustration over the low negotiating power of the 
Woodstock business team. This supplier needed to run multiple tests for different colours, so the 
company would be able to access the available profiles, but the process took longer than 
expected, which delayed the launch date of the product several times: 
 
“I was in contact with paint system for quite a while to come up with a type of warranty and this 
is what they came up with last week, saying paint system ensures that “the products presented 
above perform according to paint system test results”. This is the only result that we have had 
until now – I think they warrant nothing. So yeah, it still must be finalized, but it is a very 
difficult and long way to get a decent warranty about the paint system. We want to warrant ten 
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years to the market, and paint system has to cover some aspects of that and this is the only thing 
that they can come up with, just a product warranty based on their own results.” (Business 
Director, BU, Steering meeting, 2014) 
 
The collaboration with paint system was considered “slow” and “inefficient”, but their position 
was strong because they were the only co-developer of the necessary paint system. Interestingly, 
the reason mentioned for not signing a new supplier was, aside from costs, the lack of time, as 
developing a relationship with a new supplier would delay the launch of the product by another 
year.  
 
“Group management has decided not to put resources into finding a new supplier, and continue 
the collaboration with paint system; the reasoning is time.” (Project Manager, Woodstock)  
 
However, the fact that paint system had been so evasive in their warranty offering, which was 
wholly unpredicted by managers, had created a conflict. The vice president remembered the 
argument, at the beginning of project, which had been that having one supplier for the full 
painting system would “facilitate” getting a warranty for the entire system. This was no longer 
the case, as paint system did not meet expectations. The team realized that their negotiating 
position was very weak: 
 
“VP R&D: I just want to challenge that we some time ago agreed that it is important that we 
choose one system supplier to get the warranty. Well, we can’t get the warranty, was that then 
the right decision? 
BU: no. This was also how they described it.  
VP R&D: But I guess as soon as we are in to a situation where there is, I mean more solutions 
we have a possibility to put pressure on them as well. I guess that is it. So, I think we will get 
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there in time, but as things are right now we are not in a strong position. Just as with painting 
the profiles, we have just one supplier!  
They can afford a “take it or leave it attitude, which we can’t.” (Steering meeting, 2014) 
 
They also realized that they would probably never achieve what they had planned from the 
beginning, so they would have to formulate the “most optimal way given the situation now” 
(Steering meeting), which was interesting as initially high expectations became pursuit of a best-
case scenario.  
 
“Project Manager: what I think we need is to have a warranty on the performance of the 
systems. That’s what we need from paint system and they should be able to give us that, they 
have designed a test for it, so we just need them to put this on paper. 
VP R&D: But apparently, they are not there. Do we believe that they will ever get there?  
BU: I really don’t know. We will never get where we want. That’s for sure. Now we just need to 
find the most optimal way in this situation. That’s the only option.” (Steering meeting) 
 
To resolve the situation, Woodstock’s inventor proposed relabelling the part of the warranty 
stating maintenance free, meaning ten years without painting, to “low-maintenance” (Senior 
Project Manager, Steering meeting, 2014). After further research, the team noticed that the 
notion “maintenance free” was not present elsewhere, and so agreed relabelling would reduce 
their liability on the market. The consensus at that time was to ratify the decision, as pipeline 
was showing a market launch with the Co-creator, and missing that deadline was unthinkable. 
Furthermore, at the beginning of 2015, when the project was taken over completely by the BU, 
they decided to begin searching for another supplier who would be able to offer a warranty for 
the full system:  
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 “In order to strengthen supply security and improve our position when negotiating prices for 
coating material (putty and powder) for our profiles, it was agreed to seek an alternative 
supplier to paint system. We are looking for a supplier for the full system to strengthen the 
warranty cover.” (Project Manager, project meeting, December 2014) 
The process of creation of the warranty component showed the dependency of the value 
proposition on the value network.  
 
6.2.2.3 Creation of meaning of aesthetics 
 
The visual quality of G3 was one of the most challenging aspects of the product. In the windows 
industry, the visual aspect of the products is very important to the end-customers. They are 
interested in aesthetics, the ability to find windows of different colours, and the option to paint 
the windows at their convenience. Woodstock’s ambition was to put on the market a window 
with very high insulation proprieties competing with the aluminium windows, while having a 
wood-like characteristic: “wood aesthetic! For me wood is aesthetic, not aluminium”, the 
Business Director affirmed. This aim was a challenge to Woodstock in several regards. 
Specifically, they needed to develop a type of paint that would adhere to Woodstock, as a 
material, together with a coating procedure. Once they had the paint, they needed to be able to 
provide the standard colours required by the industry, and develop a painting repair kit for users, 
as the frames could not be repainted with standard paint found in stores. Meeting these criteria 
would create alignment along the entire value chain and network, discerning what quality and 
aesthetic means to the business. Above all, R&D and the BU needed to learn to integrate an 
extra factor in their decision-making, namely the end-customer’s wishes. This was a major 
challenge, as the company had always been a business-to-business entity. As we will see, this 
interruption spread itself across all the elements of the business model, as it became a matter of 
production, costs, pricing, value network, customers, and market acceptance (as will be analysed 
further in the chapter, in relation to each element). 
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Building aesthetics, and pursuing a suitable visual quality for the frame, were key issues on the 
agendas of each project and Steering meeting, from 2013 until the end of 2014. Every time an 
issue related to the visual quality of the frame, regardless of whether it was due to production 
mistakes by Woodstock’s board or in the painting system and procedure, considerable costs 
were added. Yet, very positive feedback was obtained from the market: “we are selling. Our 
customer is ordering more and more, and we managed to produce more, so we are in a risk of 
success” [said laughing!] (Senior Project Manager, Interview, beginning 2014). This encouraged 
the company to invest to find the right solution.  
 
Complexity was added by the fact that Woodstock needed to provide customers with multiple 
profiles in different colours, while each of the colours needed to be developed separately and 
tested against all the standard tests. The profiles needed to have a “visually acceptable quality” 
(internal document, 2013) for the industry, when compared with the visuals of an aluminium 
profile. If the quality was found to be unacceptable to customers, profiles were rejected, 
resulting in a significant amount of waste and, therefore, costs increased, meaning appearance 
became a feature labelled in Steering meetings as one of the “major risks.” 
 
“Our customer rejected 20-60% of the profiles in the latest 3 orders (14-18, 14-19 and 14-20) 
due to poor visual quality (wool tufts), but we were aware that this specific production of vr00 
was not good, and the profiles have been put on hold.” (Project meeting, 2014) 
 
“We have two major issues from the perspective of visual quality: loose wool tufts and uneven 
surfaces. This has put the waste rate up to 40% for our customers, which is far too high! Our 
customer is very concerned. It is difficult to predict which profiles will not look nice after they 
have been painted, and our customer is aware of this as they have seen profiles that looked nice 
before they were painted, but not after” (Project meeting, 2014). 
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As the development of this type of profile and paint for the Woodstock profile was an 
innovation, the team was working in a context of very high uncertainty. Their trial and error 
attitude helped them develop the product systematically, while also learning the problems. “It is 
difficult to predict” became the general statement for 2013 and 2014. This component of the 
value proposition brought many actors involved in the business together in a very tightly-
coupled system, as an error in visual production would have negative effects on waste level and 
cost suppliers, the customer and Pinta Inc.’s production factories. Managers of Woodstock 
realized that they needed to create a common understanding and a strong agreement, to 
guarantee the precedence of the concept of quality and visual quality, among the entire value 
chain. Therefore, after coordinating with their customer and painting and coating suppliers, 
Woodstock developed a “quality library” with failed and successful profiles. This library was 
situated at the production facilities (see more under the value chain section, where the 
interruptions raised at Pinta’s production facilities are analysed), customer, and suppliers. 
 
“We are now working on a quality library with examples of surface phenomena. Acceptance 
criteria are to be coordinated between us, our customer and our suppliers” (Steering meeting, 
2013).  
 
One of the most important decisions regarding the identity of Woodstock and its visual quality 
was that suggested by the new Business Director of the BU, and related to the takeover of the 
project. He witnessed that development team was looking for reference points concerning the 
visual aspect of the aluminium profiles. When conducting ageing tests, at one point the results 
were poor for the Woodstock profile, although the visual aspect was the same. Debates about 
having the right measurement began, and the question “should we listen to the numbers or to 
our subjective evaluation of the visual quality?” (Portfolio Manager, Steering meeting, 2013) 
emerged. The Vice President of Innovation reminded the team that they were running quality 
tests to create a solid business case, targeting a low complaining ratio, and the fact that the end-
customer would evaluate the profiles, suggesting that the visual look was more relevant then the 
results of the tests where aluminium profiles performed better. In this situation, the new director 
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suggested situating the product in the marketplace as a new type of frame, to stop references to 
wood or aluminium windows, which were both misleading for customers and punitive to 
Woodstock. He admitted the uniqueness of the Woodstock profile and the fact that the 
comparison should be relative, not direct and absolute:  
 
“Business Director: is there any way of defining a bit more objectively what is good and what is 
not good and what's good enough? That’s the problem we have. The samples we showed at the 
beginning where seen as not good enough and now they have started looking at everything with 
a microscope and say this is not perfect. We should say wait a minute, is that fair judgment? I 
think it is very subjective!  
Project Manager: the normal standard in this industry is that you should look from 3 meters 
away. This will not be a direct competitor for aluminium, but then you should be ready to 
emphasize the problems of aluminium, if you were looking at the alum profile close-up, you 
would see defects as well, impressions and other things.  
Business Director: we just make it clear to the customers that they shouldn’t compare it to 
wood, that they shouldn’t compare it to aluminium, it is just a category in itself and then you 
can do a relative comparison. Ok, this is what aluminium looks like, this is what wood looks 
like, and this is what our stuff looks like. Right now we don’t have the right perspective on it.  
We should go for third look; we should communicate this as a new service; don’t try to 
persuade people this is wood and don’t make them believe it is aluminium.” (Steering meeting, 
2014) 
 
6.2.3 Conclusions 
 
In summary, the interruptions and the enacted environment that resulted in the creation of the 
value proposition of Woodstock were the following: 
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Interruptions The enactment process Outcome/enacted environment 
G1 expected to be a fast 
and standard solution 
Identifying a very fragmented 
market, a traditional industry 
Conduct market research before 
acting 
Focused on one national market at 
that time 
G1: complex and 
expensive value chain 
G1 labelled as “valuable learning” 
 
Decided to stop G1, and continue 
with G3 
Fear of the unknown 
regarding co-branding 
Disagreement points 
between R&D and BU 
Labelled and formalized the 
concept internally 
 
Creating a temporary collective 
agreement (temporary retention) 
Need to adopt new 
practices: warranty - 
challenging ideology 
Labelled as a “big challenge” for 
Pinta Inc., however a “must” to 
enter the market 
Benchmarking competitors’ 
practice - in a search for reference 
points  
 
Defining and re-defining targets 
Trying to match wrong 
references and reaching a 
“showstopper” moment 
Disagreement points 
between R&D and BU 
Highlighting the need for further 
market research 
Re-labelling parts of value 
proposition  
 
Need to understand 
aesthetics - challenging the 
ideology 
Benchmarking competitors’ 
practice 
Create common quality libraries  
 
Reaching agreement about the 
value proposition along the value 
chain and network  
Label Woodstock as “3rd look” 
Table 6. 1 Enactment processes of the value proposition 
 
Woodstock’s value proposition was the result of a collaborative process, undertaken between 
different manners of making sense. The company was subject to a strong discourse over 
identity, informed by the varying positions of the group development team (the engineers who 
have created Woodstock), the BU taking it over, and the customer who had exclusivity over the 
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product and had acted as a co-developer partner for more than four years. Given the newness of 
the product, the creation of the value proposition was born out of a chaos of uncertainty (Weick, 
1995), where labelling and re-labelling, benchmarking, creating temporally compromises, while 
having a strong spoke person, were the tools employed by the development team. 
 
Porac et al. (1989) explained that when seeking to establish itself in an industry, there is an 
imitative tendency; there is an ongoing input-output cycle with the environment “in which 
subjective interpretations of externally situated information become themselves objectified via 
behaviour” (Porac et al., 1989:399). The authors argued that this imitative behaviour would help 
construct a mental model of competitive behaviour, consisting of beliefs about the identity of 
the firm, and the causal beliefs about what would be required to be competitive in a new 
environment. When building Woodstock’s value proposition, there were continual input-output 
processes considered retrospectively, as well as internal practices and external practices 
undertaken by the windows industry. The team was challenged to create a new identity and a 
new meaning, as they needed to “construct actively an interpretation by linking received cues 
with well-learned and/or developing cognitive structures” (Porac et al., 1989:389). However, in 
the case of the most important decision, kill/no kill, internal cues, meaning previous practices in 
the company, weighed far more than external ones.  
The value proposition was composed of more features, and each one of the features needed to 
have its own enactment process. Some of these features were defined at the beginning of the 
innovation process, and then re-shaped when customers sent specific cues; while other 
components, as with the aesthetic, were enacted continuously. These enactment processes 
further enacted linkages between value proposition and different other business model elements, 
linkages which are going to be analysed in chapter seven.  
Furthermore, the team needed to understand the value proposition as an integrative part of the 
entire value chain, and to recognize the strong connection between the value proposition and 
revenue model. The lack of a mechanism to appropriate the value created through co-braining 
created frustration at the managerial level, as determined at the end of that type of partnership. 
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Thus, pricing mechanisms legitimized the existence of the core of a business model, namely the 
value proposition. 
 
The process of creating a value proposition involves more than mastery of the properties set out 
by the technology per se. The customer, in this case the Co-creator, and pre-existing industry 
standards together mediated the transformation of the technology into a value proposition. 
Interestingly, this was considered a problem when formulating the value proposition, rather than 
a solution. Thus, the actors involved needed to create meaning and enact solutions affected by 
the interruptions analysed above. As seen, these interruptions had a different source: appeared to 
result from a lack of knowledge, divergent points between paradigms, a clash between new 
industry standards and ideology, and a failure to create agreement, about the value offered along 
the entire value chain. As each paradigm had its own approach to rationalizing interruptions, the 
goal was not only to enact a solution, but also to compromise the terms under which these parts 
would agree to deliver an agreement.   
 
An interesting observation here is that each of the components of the value proposition 
challenged specific elements of the business model, and these elements are all coming together 
under crisis situations only. This aspect is elaborated on further in chapter seven.  
 
6.3 Enacting the market segment5  
 
When the decision to use the material R&D had developed as a solution for the window industry 
was taken, the BU considered segmentation complete. Yet, once Pinta Inc. became better 
acquainted with the industry, and entered a co-development partnership with a local windows 
producer, they learned about the complexity of the market. This learning process was not 
smooth, and the team faced several environmental challenges, which affected both its 
understanding of the market and how to approach management of a co-development partnership. 
                                                     
5 Market segment: the users to whom the technology is useful and for what purpose, and specify the revenue generation mechanism(s) for the 
firm” (Chesbrough and Rosembloom, 2002: 533). 
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Therefore, the team had to enact an understanding of a new type of customers and the industry 
they were a part of. Their approach was to interconnect continuously through identification with 
the market segment, by formulating competitive strategy considerations, even though these two 
elements were introduced as different identities associated with the business model according to 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002:533). However, the R&D team expressed the shortcomings 
of having no clearly defined strategy several times; such a strategy would have guided the 
development of Woodstock in one direction:  
“What is the strategy here? That is a question we have never got an answer to. We tried to have 
a mission and vision to revitalize the project into G3, to show that we wanted to go that way, but 
every time a key account handler for Germany went to a new customer, they came back with a 
new set of drawings that didn’t fit. But that’s simply because there was never a strategy! Or 
maybe they (BU) had a strategy, but it was misaligned.” (Portfolio Manager, Interview, 2013) 
“How do you create a strategy for something that does not exist? I think we had the problem of 
having a BU that did not know how to create a strategy for Woodstock, and we did not know 
how to position ourselves. This would also impact the business model in terms of how many 
products you will have, the logistics, everything! And sometimes we felt that we just needed 
one!” (Project Manager, Interview, 2013). 
In these conditions, the strategic positioning of Woodstock and market segmentation influenced 
each other.  
 
6.3.1 Segmentation criteria and strategy for approaching the market  
 
The first version of Woodstock’s business plan included the decision taken by the R&D team, 
the Vice President of Innovation, and the R&D Program Director, that Woodstock would only 
serve small windows’ producers. Group management, who expected to see a high-volume type 
of business serving large windows’ producers as customers challenged the decision. When 
explaining the choice to service smaller producers to group management, the Program Director 
underlined the most important specifications of the Woodstock project:  
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A. High level of uncertainty given the novelty of the market for Pinta Inc., thus the 
importance of creating room for learning and experimenting; 
B. Production capacity challenges if serving large customers; and 
C. Brand value of Pinta Inc. might be more beneficial for small producers (for co-branding 
scenarios).  
These three aspects, as understood by the Program Director acted as the platform for developing 
Woodstock, and on many occasions as excuses for interruptions.  
 
“Group management: why not big windows manufacturers? Wouldn’t that positioning give us 
more value? 
Program Director: with small producers, we will be able to use our brand and create value both 
for window manufacturers and ourselves and we learn quicker by working with a small, 
entrepreneurial window manufacturer. With major players, it is harder to break through, as we 
do not have the capacity or experience to work with them.” (Internal document, Woodstock, 
2010) 
 
Furthermore, in accordance with the Program Director’s statement, the inventor of Woodstock 
emphasized the importance of “soft criteria” for segmentation and the importance of 
establishing a partnership with someone sharing one’s attitude towards accepting uncertainties 
when working with a “product that doesn’t not exist yet”: 
 
“My criteria for this early stage is that I would like a company that is not necessarily the 
smallest one, fairly big, they are professional and have an organization that is not small. They 
should be eager to grow and they should have a mind-set about challenging their surroundings. 
They should of course be serious about handling their products and their products should be 
considered good in the market. Then they would be willing to embrace these uncertainties, they 
have to be willing to work with us on a product that does not exist yet, and they have to spend 
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some time with us, so we’ll build success together. These are the soft criteria.” (Senior Project 
Manager, Interview, 2013) 
 
When explaining customer’s choice of Woodstock, the vice president of innovation further 
agreed that they required customers who lacked the power to create innovations by themselves, 
as the big players had: 
“We know that depending on market to market, most the volume in some markets consists of a 
huge amount of small window producers, who do not have a critical mass to do anything like 
this. They are the target! ” (VP R&D, Interview, 2013) 
 
However, when discussing this matter with the BU, they declared that they were focused on the 
geographical expansion of the project into different European markets, as their usual business 
sought to offer component parts to businesses around the world. Geographical expansion was 
seen as a must, together with selection of the best strategic positioning of the product, as they 
were uncertain whether Woodstock would compete against the wood or wood-aluminium 
segment. On every occasion, the market has influenced positioning decisions. They initially 
moved away from competing with wood, towards wood aluminium, and aluminium windows. 
Interestingly, regardless of this apparently tangible indecision, the reference points for 
benchmarking were always formulated and inspired by the aim of being “as good, or better than 
aluminium” (Business Director, Steering meeting, 2013). 
 
“Our initial goal was to be active in the wood / aluminium window segment. There were some 
preliminary signs that customers see this as a ‘too difficult’ route to market, as it will not be 
easy to compete with aluminium. They prefer to market this as a new segment; as an improved 
wood window.” (Steering meeting, September 2013) 
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The same market cue was received several months later, when the Co-creator and Pinta Inc. 
organized an important combined marketing campaign at the European handball Championship. 
Here, the R&D team spoke with the Co-creator’s customer, and learned that Woodstock was 
perceived as a competitor in the wood windows segment, rather than in the aluminium windows 
segment. 
 
“I was approached many times by people saying that they didn’t sell any aluminium windows, 
but that they strongly believed they could sell this, because it looks like a wood window. They 
knew their customers liked the low maintenance free thing of aluminium windows but that they 
would not consider them for older houses because they look wrong. They really felt that this was 
addressing a need, a niche in the market. They also confirmed the Co-creator’s idea that he was 
attacking the wood windows’ sector more than that of aluminium windows.” (Senior Project 
Manager, Steering meeting, January 2014). 
 
Nonetheless, segmentation criteria were not the main concern for the BU, as they believed “the 
market gets segmented by itself. We know exactly which segment to talk to. The only question is 
that maybe the wood segment could also be a segment that we can go for?” (Business Director, 
Interview, beginning 20146) 
 
The lack of focus concerning the type of customers suitable for Woodstock became a source of 
internal divergence, causing interruptions that affected the R&D team and BU. Tension emerged 
when the BU proposed a new customer whose intentions were to use a Woodstock profile 
covered with an aluminium foil. While the BU was pleased to receive attention from an 
important European player, the R&D team members questioned their understanding of 
Woodstock:  
 
                                                     
6 Here, stating the period of the year is important, as the business unit got a new business director in the second half 
of 2014, and he had a different approach, as analysed further in the chapter.  
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“I don’t understand why we received such a proposal in the first place. That really makes me 
wonder if the BU knows what we are doing here” (Portfolio Manager, 2013).  
 
The strategy for positioning the product in the market was to approach manufacturers to ensure 
smooth market penetration. In Denmark, the Co-creator had received an exclusivity agreement 
from Pinta Inc., which meant that no other windows manufacturer would be able to purchase 
Woodstock until the exclusivity contract had expired. This decision determined that: “the 
market positioning in Denmark has been kind of postponed.” (Portfolio Manager, 2014).  
 
Thus, in the meantime, other markets were analysed and targeted. The BU considered markets 
where insulation systems were needed, establishing Germany as having the greatest business 
potential. The strategy chosen was to approach two potential partners in Germany, after devising 
prototypes to send them as a business proposal. Still, the shock was discovering the German 
market was split into very small and different types of window producers, operating out of more 
than 7000 factories (internal documents, 2011). The dilemma then emerged of how to approach 
such a market: 
 
“The windows manufacturers are very small companies, so, there´s a huge number of them. And 
therefore, you could say this, the effort that we would have to go to get in contact with them and 
promote this, seems to be enormous. So, we considered this, questioning how could we make it 
work, and how we could get access to a sufficiently big partner, so that we could get the same 
kind of foothold in the market as that provided by out Co-creator here in Denmark.” (Program 
Director, Interview, 2014). 
 
They approached the German market by participating in specialized fairs with Woodstock; they 
also hired a special key account manager for the German market. They learnt that Pinta Inc. 
window was answering passive house requirements, meaning that they could position 
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themselves in this way in Germany. This was an important finding, and gave the team a target: 
gaining passive house certification. Additionally, the most important milestone for entry to the 
German market was to obtain certification to sell windows in Germany. Two types of certificate, 
namely the CE and RAL, were mandatory. The team worked for two years to gain the 
certifications, a goal eventually achieved in collaboration with a German window producer and 
celebrated as an important achievement.  
 
“According to German rules, the window must be a passive house window, but it is simpler than 
other German passive house windows, which normally consist of three materials: wood, 
aluminium and foam.” (Project meeting, 2013) 
 
“Then we go to the next agenda point, which is certification in Germany as everybody is aware 
this is a very important issue as we cannot do any business in Germany without the certification. 
We started this whole process in June and we are quite far along already in the whole process.” 
(Steering meeting, 2013). 
 
Development for this market was not without challenges, as it required the Woodstock product 
to be technically different from that developed for the Danish market, and it was also expected 
to have a different visual aspect: “The German market wants a sandy structure instead of the 
smooth surface we have today” (Project Manager, Interview, 2014). The team needed to learn 
how to handle the diversity required by this market and the BU proposed a benchmark based on 
the practices of the aluminium suppliers. This was considered the fastest solution to match a 
scenario in which the team could launch the product at the beginning of 2015.  
 
“There is a very large range of products and we have considered what the aluminium suppliers 
do, and they actually have a standard program, but a very large program. So actually, it seems 
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like a standard program but it is actually pick and choose stuff.” (Portfolio Manager, Interview, 
2014). 
 
Despite all these challenges, the ultimate decision to develop a product for this market was 
strongly influenced by the fact that German window producers had shown a growing interest in 
Woodstock profiles. As in the case of the Danish market, very positive feedback from that 
market and the discovery of potential customers ready and willing to co-develop the product, 
prompted management to recognize the potential of the business: 
 
“At this point what I have noticed today is the feedback from this German window manufacturer 
we met in a trade fair. I have rarely seen that level of interest in my 17 years of working with 
specific products. Really! For me one of the biggest things is that one customer made his 
production facilities available for us. He offered it to us, totally free of commitment from our 
side. That is a sign!” (New Business Director, Interview, 2015)  
 
6.3.2 Co-creation process  
 
Working together with the Co-creator allowed the R&D team to detect flaws in the material and 
discover how to improve it, to understand the market and access end-customer feedback, as well 
as understanding how the value proposition should be redefined when moving from G1 to G3. 
The Co-creator was a constant partner in development all the phases: G1, G2, G3. The next sub 
section analyses the triggers for the partnership, exploring how it added value to the project (as 
perceived by the managers) and the extent of the challenge posed, as it was labelled as a 
challenge several times, when referencing both the ideology and the paradigms involved.  
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6.2.2.1 Triggers for co-creation 
 
Pinta Inc. had to make sense not only of a new technology and discover its potential, but also of 
a new type of customer as well. In chaos of uncertainty, the team accepted the proposal by a 
medium sized window factory to enter a co-development style partnership. The R&D team 
understood very early in the process that a technology like Woodstock could not be brought to 
market by relying solely on their expertise. In their adventure with Woodstock they had 
discovered little of their previous experience was applicable. This was the trigger for the 
acceptance of co-creation. The window manufacturer, introduced as the Co-creator, remained a 
constant element in the development and transformation phases of Woodstock, from G1 to G3, 
inspiring and developing both the technology and the business model. This added complexity to 
the project, as both the R&D team and the BU needed to understand the implications of such a 
co-development style partnership.  
 
“He said to us: 'you can use my company as your R&D centre for this’ so actually we used all 
his knowledge with windows, all his market knowledge within this, and then we started up.” 
(VP, R&D, Interview, 2013) 
 
 “In the last 3 years we have changed the focus a bit, starting with G1 and continuing to G3. 
The customer was always to Co-creator, and we had a lot to learn, this was all new to us. It was 
really new and we needed all the knowledge and expertise that we could access.” (Business 
Director, BU, interview. 2014) 
 
The Co-creator showed complete confidence in the project from the outset, showing full 
commitment. The development team referred to them as a “very important team player” and the 
Program Director, looking back, was certain that co-development was the main factor resulting 
in success bringing the technology to market. She has also underlined that this type of approach 
to innovation was new to the company: 
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“So they were first front-runners, in that way we could both experiment and develop, and also 
see how the market reacted as their learning was speeding up and developing very fast! So, for 
us, for R&D, it was a very important experience to do it like this, because when we were close to 
our partners, we were able to experiment and learn: ‘what do the customers actually say about 
this and that’.” (Program Director, 2014) 
 
Furthermore, the Co-creator was labelled “a special case – a pilot introduction”, “our ticket to 
start”, “our back office, a good learning case, technical development partner”, “a good learning 
opportunity that keeps the current business plan ongoing.”7 These labels were used to convince 
group management that it was a good decision have a co-developer, as in the third Steering 
meeting in 2011 the question: “what are we getting from Co-creator?” was asked. The question 
was cost related; as the Co-creator got exclusivity on the Danish market for two years when 
using the technology, and was leveraging on co-branding. The BU considered this to be “not a 
good learning case for future customers. The Co-creator is not a case study that shows the value 
of our material for other markets” (Business Developer, Interview, 2013). The BU considered 
that they were responding to Co-creator’s requirements and expectations too easily, offering 
them too much. One of the most significant examples being that the Co-creator argued that its 
business was reliant in its ability to be flexible, able to offer windows in any colour their 
customers require. For Woodstock, testing profiles with a new colour each time was a very 
complicated and expensive process. They decided to offer a certain number of colours, and then 
for the costs for testing additional colours, to be paid by the Co-creator. The team considered the 
aluminium windows market for solutions, and found they practiced the high standardization of 
products. The BU was challenged to accept the Co-creator’s conditions, arguing: 
 
                                                     
7 These definitions were taken from both steering meeting minutes, and interviews conducted with the business 
director in 2014.  
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“We would have had a different contract signed between Pinta Inc. and Co-creator, but we were 
not involved in the project at that time, we were really at the beginning.” (Business Director, 
Interview, 2014) 
 
“My business is about flexibility, when a customer wants a type of window in a certain colour, I 
provide.” (CEO Co-creator, 2013)  
 
“I think we have been very generous with him, and it is clear that what we have done/offered 
him we can’t offer to all the customers. Of course, they want flexibility. The more flexibility 
there is with us, the more stable their processes are. We can’t do it all, we say now too easily 
‘yes’ because we are learning, but we really need to say no.” (Business Developer, Interview, 
2014) 
  
The development team bracketed several commitments signs from the Co-creator’s side, and 
shared them with management. Among these was the announcement that the Co-creator planned 
to enlarge their production facilities to create a hall especially for Woodstock, and had hired 
three sales personnel to work on this type of window. Additionally, the Co-creator had also 
proposed that the R&D team apply for an innovation prize for Woodstock, thereby 
demonstrating the level of confidence they had in the product.  
 
“Project Manager: I don’t know if all of you have heard, but our Co-creator’s CEO told us that 
they are actually planning to build a full-scale hall for Woodstock - a production hall - so they 
are very serious about the business and see the potential.” (Steering meeting, November 2013) 
 
Furthermore, the Woodstock team had promised several dates by which it would have a product 
ready for launch; these were missed several times, both in G1 and G3. The Co-creator accepted 
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the rescheduled plan on these occasions, sending another indication of commitment to the 
project: 
 
“Co-creator are fully informed of our progress and remain a loyal partner. They have made it 
clear that an introduction in September is the latest that they would consider in 2011, as order 
intake is very limited later in autumn. Thus, if we are not ready to supply at this stage an 
introduction will most likely be postponed to April 2012. Co-creator intends to assist us with 
test products whether we end up introducing in 2011 or 2012.” (Steering meeting, 2011) 
 
The same scenario was repeated 3 years later when the launch was postponed twice in 2013, and 
again at the beginning of 2014. Furthermore, they planned another campaign in mid-2014, 
which was delayed considerably due to problems encountered with suppliers. In the latter case, 
the Steering Group discussed the seriousness of the problem and the time needed to run a test 
with another paint solution. The Co-creator needed to be informed; however, it was decided not 
to convey the gravity of the problem: “Let’s inform the Co-creator in a nonchalant way and 
build trust in the achievability of a good solution.” (Steering Group, September 2014) 
 
 “With Co-creator, we now have a signed letter of intention, where Co-creator supports our 
development actively. Co-creator has asked Pinta Inc. to confirm our commitment to launch G3 
products (in July or later) as soon as possible.” (Steering meeting, 2014) 
 
The second important trigger for initiating a co-development partnership was the lack of a BU at 
the project’s outset, as that indicated the need for a certain kind of guidance for the development 
team concerning market requirements and needs. Woodstock was appointed to the BU shortly 
after the beginning of G1 phase, but their activity was perceived as “minimalistic during G1, 
and slightly more active in G3” (Senior Project Manager, 2013). However, in the evaluation 
meeting at the end of 2014, the team admitted that had the BU been on board all along, the 
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project would have taken an entirely different direction and might even have been stopped. The 
innovation process had blossomed by encouraging the “outside” market to determine the 
specifications of the product and the value proposition. The team concluded that, even though it 
was a long and complicated journey with little guidance from the BU, the result was worth the 
effort. They acknowledged the difference in paradigms, and observed that the many 
interruptions occurred at the intersection of R&D and the BU.  
 
“If the BU had asked what the specifications were, they would have then filtered what they 
wanted. If we, after half of year, had contacted the BU to discover if there was a market for this, 
then nothing would have happened; they would have killed it. So, we needed to go to a 
customer.” (Portfolio Manager, evaluation meeting, 2014) 
 
Interestingly, the decision to use a co-developer for Woodstock was defined and labelled as a 
“coincidence” by both the Vice President of Innovation, and the Senior Project Manager. 
Telling the story how Woodstock began, VP R&D explained: “sometimes it is just coincidence” 
(interview, 2013). With a background in the windows industry, he suggested using one of the 
company’s most recent innovations, a technology with very high insulation properties, to make 
window frames. The development team built a prototype, which was accepted by group 
management, and permission was granted to continue researching and developing the idea. At 
that time, in a press interview, the CEO mentioned the fact that Pinta Inc. was “looking out of 
the window for opportunities” (VP R&D, 2013). The declaration was misunderstood, and a 
small window producer contacted Pinta Inc. to ask them to acquire the company.  
 
“And then we got a lot of offers to buy companies. And by coincidence, there was one company, 
x windows. They gave a comprehensive proposition. And so then something about windows sort 
of ended up at my desk, saying: 'what are we going to do?' Then we discussed it and realized 
that maybe this idea with the window frames would suit them.” (VP R&D, Interview, 2013)  
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6.3.2.2 Co-creation: adding and subtracting  
 
This collaboration enabled the establishment of a trial and error routine outside R&D and the 
walls of Pinta Inc. It involved real settings and approaching end-customers. For example, the 
Co-creator proposed to the R&D team that they install a couple of windows at a school, free of 
charge, to get “some valuable experience about how the profiles act in real life” (project 
meeting, august 2012). This experience helped them to understand not only the process of 
mounting the window, but also how the material reacted, and design flaws.  
 
“We are not satisfied with the quality of the profiles; it is probably the box putty that resulted in 
an uneven layer of paint” (Project meeting, October 2012).  
 
The school was visited two years later, which gave the team a good sense of how far they had 
managed to improve on the first generation of products by creating a comparatively higher 
quality profile. VP R&D insisted that the R&D team would seek as much feedback as possible 
from the field.  
 
“We were a bit embarrassed! On the other hand, it was so clear to see that we got so far today.” 
(Project meeting, 2014) 
 
These inputs were used as selection mechanisms, and informed development decisions. The 
team had expectations that the Co-creator would provide as much input as possible, and when 
those expectations were not met, interruptions emerged. One of the most important inputs 
obtained from the collaboration was the access Woodstock got to feedback from end-customers. 
This valuable data was passed along to group management who needed continuous confirmation 
about the market potential of Woodstock. The first feedback from the market came in January 
2012, after the first sales of G1 were completed. They learnt that Pinta Inc.’s brand had a 
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significant sway in the Danish market among the carpenters, which led the Co-creator to insist 
on the co-branding partnership mentioned above:  
 
“This is what we were asking in G1: why are we not selling the three-layered window? He 
(CEO of Co-creator) explained to us that he had sold none of these three-layered windows 
before, but that now he was selling them because there was awareness that it was a Pinta Inc. 
Window. The brand was really lifting sales, because the Pinta Inc. brand in Denmark is so 
strong.” (Portfolio Manager, Interview, 2013) 
 
Moreover, they found that that the window built with the Co-creator, that is, the three-layer 
window, was too heavy for carpenters, thus they were avoiding installing this type of window. 
This cue led Woodstock to consider a version of the A class window, but noted that two layers 
would be “an optimal solution and best for the Danish market” (Internal document, 2012).  
 
A very important discovery from feedback was the fact that end-customers were purchasing 
Woodstock G3, due to its maintenance free characteristics, and not the insulation, as predicted 
by Pinta Inc. This was an important discovery for the R&D team and the BU, who labelled it a 
surprise:  
 
“[A]nd the last point which was also, which I have also put on this slide, is that the CEO of the 
Co-creator underlined that the insulation properties of our product actually don’t add to the 
USP for big front windows, since both our product and wood-aluminium are three layered glass 
windows, class A. So, that was also something that was a little bit surprising to us.” (Project 
Manager, Steering meeting, 2014) 
However, from the moment Pinta Inc. has begun discussing pricing strategies and even 
invoicing their product, the relationship between Pinta Inc. and the Co-creator changed; the 
latter transitioning from being a co-development partner to a customer. 
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 “But today, the Co-creator is more of a customer; they are more a customer than a co-
developer. Co-creator was a co-developer, not a customer. So, you can say that he was 80% co-
developer and 20% customer. But in the future, it will be 80% customer and 20% co-developer.” 
(Project Manager and Portfolio Manager, Feedback Session, 2014) 
 
In relation to his, a distinct episode illustrated that BU and the R&D vice president had a low 
level of trust in the Co-creator’s CEO. BU noticed the Co-creator was selling Woodstock 
windows at a considerably higher price than their other windows. The CEO of Co-creator 
explained that the production process was more expensive, but he was not believed and was 
asked to show the figures detailing the production of Woodstock windows compared with 
aluminium windows. 
 
“Business developer: we had a meeting with Co-creator and he confronted us with the fact that 
he had to position the Woodstock windows as more expensive then the aluminium windows. That 
was his story, because they required much more work and blah, blah. This is what he tells us, I 
am not sure whether he is doing this in the marketplace, and I bet he is not doing this in the 
market. But OK, the good thing about it is that I have challenged them quite a bit on this issue 
and he promised me that he would show us the costing, what the hours are, in full detail. He did 
not want to tell us or put it on an email, he preferred only to allow me to see them when I am 
there. What he tells you today, might be different from tomorrow.” (Steering meeting, 2014) 
 
The meeting was held at the Co-creator’s headquarter and the CEO of the company presented 
the costs involved in production. According to his budget statements, he was indeed pricing 
Woodstock windows 40% higher than wood windows and 20% higher than wood-aluminium 
windows. The reasons for this related directly to production and the high assembly cost of 
windows using Woodstock profiles. Despite their expectations, BU received from the meeting 
further positive cues about the success of Woodstock windows on the market. There had been a 
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low number of complaints and the Co-creator’s sales personnel were proud to sell the product, 
unlike at the start of the collaboration: 
 
“Project Manager: At Co-creator, I spoke to their sales manager, and he says, right now his 
sales staff are actually really proud to sell this product and at the beginning of the year they 
were more reluctant, and worried when they were selling the product. They were really proud 
now so that also has a huge impact on a project.” (Steering meeting, 2014) 
 
Given the strong collaboration, another issue emerged; i.e., that the capacity limit of the pilot 
production would influence the intake of orders. This issue became apparent early in the 
process, as Co-creator had received more orders than expected; of course, this was a positive 
market cue. The solution proposed was to determine a maximum limit for the number of 
kilometres of profile to be delivered to Co-creator. Furthermore, Co-creator was asked to 
provide forecasts regarding their orders. This became a key dilemma, and sometimes a source of 
frustration between Co-creator and BU, as they could not produce the product for any additional 
customers and the company could not generate profits without customers: 
 
“It is a bit of a chicken and egg story, we are speaking with a limited number of customers, and 
we can’t talk to them because we don’t have production, so we can’t produce profiles. We 
learned from this discussion” (Business Director, Interview, 2013) 
 
This was an important interruption, and the R&D team and BU worked to create a controlling 
mechanism to try to ensure the number of orders could be predicted. Therefore, in G1 the 
development team realized that they needed to work with a ‘maximum number of orders’ 
ceiling. 
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“We agreed provided the technical issues were clarified and we could start supplying to Co-
creator. However, this included limiting the costs significantly by limiting volume and timing” 
(Steering meeting, 2011). 
 
Interestingly, the same interruption was encountered in the Woodstock G3 phase, when BU 
proposed a different solution; i.e., not setting a maximum volume, but proposing a recalculation 
of price if orders exceed capacity. The challenge was that production was still being conducted 
in a pilot production setting; therefore, the business was running at a deficit. The VP of 
innovation underlined this aspect several times to the business owners, to articulate the need to 
be selective when saying yes to orders: 
 
“VP R&D: My point is, up to a certain point it would be too expensive to us because we are 
selling at a loss, so if we could have agreed upfront: ‘this is a pilot production: if you need more 
you need to pay more.’  
Business Director: We have something else in there. We have a timeframe where we can 
renegotiate prices, and I think that is more important.” (Steering meeting, 2014) 
 
The disadvantage of such close collaboration was that Woodstock was taking the risk of being 
damaged by the internal hiccups of their customer. When Co-creator went through internal 
organizational changes, this influenced the projects’ predicted timeline, causing delays: 
 
“Cooperation with Co-creator is better and better. Still they were undergoing changes to the 
structure of their organization during the last year, so that has been a cost giving rise to some 
challenges.” (Project Manager, 2014) 
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The innovativeness of the technology was apparent, as were its properties. Combined with the 
lack of a BU to define the connection between the technology and the market, there was a need 
for a co-development element to the partnership. In the last meeting about the Woodstock 
project, it was acknowledged looking back that “lessons were learned that could be applied to 
our future projects” (evaluating meeting, 2014). On reflection, co-development was labelled as 
one of the main areas of success: 
 
“One of the positive things about this project was having a customer on board right from the 
beginning. In this case, it was very important, because we were not capable of producing 
windows ourselves. However, we gained a lot of help from out Co-creator, so we considered 
them a very important team player. So, that I think is positive. It might not be the case for every 
project, but for this one.” (Portfolio Manager, 2014) 
 
6.3.3 Conclusions  
 
The enactment processes were focused towards reaching intersubjectivity between R&D team 
and BU, especially when defining the market and customer segment for Woodstock. Firstly, 
they had to consider enacting an internal common understanding and agreement regarding the 
value of co-creation, and the enactment efforts pursued by the R&D team. Secondly, the 
enactment processes were mainly targeted towards drawing new knowledge into the company to 
achieve agreement to align the BU and group management on the issue of market expectations 
from a window in general, and a window frame in particular. In the latter case, the efforts were 
split between the R&D team and the BU. With this aim in mind, the Woodstock team handled 
several interruptions, as seen in table 6.2, parts resulting from the realization that they lacked a 
particular type of knowledge, and some from the disagreements between different internal 
positions and their reactions to external challenges. 
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Interruptions Enactment process Outcome/enacted 
environment  
Facing internal misalignments 
regarding segmentation criteria, 
and lack of agreement between 
the R&D team and BU regarding 
experimentation with 
segmentation 
Acknowledging the high level of 
uncertainty  
Looking for support from high 
level management  
Entering a co-development 
partnership 
Acceptance from group 
management 
Learning the requirements of 
national markets differ  
Finding players from each market 
to helped them gaining 
knowledge  
Agreement regarding 
mandatory entry points in 
markets and that fact they 
take time to accomplish  
Co-creator partnership found too 
costly by management  
Labelling Co-creator as “ticket to 
entry” 
Identifying signs of commitment 
Acceptance from group 
management 
Technical hiccups  Trial and error together with Co-
creator 
Improving the product and 
creating learning 
opportunities 
Mistrust between Co-creator and 
Woodstock team  
Trying to get access to customer’s 
financial statements 
 
Learning about end-customer 
purchase preferences and 
complaints ratio 
Create a feeling of 
transparency  
Co-creator does not collect 
feedback from end-users 
Bypass Co-creator as filter  Feedback from end-users and 
install new practice in the 
company 
Window industry is characterized 
by flexibility and diversity  
Benchmarking  Create reference points and 
obtain knowledge about how 
to incorporate flexibility and 
diversity in the business 
Capacity limits in the pilot 
production- cannot respond to 
high order intake  
 
2 actions: 
Set a max volume platform for 
sales (G1) 
Set higher price for higher 
volumes (3) 
Gain control over the process 
Table 6. 2 Enactment processes of market segments 
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Putting forward very positive customer feedback about Woodstock’s business potential, together 
with the signs of commitment observed were convincing mechanisms employed to overcome 
instructions resulting from internal disagreements. Conversely, interruptions resulted from a 
lack of knowledge, for example special expectations deriving from the new market, were dealt 
with by adopting an imitative behaviour, and benchmarking the behaviours of other industry 
suppliers. These efforts were focused on enacting an internal environment, where there was 
dispute among those involved, regarding who the customer was and how Woodstock would 
serve them. Enacting this agreement involved aligning the actors involved, to try to answer: who 
are our customers? Can we be in this market and play by its rules and if so at what cost? Being 
in a co-development partnership gave members answers to these questions, as they learned 
about the industry’s business model and the window industry’s expectations from their 
suppliers. The key limitation was, of course, that the Co-creator was the only source of 
information in Denmark, so they partly enacted their Co-creator’s view of this industry. When 
the team contacted potential customers from other markets, the Co-creator’s negotiation position 
was weakened, beginning their transition toward mainly customer rather than mainly co-
developer.  
 
Finally, discussions about segmentation criteria and customers’ choices were not as dense when 
analysing the internal documents and Minutes of the meetings, especially when compared with 
the density of discussions and meetings regarding production and technological development. It 
was implied from the outset that “the window industry” was the target, and so they adapted to 
challenges as they emerged.   
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6.4 Enactment of value chain 
 
When creating a value chain8 for Woodstock, a trial and error attitude was adopted, especially 
on the production site. This was determined by the fact that no pre-defined processes were 
apparent at the company, as Woodstock was a new type of product for a new target market. The 
development team adjusted to this lack of knowledge by mapping out the environment in which 
Woodstock was intended to compete. Participation in fairs, researching markets, and learning 
what specialized complementary assets were needed, while contacting specialists, were key to 
building understanding (Internal documents from 2010). However, the expectation from group 
management was that the team would reach a point of generic subjectivity very quickly; 
allowing control over a stable, fixed flow of processes, to enable the production of profiles at the 
lowest cost. This goal became the condition of existence for Woodstock, and an internal 
validation factor, also reaching an automatized production setting whereby Woodstock’s profile 
could be produced at a cost of two euros per square meter: 
 
“Let’s see what will happen. It was promised we would reach two euros per square meter cost, 
and if that is happening, then we have a very good business, if not, let’s see.” (CEO, Interview, 
2014) 
 
This goal became a constant filter device against which to measure ideas. Suggestions were 
evaluated in terms of helping or impeding accomplishment of this condition of existence. 
Setting up logistics and production processes and learning the right order for production 
processes, was a key concern bringing major challenges to the development team. As the focus 
was to reach general subjectivity, all the events that resulted in a feeling of “no control” 
(Business Director, 2013) were perceived as interruptions.  
 
                                                     
8 Value chain: “requires to create and distribute the offering, and determine the complementary assets needed to support the firm’s position in 
this chain.” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002: 533). 
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As mentioned in the value proposition section, Woodstock passed through two important 
phases: a learning one, named generation 1; and a “business one” as labelled in the internal 
documents, namely generation 3, where expectations were that it would become a successful 
business.  
 
6.4.1 Value chain interruptions in G1  
 
From the initial idea suggestion that “this was supposed to be a simple business” (Portfolio 
Manager), G1 was eventually redefined by the statement that it was “way too expensive to 
continue to G1” (Portfolio Manager) “impossible to have a business” (Program Director), “not 
an acceptable solution in the long run” (Minutes, 2011). The creation of meaning for the G1 
value chain was determined by commitment from external actors (customer and suppliers) and 
uncertainty, in the form of doubts and worries about costs, from internal actors.  
 
As explained in the value proposition section, G1 designed and pushed the product into an 
expensive value chain determining the cessation of its development. The chain was as follows: 
the initial plates were produced at one of Pinta Inc.’s factories located in Germany, transported 
to their pilot plant in Denmark, where these were ground and cut, then transported to Finland for 
lamination at a wood producer partner, and finally sent to the Co-creator, their customer:  
 Profiles (Germany) - pilot plant for grinding and cutting (DK) - lamination 
(Finland) - customer: Co-creator (Dk) 
In this value chain, the ownership of different parts of the production phase were shared among 
the partners involved, and Pinta Inc.’s role was defined as that of “the supplier of basic 
materials”, choosing a position in the value chain:   
 
“The connection between the different production specifications in the value chain was 
discussed and a hierarchy can be built: window production -> window profile production -> 
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laminate raw profiles wood/Woodstock. Co-creator is the clear owner of the top two, the wood 
supplier should take ownership of the lamination and Pinta Inc. will supply the basic material. 
All are committed, together with the product quality procedures agreed.” (Minutes, 2011). 
 
Despite this commitment, numerous flaws were noticed once the chain began producing the first 
profiles for delivery to Co-creator. The logistics set in place were considered as “complicated 
and very expensive, not the right formula; really crazy!” (Program Director, Interview, 2013). 
Due to the high transportation costs, and the misalignment regarding the common understanding 
of “quality for Woodstock” among the actors involved, managers began to worry about the 
entire project triggering an end to the project, before it was too late to recoup any benefits.  
 
“G1 was probably not the right approach, due to concerns that others expressed; that is I was 
not the only one worrying about them. The value proposition was worrying, the Vice President 
of Innovation was worried, the Program Director had worries, and we sort of discussed it very 
openly between us if we should kill this off, or if we were going the right way, or if it should be 
stopped before it became a problem.” (Senior Project Manager, Interview 2014) 
 
Not only were the logistics too complicated and expensive, but also the profiles were created 
manually. Furthermore, the development team had problems building a tracing system for the 
plates, which continued to be an issue in subsequent development phases. A further recurrent 
problem was the difficulty creating a common understanding of the word quality throughout the 
entire value chain, especially for the German producer of the stone wool boards for Woodstock. 
This was a source of continuous frustration for the development team, stretching the cost side of 
the business model considerably. Consequently, production of G1 was stopped. In explaining 
the failure of G1, the innovator of Woodstock pointed out that the business model chosen was 
not unsustainable. Important to note here is that the interviewee used the word “business model” 
after I explained what it meant: 
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“What was really the big problem in the old business model was we planned to make a profile 
here, a square one, then send it to a wood provider; they would laminate it with their wood, and 
then ship it on. That meant that we had a lot of logistical problems, as they were not so big, 
meaning that we had to deal with a lot of them and none of them were used to conducting 
quality control with this, and the window elements come in so many dimensions, they come in 
small and big, they come in rectangular, they come in 8 different wood species and 10 different 
wood qualities. So, if I need to stock 8 different species of wood, of multiple dimensions, at 40 
different suppliers… This is going to kill us! It simply could not work, we needed to get out of 
this.” (Senior Project Manager, Interview, 2013) 
 
The position chosen in the value chain led to the collapse of the G1 business model, as did the 
choice of the wrong complementary asset. The Senior Project Manager explained that the 
challenge arising from being part of a conservative sub-supply chain, namely wood supplier, 
who was a reluctant to change the industry, was too big. See figure 6.3 for the supply chain of 
the wood windows.  
 
 
Figure 6. 3 Value chain positioning in wood windows. Source: Internal document, 2012 
 
The next generation, G3, managed to bypass this chain to talk directly with the window 
manufacturers.  
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“G1 failed because it was not the right product. It was too expensive, it was too complicated to 
produce, it was logistically not adequate because it was relying on a lot of sub-suppliers that 
were not suited to making this product or to distributing it product.” (Senior Project Manager, 
Interview, 2013)  
 
Despite all these interruptions and the negative result on the balance sheet, the project was not 
stopped. Two actions enabled the project to continue: the change in the product design, which 
allowed a change in the value proposition, and re-labelling the intention expressed in G1 for 
Woodstock. The Senior Project Manager’s innovative efforts resulted in a new window design, 
positioning Woodstock on the exterior of the window frame. This change determined the entire 
business model, enabling a shift toward a simplified value chain, thereby allowing better 
competitive positioning on the market.  
Additionally, G1’s identity was redefined as a knowledge gathering exercise intended to 
position Pinta Inc. in the window industry, while G3 was expected to be a “profitable business.” 
 
“But then I also started G3 and started to flash some prototypes to show that there was another 
way to do this, and it seemed like we could do it, and then suddenly it became more a discussion 
about could we develop G3 and make it work‚ because if we could do so than that could reduce 
the failure of G1 and establish the fact that Pinta Inc. was a window systems supplier. So, it 
changed from should we have a profitable business with G1, to should we have a business 
that paved the way for a profitable business with G3. So, it changed.” (Senior Project Manager, 
Interview, 2013) 
 
To conclude, G1 was the first version of the business model, and was defined as a failure (the 
failure effected both the value chain and the design of the product, which offered the wrong 
value proposition). It was later reconsidered as a business model that “paved” the way towards 
the creation of a tangible business. G1 can also be considered the first significant interruption 
for the development team in terms of their endeavour to create Woodstock. After the faults were 
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noted, the project entered a kill no kill state, where support from VP R&D together with positive 
feedback from the market allowed the re-labelling of G1, and progress towards G3.  
An important element at this stage of the development was that the BU, which was supposed to 
take over the project, saw development was ongoing and decided to postpone their decision, 
remaining involved in the development process.  
 
6.4.2 Value chain interruptions in G3  
 
The transition to G3 involved a short sidetrack called G2. This was a laminated version of G1, 
on which one of the sides needed to be painted. This version implied keeping the same value 
chain, and adding a new step for painting. It soon become clear to everybody involved that it 
was not the solution. G3 emerged, marking a major change in the value chain as the wood 
supplier was then eliminated, as the profile was positioned differently on the window frame. 
This adaptation simplified the supply chain; however, unpredictable events arose, as the team 
needed to find: new suppliers for paint solutions, support to paint the profiles, tape for mounting 
the profiles, creating and developing a pilot plant to produce Woodstock. Furthermore, an 
unpredicted outcome of the shift to G3 was that the visual and aesthetic aspects of the product 
became crucial, overriding insulation (as analysed in the value proposition section).  
The distribution of interruptions in the value chain had consequences for the production process, 
due to the need to create convergent thinking around the notion of quality, and to determine the 
right production process in terms of flow, logistics, and hand over processes, from the 
innovation department to the BU chosen as the G1 business owner.  
 
6.4.2.1 Production process related interruptions at Woodstock 
 
The elements that determined the episodes of ecological change were related; such as finding 
the right production flow and quality when making Woodstock, and finding a production 
department that would be willing to take on the project.  
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One of the most important elements in the production of Woodstock was the creation of the pilot 
plant, put together by the R&D team at the beginning of the G1 phase of development. The pilot 
plant was situated at the headquarters, where the R&D section of Pinta Inc. was situated, the 
proximity making it convenient for the development team’s creation of prototypes and models. 
The pilot plant was “just across the road” (Project Manager, 2013) and became during G3 a real 
production centre, of which the R&D team felt very proud. They had managed to set up an 
entire production line capable of supplying a single customer, Co-creator.  
 
However, this production set up challenged Pinta Inc.’s identity, as the headquarters were not 
permitted to produce for commercialization purposes only, meaning that scope was a priority 
when convincing one of Pinta Inc.’s factories to take over Woodstock. Furthermore, the capacity 
problem was raised as well; given the limitations on the number of customers that could be 
served using the pilot plant. In this scenario, agreement needed to be created to hasten lead-time 
in production, especially when the R&D team began to produce for two different markets. The 
BU raised the issue in a Steering meeting, receiving acknowledgement from all the stakeholders 
regarding the interruption: 
 
“I just want to make sure that everybody has seen this: there is a too short a lead time of 
producing for the German market while producing for Co-creator as well.” (Steering meeting, 
2013) 
 
The factories proposed to take over production were those already producing raw boards for 
Woodstock, one situated in Germany and another in the Netherlands. As productions costs were 
considerably lower in Germany, Woodstock’s BU began the process of convincing the director 
of the German factory to take over the entire production. However, given the different 
specifications that this product had from Pinta Inc.’s other products, it was a fearful that taking 
over might create an interruption. Therefore, before moving production away from the pilot 
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plant, the development team spent a considerable amount of time detailing the specifications of 
Woodstock to help helping the parties who were supposed to take it over to understand.  
 
When engaging in the process of discovering an appropriate method for Woodstock’s 
production, the identity of the project was constructed and established as different from the other 
projects run by the company. The difference was expressed relative to the fact that the stone 
wool boards needed to be processed at a higher level, involving compressing and grinding, to 
ensure attainment of a very high level of quality. This differential, high quality boards, set the 
project apart from other internal projects:  
 
“The initial quality of what we produce: binder distribution, curing, mixing and all that kind of 
stuff is not an issue if you just set out insulation for a standard insulation batch somewhere, then 
not a problem. But if you then start compressing things and you need to paint it and grind it, you 
will find out that the wool distribution is not even, we know that already, but we don’t care 
about it normally, but for Woodstock this is an issue, a major issue.” (People Process Director, 
Interview, 2014). 
 
The challenge of the product requirements being different led to increasing difficulty in finding 
solutions, as there were no retrospective examples to refer to. Moreover, it was considered 
normal practice at Pinta Inc. to “just copy what we already have done” (People Process 
Director), yet this was not an option here. The situation created the feeling that Woodstock was 
not understood well by the other parts of organization. The sense that “they don’t care” 
accentuated the fact that in the case of problems and questions marks, the Woodstock 
development team would need to find their own answers.  
 
“We get binder free areas that you cannot paint, we get pinholes because the quality is lacking 
and there is nobody else in the organization that cares about that because it doesn’t matter. So 
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Woodstock has to go back in… there is actually a shelf… because is a project where we are 
bound to go back and improve quality ourselves, after the first time. We know that this is an 
issue but the others don’t care. But for Woodstock it is imperative… it is important, it’s very 
important so they have to make it better.” (People Process Director, Interview, 2014). 
 
These issues resulted in the development team being subject to a continuous state of trial and 
error, as they needed to create new knowledge at the company. Their reasonable approach to 
taking decisions helped them to work within assumptions and test multiple scenarios until an 
acceptable solution could be found. The aim was to reach a level of general subjectivity; 
demanding a high level of certainty and control over the flow of the production process to allow 
the automatization of Woodstock’s production. The latter scenario was perceived as the only 
business-relevant scenario for Woodstock, as production costs had been set to reach two euros 
per linear meter (as mentioned above), to allow a high mark-up of 40% (Portfolio Manager, 
Interview, 2013). For that reason, the team’s efforts were focused on defining the correct 
process flow: 
 
“First, we need to see the right process, so you’re not ending up with something like this where 
we don’t have the correct flow of the picture from the paint.” (Senior Engineer, Project meeting, 
2012) 
 
The trial and error phase continued for longer than anticipated, and while seemed natural to the 
development team, it challenged the business owners and higher management, who struggled to 
accept it. In the following two years, managers at different levels mentioned the same questions 
at several meetings. 
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 “Another question is, I am not a specialist about the painting, but for me when you see these 
surveys concerning parameters like work-flow, one day you have to define the receipt, right?” 
(Business Director, BU, 2013) 
 
“It is 2014 and there has been much development, when do we get it?” (System Division 
Business Development Director, Interview, 2014) 
 
“These additional production steps are cutting and grinding and painting, and should be made 
here at the pilot plant. Yes, and then when we would know how to do it, we can scale it up and 
do it right at full scale to supply all the markets.” (Portfolio Manager, 2014) 
 
Furthermore, the quality of the surface and the visual features of the product were playing a 
central role in fulfilling Woodstock’s value proposition. When producing the profiles, the team 
had encountered numerous difficulties. They had combatted phenomena such as pinholes, 
craters, too high water intake, and loose wool tufts scattered around the boards. These 
continuous interruptions, “an unexpected issue appeared this morning in production” (Project 
Manager, Project meeting, 2013) set the team back every time, obliging them to act, spending 
resources to find, correct and learn how to avoid problems in the future. The project meetings 
for 2013 and 2014 were focused on learning, seeking solutions, and aligning policies around 
technical interruptions. To overcome this, actions were directed towards creating convergent 
thinking regarding the level of quality demanded of the stone wool boards for Woodstock 
produced at the production factory.  
 
The stone wool boards for Woodstock were produced both in eastern Germany and in the 
Netherlands. Although, as mentioned above, costs were lower in eastern Germany, therefore the 
aim was to systematically move the entire production of Woodstock profiles to that factory. At 
that moment in time, the process of refining the stone wool boards for the profiles was still 
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being done at the pilot plant, in the R&D centre, at the company’s headquarters. The necessity 
that the German factory now deliver goods of much higher quality than previously proved an 
impediment leading to high waste costs and extra work from the development team. Several 
meetings took place over a two-year period, as staff had to be sent to supervise and train the 
personnel in the factory on quality. The development team was sceptical that the move of all 
production to Germany could be done in the time plan set out: 
 
“We discard many of the products from Germany due to quality issues. Two main issues are 
shots in the material and brown spots. Several actions have been planned to resolve the shots 
issue.” (Project meeting, end of 2012) 
 
The relocation of the pilot plant was also supposed to happen in steps, once the production 
process flow was in place and the employees in Germany could handle the level of complexity. 
To benefit the development process, the Steering Group decided at the beginning of G3 to keep 
the pilot plant at the headquarters, preferring to make no investments or modifications in 
Germany. An estimation of the timeframe for relocation of the pilot plant was lengthened to 
three years, based on number of customers that could be served.  
 
 “This scenario places the whole pilot plant at the headquarters, and makes no modifications in 
Germany. With successful development, it can supply commercial products for our pilot 
costumers in May 2013 in the necessary amounts. The lifetime of this pilot is expected to be 
from Nov 2012, and it will be 6 months after that the next stage is established in Germany. 
Given our current estimates that would be mid-2015.” (Senior Project Manager, 2012). 
  
The decision was justified by three arguments: time to market, investment levels and skills. The 
most important of these was that the launch of the product could be faster than that proposed in 
the scenario; were production was moved to Germany, costs would be lower, and the 
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development team would be present and in control of all the processes. The priority then became 
a fast start: 
 
“The fastest start, the highest efficiency in development. Staff are located next to the pilot line, 
which ensures the best use of time and resources and makes a wider range of competences 
available to realize the project. This increases the chance of success. It the unit was established 
in Germany, all R&D-staff would have to go there frequently, since Germany is not staffed with 
qualified personnel to execute the development work. This would seriously delay the 
development and make dynamic execution impossible. Lower travel costs too.” (Senior Project 
Manager, 2012) 
 
In terms of the disadvantages, it was specified that firstly, productions costs in the pilot plant 
were considerably higher, given the difference in wage level between the countries, and 
secondly, production at the plant production was semi-manual.  
 
An alternative might have been to use Pinta Inc. factories with a record of producing higher 
quality board than that made in Germany, but were situated in Western Europe, where the wage 
level was considerably higher than in eastern Germany. As the promise towards the group 
management was to produce Woodstock at only 2 euros per meter, moving production to these 
factories could not be considered.  
 
To better manage production in Germany a quality library was create at the factory, in order to 
offer the opportunity to understand the needs of Woodstock, to create a “psychological effect.” 
The purpose was to create alignment, and joined up action (Weick, 1995:43). Furthermore, 
within the same scope, it was proposed that the director of the factory in Germany join the 
Steering meeting, to understand the requirements and the implications for Woodstock of not 
receiving the appropriate quality from them: 
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“The reason why we think that director of Germany factory should be here is that we think that 
Germany production is the origin of some of the defects we’ll have to correct later on, the fish 
eyes and other things. It is something that will haunt us somewhat until we get it solved.” 
(Senior Project Manager, project meeting, 2014). 
 
“VP R&D: and maybe there’s a psychological effect by having the library just next to the 
German production, so they can see if you produce like this, you get this, which we cannot 
accept.” (Steering meeting, 2013). 
 
At the final evaluation meeting about Woodstock, the collaboration with the German factory 
was characterized thus:  
 
“Average. It has required a lot of resources, however with marginal learning outcomes. This is, 
of course, not very positive as we have spent a lot of time there and not learnt at all.” 
(Evaluation meeting, 2015) 
 
A Senior production engineer explained that the difficulties with the German factory were 
threefold: first its identity as an insulation business, which demonstrated that a strong embedded 
identity could hinder joint action; second, the cultural aspect, the high-power distance, lean 
focused, and low importance being given to quality issues; and finally the lack of a feeling of 
ownership.  
 
“It's a lean organization that has absolutely no capabilities of doing new things. Even doing the 
traditional things in the right way is challenging: something that is bad quality at two o'clock at 
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night, it is suddenly good quality at eight o'clock in the morning. That's the line of thinking.” 
(Senior Production Engineer, Evaluation meeting, 2015) 
 
At the same meeting, it was specified that the number of quality issues faced over the years, 
could have been avoided if production had been moved to a system division type of production. 
The discussion was only about ascertaining if the right decision was made, but also about 
Woodstock’s identity: was the project under insulation, a system division, or a combination of 
both? 
 
“Project Manager: Would have been another culture if it would have been in Western European 
factories? Would these figures have been different?  
Senior production engineer: I think so, because they are more used to system thinking and 
system thinking is more quality added thinking. Look at the businesses in system divisions, their 
people are used to quality and they have just started a new factory in China and they already 
have 100% running god quality. 
“Engineer: Do you think I’ve spent a week down there just for fun? It was lack of maintenance 
all over. It is an insulation related business.” (Evaluation meeting, 2015) 
 
The problems with the German factory went beyond quality, the Project Manager referred to a 
“political problem”, as the managers at the factory were expecting some rationale for using the 
production plant. Furthermore, the Project Manager was aware that the quality was not at the 
level required, but that it was the only place to produce the product at a cost that would 
ultimately deliver a turn over, therefore, they needed to create solutions: 
“This is huge political mess because on one side there is the factory’s director, who has this 
plant standing there, he wants to make money, he invested a lot of money in this plant and he 
wants to produce. But we don't get the quality we did when we were in the Western Europe. And 
the wages are cheaper in Germany so we can make cheaper board in Germany, but if, in the 
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end, we have too much waste from Germany, then it might be cheaper going to the Western 
Europe.” (Project Manager, 2014) 
 
Given this challenge, the focus was on the factory and staff learning processes, and on 
understanding the requirements of Woodstock. The Project Manager decided to create 
transparency by sharing process related documents and facilitating communication between 
Germany and the pilot plant. Optimization was always the focus, as the Project Manager was 
working with time line estimations and a precise cost structure for all the steps (internal 
documents). However, the quality from the German factory was always an issue: 
 
“Still the raw material from Germany is not satisfactory. There is still too much waste, meaning 
that the boards cannot be used. There are some methods to improve the quality but the effect has 
not been evaluated yet.” (Steering meeting, 2013) 
 
In 2014, quality took central stage in all the action lists of Woodstock’s Project Manager. In 
every project meeting, time was dedicated to discussing production both in the German line and 
at the pilot plant. Many of the project meeting’s minutes had contained “hot issues.” “Hot 
issues” were the technical challenges that pushed the development team to look further for a 
solution and which had a negative influence on costs, and the scenario when moving the pilot 
plant to Germany, versus building a second pilot plant close to the factory: 
 “Hot topics: 
On our team day, the 30 June, we will make a SWOT analysis concerning the pilot production 
and moving the pilot plant.” (Project meeting, June 2014) 
“Hot issues: 
Pinholes in the finished profiles have a very high priority due to an increase in waste at the Co-
creator (up to 30%). A brain storm meeting with participation from the Co-creator, paint 
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system, supplier of painting methods and Woodstock will be scheduled to discuss the pinhole 
issue.” (Project meeting, September 2014) 
 
Interestingly, when interruptions occurred and were perceived as “crisis,” the tendency was to 
involve actors from the value chain and the customers, to reach a solution jointly.  
 
Finding a place for producing was under continuous discussion, and in mid-2014 the 
development team had a team day, on which they created a SWOT analysis to build a second 
pilot plant in Germany. While many positive points were identified, such as lower variable 
production costs (VPC), and less handling, when optimizing the design process, the difference 
in understanding the concept of the “quality” of the stuff in that area was mentioned 
permanently as creating a bottleneck. This would involve extra costs for traveling for the R&D 
staff, and for training to undertake the knowledge transfer. The fear that knowledge would be 
lost was stated also. The more important question was the risk of moving a product that was still 
in its development phase, into production at the BU. 
 
One of the methods by which Woodstock managed to balance its high development costs and 
quality related failures was by using: Exter, a spin off from Woodstock, that utilized the failed 
boards rejected from Woodstock. In this manner, the waste was lowered considerable and the 
costs were transformed in profits, as Exter was a very successful project. Exter was used to 
convince group management that Woodstock production costs could be lowered, and to 
convince the German factory that they have a business, and a product, which demands volumes. 
Furthermore, Exter was perceived as a great opportunity to improve the learning curve of 
Woodstock, as more resources could be put into trial and error processes.  
 
“They will say, 'okay. We don't want to do that. It costs too much.' But then Exter, the other 
project, comes in with a very large volume for Germany, and since those specifications are 
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almost the same for the plates, then maybe Germany will realize that, 'okay. Now we actually 
have business for them: Exter and Woodstock.' Therefore, they can allocate the quality 
personnel to that; we need to be there all the time reminding them that they need to allocate 
people. As we are there all time, there is no problem, but the day we are not there, then they will 
have some issues.” (Portfolio Manager, Interview, 2014) 
 
“Exter is not so sensitive to it. That's why unofficially when we have a bad production, it gets 
sent to Exter.” (Senior Engineer, 2014) 
 
Concluding, Woodstock’s production had to meet the value proposition promised to customers: 
high quality profiles, while meeting an internal value proposition demanded by stakeholders: 
low production costs. The dilemma of achieving the perfect cost-quality balance led the 
development team to understand they needed to align the meaning of quality. To achieve low 
costs, the team searched for general subjectivity: as they believed that creating a system with 
standard plots (Weick, 1995:71) and a controlled, predictable process flow would provide 
evidence of an established product with business potential.  
 
6.4.2.2 Logistics-related interruptions 
 
A special portion of the project meeting was dedicated to logistics. In this section, the process of 
transporting the parts, the invoicing and ownership of each activity in the value chain were 
discussed. The Business Director of the BU described and labelled logistics as one very 
important problem, and even as “the biggest challenge.” He mentioned that logistics needed to 
be coordinated with the level of service they offer, meaning a connection with the value 
proposition needed to be created:  
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“The biggest challenge would be the logistics: we have to agree on a certain service level. In the 
case of Co-creator, we have 9 profiles, 5 colours meaning 45 different articles for 1 customer. 
Co-creator if he wants more colours, let’s says he want 12 different profiles, 20 colours - 240 
profiles - how is the logistics going to be achieved?” (BU Director, Interview, 2014) 
 
Furthermore, they needed to link their logistics to industry requirements, because the windows 
industry operates on a very short lead-time, this flexibility had to be present in Woodstock’s 
value chain. The flexibility feature of the windows industry was a strong reminder that 
Woodstock was a different kind of business, and that more knowledge was necessary in order to 
be able to operate it. The BU director explained that the ideal scenario would be to offer a 
standard product, and reduce customization, the latter being an important challenge.  
 
“Next to the fact that the windows producers have orders from one day to another, the lead time 
from order to delivery is 4 weeks. From the customer to himself, to us, and back to him, is pretty 
tight! How are we going to organize that logistics? What are we going to do? It will be a 
challenge for us to say no. After that, we give 9 colours, imagine if each customer chooses a 
different profile, so at the end of the day, we must produce different profiles, different colours 
and different customers, a magnitude of numbers! How are we going to stock?” (BU Director, 
Interview, 2014) 
 
Stock, indeed, was very important, as the number of orders from customers had increased 
considerably. While this was a positive cue for the business, the Business Director knew there 
was a need not only to focus on stock, but also to create a system that assured coordination 
between the actors involved. The lack of coordination had created hiccups in the deliveries to 
Co-creator, as stocks were non-existent. For this reason, the need to coordinate between supplier 
of painting methods, Co-creator and Pinta Inc. was mentioned at several project meetings: 
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“Painting methods supplier should advise both us and Co-creator which profiles and quantities 
they are shipping. Orders from Co-creator are increasing.” (Project meeting, 2014). 
 
“Some of the products that Co-creator has ordered now are for their stock. We invoice them 
once a month. Unfortunately, our deliveries to Co-creator have been subject to delays, because 
Painting methods supplier had fewer products in stock than we assumed. Painting methods 
supplier will make a count of their inventory this week – we will push them to do so during our 
visit.” (Project Manager, 2014). 
 
In the search for general subjectivity, the manner of handling what the Portfolio Manager 
labeled “a logistical nightmare,” especially once more customers were being served outside 
Denmark, was achieved by always making two plans: one for the short term and one for the long 
term. This allowed the Woodstock team logistical control in the short-term, but control was to 
be passed to BU over the longer term. Orders were sent to Painting methods supplier, who was 
to paint them and supply Co-creator. Woodstock team’s role was to ensure coordination 
between Painting methods supplier and Co-creator regarding the timeline for ordering and 
supplying. In addition, the stock for Woodstock was to be kept at Painting methods supplier, at a 
volume that would permit a new production cycle in the pilot plant. It was agreed by consensus, 
as mentioned in the Steering Group meeting, that the shorter-term solution was more expensive:  
 
 “So that is the short-term solution. It will be a more expensive solution in logistical terms since 
Co-creator will not expect to have any stock profiles, besides what they have leftover.” (Senior 
Project Manager, Project meeting 2014). 
 
The long-term solution involved handing Woodstock over to BU, with R&D no longer having 
any business-related responsibilities. It was made transparent at one of the Steering meetings 
that BU had to take responsibility for logistics and integrate it into the business development 
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plan, as logistics were likely to become increasingly complex. However, BU was asked to 
secure operations that were controllable, before accepting a full take over: 
 
“Senior Project Manager: My comment on this is that it is hugely important that we take control 
of the logistics here, because logistics will be a major issue as this grows. I think we should get 
this part dealt with in business development. I think BU should take the responsibility for this 
analysis as soon as they are able to take over. We are certain that we know short-term how to 
get materials moved to Co-creator, but I think this is just as important as getting all the unit 
operations in place in the factory.” (Steering meeting, 2014).  
 
The logistics set up differentiated Woodstock even more from the other Pinta Inc.’s projects. 
Woodstock was organized to have own its logistics, from the beginning through to the end, and 
it was defined as an “in between” type of business, with characteristics from both insulation and 
system business; as analysed in terms of differences and similarities in chapter five. This aspect 
raised issues of identity.  
 
“We simply don't know who is going to take care of the logistics? It is different from the other 
businesses. It's something in between, where we sell insulation products on a pallet from a 
factory, and then we are in charge of the logistics until it ends up at the dealer. In the system 
division, we are selling through all sorts of dealers, but very much talking to architects and so 
on, about projects sales. But here, we want to have a direct person, direct delivery to the 
customer, so we'll own the logistics. And also own the technical sales staff because that's also 
part of the channel by which we support our customers and so on. We also need to be there.” 
(Portfolio Manager, Interview, 2014) 
 
An additional interruption to logistics was the need to transport boards and profiles between 
headquarters, customers and suppliers. As the profiles had to be transported safely, the team 
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researched practices in the windows industry. They learnt that the profiles had to be cut into 6m 
lengths, which would then be transported between partners in 6m long baskets. The solution was 
identified by the aluminium industry, together with the idea of having a leasing price tag on the 
baskets, to ensure their return. Thus, the customers paid for the baskets, and received their 
money back when the baskets were returned to Pinta Inc.  
 
“We bought 60 baskets, which are used in aluminium industry, and we bought them from a 
supplier, 6 meter long baskets are used for logistics. But the idea was – and that comes from the 
aluminium industry - that the baskets were the property of Pinta Inc. They will all get a set 
number and our name will be on the baskets.” (Project Manager, 2014) 
 
To track the baskets, the development team added more steps to the chain, asking Pinta Inc. 
Scandinavia to put in place a tracking system to assure return of the baskets. As the trial with the 
baskets worked well in Denmark, the team began investigating if the formula could be copied 
for application in Germany.  
 
Pinta Inc. Scandinavia was employed to support the development team in their trials when 
handling orders from, and invoicing, Co-creator. The challenge was that the R&D team had 
never been responsible for invoicing before, thus they had not had to master these kinds of 
competences and the need to be taken over by a sales BU was becoming more pressing as the 
number of orders grew. From the first order, until the handover happened, a period of more than 
two years, tasks were handled by the Portfolio Manager for R&D. He managed the task by 
creating a system intended to communicate both transparency and control. He organized several 
communication meetings at which Pinta Inc. Scandinavia, Co-creator, and Painting method 
supplier were present so that they would all commit to the system together. Furthermore, the 
aim was to create a routine, and invoicing via Pinta Inc. Scandinavia. This was set up to “fit with 
their standard routine,” proving the aim was to create a process that could become routine very 
fast, while guaranteeing control. In addition, the moment when Co-creator was asked to order 
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via an online system, shifting over from a practice of sending orders to the Portfolio Manager, 
provided evidence that general subjectivity was reached in the order handling process.  
 
 “Logistics: Portfolio Manager is not supposed to handle orders this week and we hope BU and 
Pinta Inc. Scandinavia have made an agreement. Portfolio Manager believes that Co-creator is 
ready to use the web-shop. We have requested Painting method supplier to find out how much 
they have in stock – by counting stock to make sure the automatically generated stock list is 
correct.” (Minutes, November 20149). 
 
However, the VP R&D questioned the fact that BU had showed few intentions to take over the 
order handling since the start of 2014. BU explained they were expecting an automatized system 
to be in place, before taking over, sending the signal that the development process was not at a 
level they were conformable with; requiring that they needed cues for a “ready business:” 
 
“VP R&D: Are we still the ones taking the orders? I mean, when is BU taking over?  
BU: We agreed in the second quarter of the year that we would move this into a hopefully 
automatized system… and then it goes to Pinta Inc. Scandinavia. But today I’m not spending 
any time on this.” (Steering meeting, January 2014). 
 
In conclusion, the development team, together on this occasion with the BU, were searching for 
the same approach to creating meaning, through coordination and creating a sustainable routine 
of practices for logistics. Furthermore, to keep acting and not damage the process with 
interruptions, the team worked with both short-term and long-term scenarios. The activity of 
labelling proved to be very powerful, as more focus was given to logistics, when it became 
labelled “a problem.” 
                                                     
9 The handover to the business unit was in beginning of January 2015. 
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6.4.2.3 Handover and transfer of knowledge interruptions  
 
One of the most present discussions between the development team and BU concerned handing 
over Woodstock, that was moving it out of R&D’s hands. This engendered several 
disagreements between the two actors, and much frustration, as their beliefs and expectations of 
each other were not aligned, or expressed clearly; this despite the communication matrix 
outlined at the beginning of the project. 
 
The handover came with challenges that mobilized Pinta Inc.’s identity. As Woodstock had set 
up a pilot plant in Denmark, at the headquarters of Pinta Inc., the question of who would take 
over responsibility and ownership at that plant was foremost in everyone’s minds from G1 
onwards. The available options were that the pilot plant be taken over either by the German 
production business, as the boards were already produced there, or by a Danish production 
business. All the interested parties held conflicting preferences, and failure to take ownership of 
the pilot plant was considered “the biggest problem” affecting the handover process. A 
challenge arose, because in a normal Pinta Inc. project, the BU would take over the products 
after full development and assessment of what is needed to get to market from a production unit 
(people process director). However, both ideology and paradigms were used as arguments for 
not taking responsibility over the plant: 
 
“The biggest problem is the pilot production over here at the headquarters. Who will have 
responsibility for that? Somebody needs to take responsibility, and the setup is normally that BU 
would just buy a finished product from a production department. They will claim, 'no, it's not 
BU because our standard setup is blah, blah, blah.' the formal way of doing it at Pinta Inc. Is 
that the production department takes responsibility? We have candidates. We have a German 
production department, and we have a Danish production department. The Danish one says, 'it's 
not us. We have never been involved, so, why should we? Just because it's in Denmark, why 
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should we? We don't know anything about it.' They have no interest in this. So, the last one, the 
only one to go in and discuss this with, is the German one, and they're just saying, 'no, no, we 
don't want it. We'll do it in three years when we get the plants in Germany, but we cannot run a 
plant in Denmark.’ And R&D is saying, 'we're not allowed to do it.' we can do it like we've done 
in generation 1 by just kind of handling it like that, but Pinta Inc. is not a production 
department, We're not defined as a production department, so we're not supposed to be doing 
this.” (Portfolio Manager, Interview, 2014).  
 
One of the first interruptions to handover occurred in G1, with the discovery that it was not a 
relevant solution. The development team had decided to continue taking care of the operations, 
while further researching options to improve. The uncertainty surrounding the project made the 
BU choose to wait:  
 
“Handover to BU: it was originally intended that the operations should be handed over to BU 
during 2012. With the changed scope of the project (change to generation 3), this is not relevant 
anymore. R&D will therefore continue running the operations. Co-creator is expected to change 
to generation 3 in q2 2013, but if they do not they will continue ordering generation 1 products 
throughout 2013. When the price agreement terminates at the end of 2013 Co-creator will not 
want to pay the full price for the product, and will change anyway to another product. R&D will 
run the operations until the termination of the agreement.” (Concluding Report, 2012). 
 
However, “a realistic exit-date for R&D regarding involvement in production was discussed, 
and based upon the current experience and state of the business” was considered to be at the 
beginning of 2015.  
 
R&D’ s identity entered the realm of discussion as well; its purpose was not to conduct nor take 
responsibility for production, as was the case with Woodstock for more than four years: 
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“So it's also about, 'what are we good at?' we're good at doing development work and not 
running production, so maybe we should try to focus on where the experienced guys are.” 
(Portfolio Manager, Interview, 2014). 
 
The records of Steering meetings from 2013 show internal discussions centred on handing over 
continued. The R&D team considered the inaction of BU as representing a lack of commitment 
towards Woodstock. In one of the Steering meetings, the Portfolio Manager asked the BU about 
its intentions; in particular, why some meetings had been cancelled. In his question, he again 
emphasized the difficulties encountered by R&D handling operations and invoicing, given their 
lack of experience, and constraints: 
 
“I have a question about what is going on regarding the clarification of the internal setup, 
group transfer pricing, responsibility for the long-term business and production. There have 
been some planned meetings that have been cancelled. Where are we on that? Because that very 
much spills into how long R&D will need to handle all the invoicing manually, because it is 
quite a tedious job to do all this manual invoicing and stuff like that, so we should get it on 
track.” (Portfolio Manager, Steering meeting, 2013)  
 
As discussions between these two actors, R&D team and BU were intense, VP R&D acted as a 
mediator, reminding both parties that the transfer had to happen as soon as possible, and that the 
existing long term plan had to be followed through. He also asked for the creation of a common 
plan and early considerations of how things should be done in the transition phase, given the 
time implication: “things are not going to happen in a snap of the fingers.” The short-term 
solution, formulated at the beginning of 2013, had established that the Portfolio Manager was in 
charge with the supply chain; i.e., order handling and delivery.  
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“Who is the supply manager for this business? It is clear this is only a short-term solution” 
(Steering meeting, VP R&D) 
 
The long-term solution stipulated that BU would take over Woodstock, and it was confirmed 
that this could not occur later than mid-2014. These expectations were not met, as the handover 
was a long process; it lasted approximately two years. The VP R&D had insisted at several 
meetings that the transition steps should be undertaken faster. In explaining their position, BU 
underlined that since the development of the product was not ready, the step could not be taken. 
 
“It is a good investment that we are making. It is positive, people like this product. It has some 
pluses, some strong arguments in favour of the product. Let’s start. When sales are moving, we 
are going to get more sales personnel. If we feel that the business has taken off, then we will 
begin investing in it.” (Business Director, 2014) 
 
The BU lacked the necessary cues to convince them that the product was ready for market, 
without further support from R&D. Additionally, the BU wanted to be certain, and they named 
this condition “crucial”, that the production cost level per linear meter would indeed be 2 euros, 
as promised:  
 
 “BU: I think that the moment we take it over it is a business and the development phase is 
ended. Now there is a product development element to it and there is production development 
process to it also. So assuming that’s all sorted by the end of the year, or in the next few months, 
and we can prepare, then yes we very much look forward to this. Plus, there is still an urge to 
justify the 2 euros per linear meter in terms of VPC. I think most of these things are crucial for 
taking over the plan and the entire project.” (Steering meeting, July 2014) 
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The Project Manager was given a special task for the handover, which involved creating a risk 
evaluation for the transition of business from R&D to BU. A special meeting was called to 
discuss these risks and devise a mitigation plan, with the aim of creating agreement over the 
fears and doubts proceeding from both parties. When predicting points of difficulty, risk factors 
were estimated and solutions proposed. The risks analysed preceded from two variables: the 
probability of the handover happening and its impact. The highest risks were believed to be:  
 The loss of knowledge during the transfer, particularly of “all of the small facts gathered 
over the last four years – logistics, process, design”, and a consequent loss of quality;  
 The risk that Co-creator would no longer feel a priority; and 
 The risk that problem solving would become more difficult, since the path from problem 
to production would be longer.  
To mitigate these risks the plan involved keeping the R&D staff involved in the process, as they 
had core knowledge, and this could ensure a close communication between R&D and BU.  
A list of risks related to moving the pilot plant were also evaluated, and the following 
considerations highlighted: the production set up, which was in Danish, must be translated into 
German and English; not being able to get the same surface quality had been mitigated by 
positioning R&D staff in Germany; was Germany ready to accept demand for a high end/high 
quality product. The latter consideration was very high risk, as quality might suffer resulting in 
claims. The mitigation proposed was: “to increase focus and help German organizations to 
change their mind-set to acquire a different type of product.” (Handover Risk Matrix, 2014), 
acknowledging one more time the difference in mind-set.  
 
The risk evaluation highlighted the fears of the development team, and how their work would be 
continued. Several questions were also mentioned by the People Process Director: “now we have 
developed a business and a production process and you have included suppliers, sub suppliers. 
How do you communicate that to another part of the organization? How do you move it? Are 
they going to accept everything we decided? Are they going to like it? Are they going to have 
other ideas? How do you secure the quality? Is the organization ready to take this up?” (People 
Process Director, Interview, 2014). 
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In the last Woodstock Steering meeting, BU had announced that the Steering Group format 
would be changed. VP R&D and Senior Project Manager were not mentioned as part of the 
formula anymore, and were thanked for their efforts. In exchange, the Program Director from 
R&D and the Project Manager of the follow up projects at Woodstock were retained. The 
director of the German factory was involved in deciding the new format, in order to improve 
commitment, as the pilot plant would fall under his supervision.  
 
Making sense of the handover was a process that unquestionably differed from previous 
interruptions. The expectations of the development team towards the BU, and their desire to 
organize the transition process prompted several frustrations and a lack of communication. 
Several times, the development team had expressed doubts; specifically, that BU “seems to have 
a different agenda;” “they are not in the same team with us”; “we would have needed more 
support from them.” At meetings, the VP R&D refereed and tempered the discussions, 
reminding everyone they ultimately shared the same goal.  
 
6.4.3 Conclusions 
 
The value chain was the central element of Woodstock’s business model, and its principal focus 
was cost. When determining related elements, Woodstock’s identity was negotiated and 
renegotiated several times throughout the period of development, with emphasis on an eventual 
G4 version. The new director of BU, in his period getting acquainted with the business, asked 
the team why owning such a big part of the logistics was important. In his vision, outsourcing 
some of the production steps would be more profitable to the business. However, over the 
development period, this question had been asked before, and the inventor of Woodstock had 
always considered that creating knowledge inside the company was more valuable than buying 
it in. With knowledge creation in mind, a discourse of overcoming challenges through trial and 
error was adopted, and trial and error was accepted as the norm for creating flow in the 
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production process. The interruptions to Woodstock’s development mainly resulted from the 
initial lack of knowledge of the window industry and the importance of quality to that industry. 
However, when choosing a factory to take over production, cost was critical, resulting in 
extensive discussions about the quality versus cost balance for the business.  
 
Uncertainty also resulted in divergent thinking from the parties involved, and numerous 
frustrations. The development team was convinced that by achieving a very high level of 
control, and general subjectivity, across all the parts of the value chain, this would provide a 
strong cue for the BU to invest in Woodstock’s potential. Thus, divergent thinking needed to be 
driven towards convergent thinking along the value chain. To achieve this, several instruments 
were employed: representations of reality, such as a quality library; a mediator for the 
arguments and debates, the VP R&D being present at all Steering meetings; benchmarking, 
applying imitative behaviour for the industry in which Pinta Inc. wanted to position itself. Porac 
et al (1989: 401) explained there is a tendency to imitate the behaviour of some industry peers, 
as it provides a “mutual enactment process.” 
 
Analysing the distribution of interruptions to the value chain, the enactment processes that 
maintained the ongoing flow of sensemaking were: 
 
Interruptions Enactment process Outcome/enacted 
environment  
No internal knowledge about the 
production process flows needed 
to create Woodstock  
Trial and error, work with 
assumptions.  
Labelled the goal: 2 euros/square 
meter and used this as a filter 
device for decision making  
Labelled project as “different” 
 
Retention of production costs 
not to be higher than 
proposed (2 euros/square 
meter). Activities that would 
increase the costs were 
perceived as interruptions. 
Create agreement about the 
newness of the project and 
no retrospection was possible 
G1- too expensive logistically Labelled as “not the right thing” G1 stopped and continued 
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and no alignment over quality 
level 
and reaching agreement about this 
opinion 
Identifying the flows: production 
done manually, no tracing system, 
too high costs in production and 
complicated logistics, wrong 
position in the windows industry 
supply chain - very low business 
potential  
with G2 and G3. 
Retention based on very 
positive market reaction and 
support from senior 
management.  
Internal fears about taking over 
Woodstock pilot plant 
Identifying concerns:  
- Fear of not taking over a fully 
developed product 
- Fear of taking over a product 
with very different specifications  
Reached agreement about 
who should take over. Invite 
the director of the production 
facility in the Steering 
Group.  
Coupling Woodstock with 
another product that could 
generate volumes  
Numerous, unexpected, technical 
issues were affecting Quality 
resulting in frustration between 
R&D team and German 
production 
 
Identify the sources of failure 
Identify important differences 
between insulation versus system 
thinking 
Install quality libraries at all 
the actors involved in 
production 
Create agreement regarding 
the impact on the timeline 
 
Very high development costs  Identify as a delay to the team 
attainment of the target of 2 euros 
per square meter 
 
 Use of waste and boards was 
considered a failure from 
Woodstock as raw material 
for other projects were 
decreasing costs 
Need to adapt logistics to 
industry standard 
Identify the need for flexibility in 
the industry  
Identify the importance of 
coordination among the suppliers 
involved  
Benchmark industry practice 
(Aluminium practices) 
Create short term and long 
term contingency plan 
 
The need of invoicing and 
creating a platform for ordering  
R&D identifies that they have 
never invoiced before and admit a 
lack of knowledge  
Portfolio Manager takes over 
the task temporarily  
Internal frustration between R&D 
and BU over the handover date 
 BU identifies Woodstock as still 
in a development phase, both as a 
product and in terms of 
Setting a short-term plan 
And mediating between two 
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production  
 
R&D identifies a fear of losing 
knowledge and drop in quality 
internal paradigms  
Reaching agreement through 
a mitigation plan 
Table 6. 3 Enactment processes of the value chain 
 
Many times the source of these interruptions were divergent points between the actors involved, 
as they had different expectations that were not met, therefore the enactment was focused on 
creating agreements, better communication practices, transparency and even trust.  
 
6.5 Enactment of value network  
 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002:534) explain that value network show the role of suppliers, 
customers and other third parties involved in creating value when taking a product to market.  
For Woodstock, the value network plays an integral role in the development of both the product, 
the production process, and the business model, given the newness of it. The Woodstock team, 
aware of the kind of support needed, was seeking out co-developers, rather than simply 
suppliers or customers. Therefore, in cases where potential suppliers were not interested in co-
creation, they were not taken into consideration as part of the value network: 
 
“This supplier is on hold. Their existing method is too expensive, and they have not shown 
interest in co-development of other solutions. They want us to pay for tests, which in the end 
supports their development.” (Project meeting, March 2012) 
 
As the aim of Woodstock was to create a wood looking-like window, the team contacted and 
worked with suppliers from the windows industry, in both G1 and G3. The challenge was that 
the Woodstock material, even though it was expected to appear as wood from an aesthetic point 
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of view, was stone wool. Thus, the solutions provided by the suppliers were often unsuitable, 
and the necessity to develop solutions that would be applicable to Woodstock arose. For 
example, in one of the Steering meetings from 2013, when G3 was under development, this 
uncertainty was clarified, with the aim of reaching an agreement:  
 
“Business Director: Just one question. I know the answer, but just so everybody from this group 
is aware: how do you rate the risk from the paint solution given by Paint System with the new 
formula? 
Senior Project Manager: That is based on a gut feeling, I would rate it as medium. They have 
made this product for other uses and they have, as far as I understand, evaluated it for high 
volume use in the wood industry and it performs well. The uncertainty is, of course, that our 
material is not wood. That means we cannot draw a direct correlation with the positive tests 
they have had on wood.” (Steering meeting, September 2013)  
 
Therefore, the interruptions to the value network came from two sources: the first was that the 
project was being worked on with only one supplier providing two of the most important 
components of Woodstock, and second the trial and error phase undergone to create solutions to 
fulfil the objectives of Woodstock. Despite the risks and number of major hiccups that occurred, 
the one supplier policy remained the same from the beginning of G1, until the handover of the 
project to the BU. Interestingly, this appears to be linked to company ideology, as it was a 
normal practice at Pinta Inc. to work with one supplier: 
 
“What I am saying is that now we have been producing one of our core products for 40 years 
and we are still fooling around with one supplier, and we can still not define what it is that we 
want from our supplier.” (Senior Engineer, Evaluation meeting, 2015) 
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“Paint specialist: I hear that it is not a general policy of Pinta Inc. to have second suppliers of 
anything. I think that’s a real problem!  
Production director: We are challenging the core of Pinta Inc. We don’t even have a second 
supplier for our binders. If you start discussing about a second supplier, you’ll hear: ‘We will 
deal with that in time, purchase will find something.’ I think we are conducting projects 
according to the Pinta Inc. line of thinking, mechanically and physically orientated, and not 
process oriented, and Woodstock is like a Swiss precision clock, everything has to fit. Upper 
management is thinking: ‘yea, we’ll deal with that later on.’ But it is not like that.” (Evaluation 
meeting, 2015) 
 
Woodstock had one supplier for paint system, Paint System as discussed in section 6.1, and one 
to provide a solution for how to paint the profiles, Profile Painter. With both these actors the 
team ran into major interruptions, but the risk was known and accepted by the shareholders, as 
apparent at the last Steering meeting for Woodstock: 
 
“What I would like to highlight regarding Profile Painter is that we currently have a monopoly 
like situation where there is only the one sub-supplier and we run a high risk if something 
breaks down or if something goes wrong with the price negotiation. So I just want everybody to 
be aware that this is a risk.” (Steering meeting, December 2014) 
  
Two episodes led the team to question the retention of such a policy.  
 
An important element of the Woodstock production was the paint, as analysed in the enactment 
of the value proposition. As the material was made of stone wool, it was very difficult to find a 
type of paint that would not be absorbed by the material. A solution was developed together 
with Paint System, after a careful search inside the company. The collaboration with them began 
in 2010, with G1, when they were chosen because they were “the biggest supplier of paint to the 
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window industry” (Internal document, 2010). Problems with the painting not being suitable for 
the Woodstock profiles were evident from the outset, and Paint System committed to creating a 
powder coating solution. The development took longer than expected, pushing back internal 
deadlines agreed with the Co-creator for launching G3 to the market several times. The 
development and business teams began reflecting on the fact that they were “very dependent on 
external companies” (Project Manager, Interview, 2014). An incident that highlighted this 
dependency took place in mid-2013 when Paint System announced, while the team was 
preparing for a launch campaign with Co-creator in September 2013, that they were not able to 
provide a paint solution anymore, due to a problem with one of their suppliers. The interruption 
was labelled a “disaster,” as no alternatives were available, and the development and testing of 
alternatives would take a considerable amount of time.  
 
“We are very dependent on external companies. Only one disaster occurred when Paint System 
had that news for us. But it would have been nice if we had been able to take precautions 
against such events right from the beginning by not relying on one supplier.” (Project Manager, 
Interview 2015). 
 
Both the development team and the BU were aware of the risk they were facing. When asked to 
explain their selection criteria for agreeing to accept such a risk, the facts listed were: 
a. Lack of resources: 
“We lack resources, so we just decided to focus on one supplier” (Project Manager, 
Interview, 2014); 
b.  Internal deadlines demanded we bring the product onto the market fast, resulting in a 
lack of time to develop alternatives: 
“It takes too much time to develop a new supplier, and we didn’t have that, we have to 
launch our product and that is our priority” (Portfolio Manager, Interview, 2014); 
c. The knowledge that they were operating with small volumes, which would result in 
manageable losses: 
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“Right now the volumes are so small, that we can just take it back” (Portfolio Manager, 
Interview, 2014); and 
d. It was a known risk, that had been subjected to high levels of debate leading to 
agreement: 
“Then, of course, on the supplier side there, we talked about how we needed to have 
alternatives on the paint side, and we had actually accepted that we only had one 
supplier with this solution. When Paint System suddenly pulled the plug on the solution, 
which was the risk we had accepted, suddenly action was needed. Of course, that messed 
up the whole thing, but the good thing was that it was a known risk. Nobody blamed 
anyone when it happened, and that was nice!” (Portfolio Manager, Interview, 2014). 
 
The word “blame” indicates the importance of engaging in the decision-making process 
together, to be able to share risks. In this case, the team and the BU had to focus on the supplier 
situation only, and not on further internal interruptions, which might have occurred in the 
absence of pre-existing alignment. Moreover, when the “disaster” happened, the team realized 
that they had already enacted an acceptance of this risk at the intersection between managerial 
expectations to launch the product fast and risk expressed small operational volumes. 
Nevertheless, in the evaluation meeting, the development team asked themselves why 
“searching for alternative suppliers” was on the activity list, but it was never budgeted for; 
therefore, it was not sustained by the BU.  
 
When the situation arose, the decision was made to postpone the launch for several months, a 
decision accepted and understood by Co-creator, and to use the paint already in stock for orders 
in the pipeline while developing a new solution with the Paint System, who would remain as the 
sole supplier, while another supplier would also be sought out. Interestingly, the criterion 
employed for searching for an alternative supplier was that they must be “one of the biggest 
suppliers of powder paint in the world” (Project meeting, September, 2013), which was the 
same criteria used when finding other suppliers.  
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The development of an alternative solution to that of Paint System was not without major 
hiccups, leading the management team to label their behaviour as exhibiting a “lack of 
commitment” based on the reality that the development of a solution for Woodstock was not a 
core business aim of Paint System. The team also admitted that they had made this discovery 
very late in the process and that it would therefore be difficult and time consuming to build up a 
relationship with a new supplier. The issue of time was repeatedly cited as an obstacle when 
seeking out a new supplier.  
 
“In the last half a year we really learned that they don't look at this business with us as a part of 
their core business, and unfortunately we have also realized that it takes a long time to get rid of 
a supplier” (Steering meeting, end 2013).  
 
The episode coincided with the group management meeting, where all the activities in Pinta Inc. 
were evaluated. At the meeting, given the situation in Woodstock, the “kill/no kill” decision was 
on the debate table, and the worst was expected. In an interview with the vice-president of 
innovation, after the meeting he affirmed:  
“It was very close to be killed, and, this time, I told them clearly, ‘don’t keep it for my sake!’ It 
is true that they were seeing this project was my toy, so it was important to tell them that. So it’s 
not on my hands anymore and they still kept it. That’s a good sign, I think they finally see the 
potential!” (VP R&D, Interview 2014) 
 
The second episode prompting frustrations about the one supplier policy was the relationship 
with Profile Painter. Their role in the value chain was to support the painting of profiles 
vertically, for a length of 6 m, the window industry standard. Furthermore, this supplier had to 
find the right painting processes for spraying the profile to assure its aesthetic appeal. A number 
of debates took place between the development team and the supplier, as the painting process 
that occurred was causing visible impedances to the aesthetic flow. Profile Painter, as another 
supplier, needed to provide the necessary quality for Woodstock, resulting in the company 
 215
getting a quality library installed at their premises. Moreover, the Project Manager observed that 
the company needed more time to understand and adapt to the Woodstock material, as they had 
never encountered it before. Points of concern raised with this supplier were several: the impact 
of trial and error conducted at Profile Painter on the cost side, as the level of waste was 
significant, and the credibility, as they were not delivering as promised.  
 
“We discovered that Profile Painter makes changes to their processes without advising us. 
Furthermore, their process is not entirely constant, e.g. we have seen them making a 20 Minute 
stop in the middle of a process when preparing to shift to painting other profiles.” (Project 
meeting, October 2014) 
 
The incident was labelled a “real problem” (Project meeting, February, 2014), as the supplier 
encountered difficulties painting profiles vertically on a length of six meters, the cutting length 
used in the window industry. They could provide the service for three meters instead, and that 
had a significant impact on Woodstock’s cost structure. The three-meter solution was accepted 
as temporary, given the order intake from Co-creator, which had to be taken care of.  
 
“There are still some challenges for painting 6 m profiles by 1st of March, and we doubt that it 
will be ready and we propose a new deadline.” (Project meeting, February 2014) 
 
“This is a temporary solution, as Profile Painter charges us per profile, not per meter, this is a 
very costly operation.” (Steering meeting, March 2014)  
 
“It’s critical because it is extremely expensive for us to produce profiles in 1.5- 2, or 3 meter 
lengths, it’s not feasible for our business. So, we need to make them in 6 meter lengths very 
soon!” (Senior Project Manager, Interview, 2014) 
 216 
 
As the problem persisted, the new head of the BU asked the development team to rate the 
performance of the supplier; it was acknowledged that they were performing well as co-
developers, but poorly as suppliers. 
 
“New BU Director: How would you rate our collaboration with Profile Painter? 
Project Manager: as a co-development partner, I would say 8, and as a supplier we have seen 
sloppiness, so it is lower.” (Steering meeting, October 2014) 
 
The situation with Profile Painter ended up being the same as that with Paint System, and the 
fact that it was an accepted risk, known to everyone, meant that no contingency measures taken:  
 
“Business Director: What I would like to highlight regarding Profile Painter is that we currently 
have a monopoly like situation, where Profile Painter is the only sub-supplier and we do run a 
high risk if something breaks down or if something goes wrong in the price negotiation. So I just 
want for everybody to be aware that this is the risk” (Steering meeting, December 2014). 
 
During the development of Woodstock, all the actors involved in the value network, from 
suppliers through to customers, were co-developers at different levels. Only when Co-creator 
began ordering via an online system and being invoiced for the purchases, moving away from 
ordering directly from Portfolio Manager in the second half of 2014, did the R&D Vice 
President observe the pressing need to implement effective supply chain management assigning 
an individual to be responsible for it. The number of orders from Co-creator and a new customer 
on the German market, revealed the need for better coordination among all the suppliers in order 
to deliver on time. The supplier-Woodstock relationship has changed, and the risk of not 
managing the new expectations was likely to increase costs considerably:  
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“We do not have a supply chain manager yet? We need supply chain management: From a 
production point of view, it is now important to start supply chain management for our 
customers, also from a cost point of view this is needed, as we want to keep track of the costs.” 
(Steering meeting, November 2014) 
 
6.5.1 Conclusions  
 
Concluding what had been learnt, table 6.4 brings together the enactment processes for the value 
network. Woodstock was designed in a strong co-development partnership with both customers 
and suppliers, because of the newness of the product for both the company and the market. The 
creation of the value proposition was dependent on the input from all parties, which led 
managers to compromise, and accept situations as they were, affecting the cost side of the 
business model. The retention of one supplier was accepted, even though it was known that this 
would be a source of further ecological changes. The plausibility of the decision was influenced 
by ideology, as the practice has been met in the company before.  
 
Interruptions Enactment process Outcome/enacted 
environment  
Learning that Woodstock needed 
different solutions to wood 
Identify that wood-solutions do 
not apply to Woodstock 
 
Accept suppliers and 
customers who are willing to 
be co-developers 
One supplier policy – challenging 
the ideology 
Identify this as an inherited 
practice 
State the long time needed to find 
and developed a new supplier 
Selection based on lack of 
resources, focused on delivering 
to customer 
Temporary retainment for 
development purposes and to 
meet customer’s expectations 
High agreement over risk 
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Several development hiccups 
with suppliers  
High impact on costs 
Identify the newness of the 
business to suppliers as well 
Labelling the delays a 
consequence of “lack of 
commitment” 
Lack of alignment regarding 
quality  
Temporally retained solution 
to achieve a fully developed 
process flow 
 
Install a quality library  
Table 6. 4 Enactment processes of the value network 
 
 
6.6 Enactment of Revenue Model10  
 
Woodstock was created based on an ideology whereby volumes and production in the 
“cheapest” manner possible were considered the DNA, at the core of the business. Pinta Inc. 
presented itself as “the world's best producer of stone wool fibbers, in the cheapest way. That's 
what we are, That’s the core, our DNA” (VP R&D, Interview, 2014). Value is measured in tons, 
which creates the problem of not being able to measure the real business value into production. 
“That’s the problem! We cannot drag the value from the customer into production, and interpret 
it into production figures, we interpret it as tons” (VP R&D, Interview, 2014). Of the existing 
internal businesses, parts of the system division, had managed to shift slightly from this mind-
set and measured value costs, by pricing in square meters, not tons. In this context, the Vice 
President of Innovation knew that Woodstock could not be sold to the market in the Pinta Inc.’s 
usual way, given both the high level of refinement of the stone wool material in Woodstock in 
comparison with the other internal products, and the competitive windows market they were 
targeting. Furthermore, as the technology for producing Woodstock was so much more 
complex, the aim was to get a premium price for the stone wool, that otherwise would have been 
sold by the cubic meter; i.e., by trying to move away from the “bulk type of thinking” (Senior 
Project Manager, Interview, 2013).  
 
                                                     
10 Revenue model: “to estimate cost structure and profit potential of producing the offering” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002:533) 
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Therefore, the focus was on lowering Woodstock’s production costs for reaching two euros per 
linear meter, to have a “sales price of 4.50 or more euros” (CEO, Interview, 2014). Yet, given 
the specific feature of Woodstock, namely high quality, it created many internal struggles, as the 
prioritization of quality resulted in greater than expected production costs. Thus, having a mind-
set of thinking in big volumes meant pricing a high-quality product, with the services that the 
R&D team has created around the product, was one of key barriers to creating a realistic 
business model for Woodstock.  
 
The enactment of the revenue model focused on two aspects: creating agreement about the level 
of production costs, and, secondly, learning how to price such a product, by moving away from 
the price per cubic meter mentality that drove Pinta Inc. 
 
6.6.1 Reaching intersubjectivity on cost  
 
Woodstock underwent different stages of development, which had not been planned or predicted 
initially. This had resulted in frequent adjustments to the budget allocation; meaning 
adjustments were dictated by the cost of numerous interruptions in production and unforeseen 
logistics, as analysed in the previous sections. G1 failed because it had a design that required 
logistics that were too costly for the value they created on the market, with the result that the 
team had to design G2 and G3. Several cost centres had represented a key challenge for the 
development of the business, as both were in a learning phase in the case of Woodstock, namely 
level of waste and waste handling across the entire value network, unknown process flow, 
alignment on quality, and production in the German factory.  
 
To allow the development, the team chose to sell Woodstock with a negative margin, as being a 
“learning (…) experience, compared with having a product in the market, it is hard to quantify. 
This is the cost for getting experience in the market. The experience is being worked into the 
development project along the way” (Internal documents, Steering meeting Report, 2012). The 
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team began working with variable production costs (VPC) to create as so-called “learning 
curve.” Due to this label, failure and unsuccessful attempts were accepted as learning 
experiences. The concept of a learning curve led to acceptance that G1 had been essential to 
delivering a common understanding of the deficit that needed to be covered, and to support 
arguments to use an industrial setting, to reduce production costs:  
 
“There is large sensitivity in the business plan in relation to sales volume and sales price. A 
learning curve for VPC has to be established and potential investments for automation have to 
be identified. The cost scenario for Woodstock is based on a German factory running for 12 
months and no automated manufacturing process.” (Project meeting minutes, 2011) 
 
Yet, in the case of G1, the production of the window was double in cost to the market price; 
therefore, the deficit, which was to be covered by Pinta Inc. was significant, and G1 was halted, 
and labelled a learning experience: “Because we see that G1 worked fine with the customer, we 
had no complaints.” (Senior Project Manager, Interview, 2013). 
 
The majority of interruptions were caused by lack of alignment (a word used by the VP R&D) 
between the R&D team and the BU regarding the costs of development and ownership of those 
costs. While R&D was operating according to market cues, BU applied costs cues to legitimize 
the creation of Woodstock; therefore a common agreement, possibly even a compromise was 
needed. Conflicts between the two actors were triggered by the fact that the Business Director 
felt overwhelmed by the level of cost of the product, in comparison with the promised scenario 
of a learning curve where the product would cost approximately five euros. Looking at the 
budget for 2013 and that for 2014, the Business Director asked:  
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“What have you done with half a million? How do we handle all that cost? Who is covering it, 
who controls the costs? Are all these VPC costs for me? Because it doesn’t make any sense to 
me! Just look at the amount!” (Business Director, Steering meeting, 2013) 
 
The facilitator negotiating all internal interruptions was always the VP R&D. He was the 
convergent point between the two sides, and he continually reminded everyone how different 
Woodstock was in comparison with all the other internal projects, as it was dependent on 
warranty and liability. He underlined repeatedly that this dependency made predictions about 
sales and breakeven points a challenge, as they needed to allocate more time for the integration 
of new customers. In this setting, the VP R&D reaffirmed the importance of aligning 
expectations:  
 
“It’s extremely important that you align expectations, because if somebody believes that you will 
get skyrocketing sales in just one year… then the expectation will be too high. And in a thing 
like this it is also important to say that we are moving into a learning situation where we will 
every day experience something new. And one thing that I think is critical here, on the sales 
side, is to learn that this business is much more about warranty and liability, which we are not 
used to, to the same extent, in Pinta Inc. so that means that integrating new customers will take 
longer, and that is really also a matter of aligning the stakeholders.” (VP R&D, Steering 
meeting, November 2013) 
 
Furthermore, since the project received very high costs, he suggested: 
 
“Start looking at this as if it is a business, not a product! Get a business controller, and think 
about this as being an established business. Moving from R&D into an operation is a challenge 
for us. At the same time, we have to develop stuff, we have to make sure that the quality is in 
place.” (VP R&D, Steering meeting, November 2013) 
 222 
 
Considerations like these led to an agreement to operate with negative contribution margins, and 
a common understanding that VPC levels were high and would be “as long as we run from the 
pilot plant” (Steering meeting, January 2014). Moreover, the VP R&D emphasized quality; he 
assured the group that costs were at an acceptable level, as long as quality was not 
compromised. Attaining the right quality was a phrase repeated constantly to explain the failure 
to meet the VPC learning curve. In order to create agreement on this issue, meeting the VPC 
learning curve was a requirement added to the risk matrix and presented in Steering meetings. 
 
“Project Manager: Then we go to number 11, not meeting the VPC learning curve, it is also a 
new one. We have put it, from a quality perspective, we have put it between low and medium 
impact, you might think differently if you’re paying.  
VP R&D: Quality before delivery, delivery comes before cost, Quality comes before cost 
savings, and that’s why we’re doing this this way.” (Steering meeting, January 2014) 
 
At the same time, they had managed to create a buffer to reduce waste, and thereby costs, by 
having additional projects utilizing the boards rejected by Woodstock. This afforded a 
significant advantage during and discussions around this spin off, when analysing the value 
chain, and reminded the team that they were in a volume sensitive business, where VPC was 
calculated per square meter adding a certain level of mark-up, making them depended on 
creating large volumes. However, the Business Developer has emphasized that as long they 
were in a pilot production setting; it would be very difficult to produce large volumes given the 
capacity of the pilot plant. VP R&D reminded the Steering Group that this was much more than 
a production capacity issue; it was also a cost problem, as the VPC was calculated on very low 
production runs:  
 
“VP R&D: I don’t think it’s a capacity issue, I think it’s a cost issue.  
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Business developer: Point taken, you’re very right. There is one thing, all the VPCs are 
calculated on very low production runs, and if he’s going to increase sales heavily, we can go to 
bigger production runs and that will have a huge impact on the costs for us, positively. So let’s 
see.” (Steering meeting, January 2014) 
 
The Portfolio Manager defined the scope of the project: “we’re going for a commodity product 
and therefore we simply need to be in control of our costs.” The VPC were the most debated 
aspects of the business model and management knew that whilst Woodstock was going to be 
produced in Denmark, not in an industrial setting, handling orders meant the production VPC 
was going to be very high. Therefore, while further investment had begun to be calculated to 
industrialize the production, VP R&D asked for transparency concerning both the VPC source 
and calculation, and the creation of a business plan for Woodstock to guide the team, by helping 
them to create reference points. In the evaluation meeting, beginning 2015, it was discussed that 
some costs were not presented in the reports, creating a false impression that production costs 
were lower than they were. This issue created moments of mistrust between R&D and BU, as 
the end result of a learning curve was higher than expected. The perception of the BU was that 
these numbers, VPC on quality aspect, had been conveniently omitted:  
 
“So the blue column in the excel file, it’s actually where we were not wise enough when we 
calculated the VPC. We forgot something, we forgot to include that normally quality control is a 
part of VPC, we forgot.” (Portfolio Manager, 2015) 
 
This comment produced immediate reactions to explain the numbers that were missing from the 
initial calculations due to the lack of knowledge at the moment of production, as the team did 
not have the right production formula and so there was continued trial and error. As they did not 
know how to handle that kind of uncertainty, they had chosen not to insert any values at all, 
summing up lower VPC, and arguing against its plausibility: 
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“We lacked knowledge about the final specifications for the profiles. We had no idea about what 
the volumes might be, or how to spread the transport costs of a truck to several profiles. So, it 
was definitely wrong to say we forgot something. We calculated and incorporated everything 
corresponding to our knowledge at that time. There were things that we knew should be part of 
the cost, but we could not evaluate it, we commented on it.” (Business Controller, 2015) 
 
The decision to estimate to zero what was unknown was challenged, due to the consequences of 
presenting a product cheaper than it was to group management.  
 
“Business controller: In order not to make the product too expensive, we took them out from the 
beginning. There was a discussion about leaving it or taking it out. 
Portfolio Manager: This is one of my issues. What I want to do is to highlight we were not 
completely honest about the price. Sorry if I provoke you here. And it is exactly what you said, 
we would have killed the product if we had been completely honest about the cost.” (Evaluation 
meeting, 2015) 
 
“Project Manager: Let me challenge you in another way: the BU would not have been 
completely honest with us in the absence of understanding about this. They cannot handle the 
truth.” (Evaluation meeting, 2015) 
 
However, the business controller pointed out that the real issue with the VPC calculations was 
not the manner of calculating the data, even though a number had not been written down, it was 
“verbally commented on” (Business controller, 2015), it was the way it was communicated. The 
numbers were avoided in business negotiations between BU and R&D, when revealing the price 
of the business upon transfer from development to the BU.  
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“The problem is what followed after that, some say open communication was used and filtered 
for business negotiation and this was a mistake. If we are talking about doing something wrong 
or right, at the time transferring the business was discussed it would have been wise to say: 
listen there are these five items that I don’t know how to incorporate, how should we deal with 
it?” And this was a mistake.” (Business Controller, 2014) 
 
Lack of knowledge was introduced as an argument to explain the situation, and the fact that the 
team had been working up three different scenarios: the learning curve, the pilot plant 
production where everything was done manually, and therefore, had higher VPC, and the 
predictions for an industrialized setting where the target estimation was two euros. Full 
automatization was identified as the only scenario in which Woodstock would be “a good 
business” (Program Director, 2014), and this scenario was possible, according to the BU, in the 
German factory, in spite of the several quality issues that had emerged there. 
  
“The factory down there is just a big black box sucking money and if you don't keep track of that 
it is difficult to explain where all the money went.” (Project Manager, Interview, 2014) 
 
When transferring the business from R&D to BU, a higher learning curve, with approximately 
40% more variation than promised, but promising a production cost scenario to two euros in an 
industrialized setting appeared to be attainable.  
 
 
6.6.2 Benchmarking pricing structures 
 
Market research had helped the business and R&D team identify that Woodstock was a product 
with superior qualities in comparison with other profiles on the market. Moreover, none of the 
windows on the market shared similar properties to the Woodstock window. In these conditions, 
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the dilemma was how to price a premium product, while accommodating existing practice in 
Pinta Inc. to operate with high contribution margins. High margins were expected from 
Woodstock if it were to be perceived as a worthwhile business. The team considered that 
benchmarking against other materials available in the marketplace was the easiest solution: 
 
“It has proven very difficult to get real prices on windows for the chosen target segment (passive 
house type). Evaluation of what our solution is worth in actual monetary terms is difficult. We 
have to rely mostly on comparisons with other materials, like wood, alternative insulation 
materials, and other tangible/intangible benefits.” (Internal document, 2011) 
 
“In Pinta Inc. we operate with very big contribution margins, and if we compare businesses, 
then they will find out that Woodstock is only contributing 5%, that will not be seen as a good 
sign. They will say ‘out with them’. So, it needs to be a comparable contribution margin based 
on other businesses, or group management will not believe in it.” (Portfolio Manager, Interview, 
2013) 
 
Even though benchmarking seemed to be the most reasonable solution, the question of against 
whom was raised very quickly. In G1, Woodstock defined itself as a competitor to wood 
windows, while the changes in G3 allowed it to go up against wood-aluminium and aluminium 
windows as well. Furthermore, any decision had to include an understanding both of 
Woodstock’s customers and how their product would be positioned for the end customer, as a 
wood window with higher insulation properties, or as wood-aluminium with maintenance-free 
features:  
 
“It's also about pricing, because the wood-aluminium windows are priced at 50% above normal 
wood windows. So, if our customers, the window manufacturers, are going to say 'okay this is a 
wood window', and sell it as a wood window with better insulation properties, then we would 
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have a lower premium, because there's a mark-up with wood-aluminium because its 
maintenance-free. So, we go and say 'okay we can do the wood-aluminium which is 
maintenance-free’ so the customer would get that plus the insulation. So, that's why it's 
important to find out which segment our customer is targeting. And how he will price it, because 
that also tells us something about how we can price it.” (Portfolio Manager, Interview, 2014). 
 
Interestingly, the discussions on pricing strategies and profit models for Woodstock were very 
limited at both project and Steering meetings. In the Steering meetings, the need to debate 
pricing considerations was triggered by an important campaign launch with Co-creator at the 
very beginning of 2014. In preparation for that event, the Project Manager had drawn attention 
to the fact that too much attention was being paid to the technological development of the 
product and all the costs involved, and far less to discovering the appropriate pricing strategy for 
the profile. Co-creator was to begin promoting the window to their customers, namely 
carpenters and was planning a marketing campaign at the handball championship to which 150 
carpenters were invited, therefore, decisions about pricing strategy was needed.  
 
“I find when we're talking about the launch that we have underestimated and keep 
underestimating the things around the physical product. If we launch and we don't, for instance, 
have a price, or we don't have a logistic solution, or have all other kinds of things, that it is just 
as troubling as not having a profile. So, therefore I put a little emphasis on presenting this here, 
because this needs to be on our list for attention as well.” (Senior Project Manager, Steering 
meeting, September 2013) 
 
Furthermore, it was emphasized that the business team should contribute to these aspects much 
more, as R&D was lacking competences in these articulated areas.  
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When determining the price, a combination of competitive strategy and cost sensitivity was 
adopted. The team found that they could compare it only with aluminium windows, based on a 
comparison of production costs, as they had to handle combinations of materials too, while 
wood frames were made of only one material. Additionally, Woodstock incurred extra costs 
when taping the profile onto the window frame. 
 
“It's quite difficult to determine if there are going to be extra costs or not, and this also depends 
on what you compare it to. Compared to a wooden window, there would be extra costs because 
they have nothing on the outside. This window should be compared more with an aluminium 
window. Then you would have this kind or ever-shield on the outside.” (Business Developer, 
Interview, 2013) 
 
“So that the discussion I think is about whether we should price position as aluminium or above 
or below. Where to get in to the market?” (Portfolio Manager, Interview, 2013) 
 
The decision was made on pricing a linear meter, profiles times number of colors, as was 
standard for the industry, added services such as co-branding and thermic calculation had been 
included in the price. 
 
“Sell it by the linear meter. Today we are selling it by the linear meter, six meters long that is 
standard for the industry. Price to be defined for each customer.” (Business Director, BU, 
Interview, 2014) 
 
Furthermore, they explained the services offered were not incorporated into the revenue model, 
because they were positioning Woodstock as a product, not a service:  
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“Today we don’t generate value on the service, but you can also say that it is a service, because 
you can customize and we make specific calculations. But these are not reflected in the revenue 
model. We are selling it as a product and that it is, but maybe in 10 years’ time we’ll change.” 
(Business Director, BU, Interview, 2014) 
 
Interestingly, to compete, Woodstock decided to keep the same price level for all profiles, 
regardless of colours, even though the costs for developing profiles in different colours were 
significantly different between light and dark ones.  
 
“It was discussed, but I think the decision made was that we wanted to be competitive in all 
colours and we needed super durable dark colours because of our substrate and because of our 
high demand for durability. But if you go out and buy an aluminium profile, you don't pay 
differently for the different colours.” (Project Manager, interview 2014) 
 
Yet, the most important discussion on pricing was triggered by the discovery that Co-creator 
was pricing the Woodstock window at a considerably higher price than their other windows. 
This was discussed above, and it triggered the VP R&D to ask the business team to define 
defining a real value proposition for Woodstock, as it was apparent that they were 
underestimating the product and leaving money uncollected.  
 
Co-creator was pricing the Woodstock window 40% higher than the three-layer wood window. 
Its CEO explained the wood windows were not as successful as wood-aluminium windows, and 
that it saw Woodstock as competing against the later. As a wood-aluminium window 
commanded a premium price of 30-40% more than wood, Co-creator had decided to price 
Woodstock the same, adding an additional cost for the fact that more technical work was 
required to assemble a Woodstock window. In these conditions, Co-creator’s CEO explained 
that he was expecting a 15% turnover on a Woodstock window. This led the VP R&D to 
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emphasize the fact that a well-defined and known value proposition would help the team create 
the right pricing strategy. He drew attention to the importance of being fully aware of the value 
they were offering to the market, in order to understand type of value to be created. VP R&D 
criticized the lack of a business model for Woodstock. 
 
“VP R&D: Can’t we then make a right value proposition by ourselves find out what is then 
deduce the right pricing structure? We really need to know what the performance we deliver is, 
what is the price customers are willing to pay and how do we drive that down to our target VPC 
cost for the end of the learning curve, so that we can see that there is still a business for us. 
That’s what I think we need to create and have an overview.” (Steering meeting, December 
2014) 
 
6.6.3 Conclusions  
 
The fact that Pinta Inc. was a cost sensitive company was evident from their approach when 
building the revenue model for Woodstock. Based on competitor-driven and cost-based pricing, 
all the decisions when designing the business model for Woodstock were weighted against 
costs, even though quality was mentioned as the primary focus. Interestingly, toward the 
handover of the business to the business owner, it was affirmed that a value-based pricing 
should be approached; to capture the real value Woodstock was bringing to the market.  
 
Table 6.5 summarizes the interruptions encountered when creating a revenue model for 
Woodstock. The main difficulties related to encouraging internal actors to accept the costs that 
accompanied the learning process. Furthermore, the development and business teams felt the 
need to reach a balance with the ideology; thus, matching the same level of contribution margins 
practiced, as the features were different for Woodstock.  
 
 231
Interruptions Enactment process Outcome/enacted 
environment  
Identifications of cost centres Label them as “learning 
processes” 
Highlight positive feedback from 
the market  
Create agreement 
Create variable production 
costs for learning curve 
Conflicts between R&D and BU 
on costs ownership 
Consider failed expectations in 
terms of costs 
Identify the existence of high 
costs for pilot production scenario 
Perceive lack of transparency 
about VPC 
Identify miscommunications 
between parties involved  
A mediator emerged calling 
for alignment and 
reaffirming Woodstock’s 
identity as different 
Accept that it was a lack of 
knowledge when calculating 
some VPCs 
Working with different 
scenarios 
Lack of skills for handling costs  Define Woodstock as a business, 
and not simply as a product  
Hire business controllers for 
handling costs  
Quality versus costs decisions  Observe that quality comes first in 
Woodstock 
Create an agreement 
Use spinoff projects to level 
up costs and reduce waste 
Lack of knowledge in pricing 
high value products 
Identify the conditions for 
existence: having a comparable 
contribution to the market with 
ideology  
Identify the difficulties when 
defining the competition 
Identity the need to have a well-
defined customer segment 
Identify the imbalance between 
technology versus business focus 
in the development stages 
Benchmarking: looking for 
reference points in potential 
competitors  
Mediator called to link the 
value proposition with 
pricing strategy and costs 
centres, based on customer 
and end consumer behaviour  
Table 6. 5 Enactment processes of the revenue model 
 
Aside from the above-described balancing act, the creation of a revenue model demanded well-
defined customer segmentation and market positioning. As analysed in the value chain section, a 
confusion arose as Woodstock was a competitor for wood, aluminium or wood-aluminium has 
 232 
many interruptions occurred, when defining inaccurate reference points addressing under-
pricing and profit losses. Moreover, creating focus on costs and reducing production costs 
resulted in fewer resources being allocated to defining pricing and profit-making strategies for 
Woodstock. Lacking this aspect, services such as co-branding were not retained long term, 
while others, such as variety of colours, energy calculation, and design, were offered free of 
charge.  
 
6.7 Conclusions  
 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the enactment processes that informed the creation of the 
elements of Woodstock’s business model. The research question that has guided this chapter is:  
What are the enactment processes that enabled the creation of the elements of Woodstock’s 
business model and how do managers of Pinta Inc. made sense of the emergence of a new 
business model?   
In identifying the main interruptions for the creation of Woodstock business model, the features 
of ideology and paradigms active in Pinta Inc. have been the source of several interruptions. The 
manner how these have collided with the new identity willing to emerge, have determined the 
believing team in the project to enact, thus create solutions and routines that have not been met 
before in the company. The acceptance of these ones, for example co-branding, co-creation and 
end-consumers’ visits, have determined further interruptions and new enactment processes. 
Some of the outcomes were retained for good, such as acceptance of co-creation practices, and 
others only temporarily, for serving a short-term purpose, for example co-branding.  
Analysing the emergence of Woodstock’s business model, it can be observed that it was an 
effort of reaching acceptance, translated through compromises from different parts, of working 
at an intersubjective level. Yet, BU was always running after best-case scenarios where generic 
subjectivity, meaning control and processes that act as a Swiss watch were achieved. The value 
for retention for them was control. However, their run after control triggered mistakes, counter 
productivity and conflicts between the actors involved, and, in the interest of keeping the project 
moving further, they had to redefine goals and accept decisions at the intersubjective level. At 
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this level, “face-to-face social interaction in real time” (Weick, 1995:72) and possibility of  
“mutually reinforcing interpretations, and beliefs, values, and assumptions” (Weick, 1995:73) it 
was possible to co-enact with both Co-creator, and the suppliers, acting as co-development 
partners.  
Moreover, even though the creation of Woodstock was a collective effort of many parts 
involved, each one drawing on different vocabularies (Weick, 1995:107), there was no actual 
focus on how the collaboration should happened, and it was expected to run efficiently. In 
situations of conflicts between paradigms, a mediator emerged, in the person of the vice-
president of innovation, mediating the disagreements, and facilitating the process, especially 
from selection to retention.  
By grouping the identified interruptions (table 6.1 - 6.5), six main categories have emerged: 
 
a. Underestimation of the product: lack of information about the market value and the 
attractiveness of Woodstock for the end consumers made the company perceive it as a 
simple, standard solution for windows industry; however, the end customer taught them 
that Woodstock ought to be positioned in the marketplace as a distinctive product with 
advantages over the other types of window frames available, as a 3rd look!  
b. Quality versus cost dilemma: Woodstock had to be a high-quality product to answers the 
requirements of the market, while internally, the conditions for existence imposed by 
group management was very low production costs.  
c. Divergence between paradigms: The R&D team and BU had numerous points of failed 
alignment regarding the type of business Woodstock would be. This included 
misalignment on the topic of who was responsible for developmental costs, and why 
learning costs were so high; BU did not predict the need to generate so much new 
knowledge for Woodstock’s business; R&D had expected much more involvement from 
the BU; choice of the wrong specifications as reference points in the benchmarking 
practices; and postponement of the hand over date. 
d. Challenging the ideology: the product demanded Pinta Inc. adopt new practices: 
warranty, aesthetics and quality, co-creation and co-branding, adapting its logistic 
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practices to new industry requirements, exhibiting flexibility and diversity. The 
company’s one supplier policy failed, and issues arose as R&D became a production and 
business development unit, as well.  
e. Lack of knowledge regarding pricing high value products, production processes for high 
quality specifications, as well as handling costs. 
f. Moments where there was a lack of trust both internally, between R&D and BU, and 
towards Co-creator. 
 
As seen in table 6.6, these interruptions were encountered several times throughout the 
enactment processes, and had influenced the creation of each element. While the value chain 
was the element that required the most attention, as it was the most inundated with interruptions, 
market segmentation and creating a competitive strategy were the sections less challenging for 
the development team (R&D team and Bu together). It was only needed for knowledge and 
intersubjectivity between the paradigms. Furthermore, the creation of value proposition was a 
matter of understanding the potential of the technology on the market, reaching alignment 
between paradigms, and getting acceptance from the ideology. The revenue model has 
encountered challenges emerged from lack of knowledge on how to handle premium products, 
how to handle costs resulted from the need of high quality, misalignments between paradigms, 
and challenging the ideology. Lastly, the value network creation needed to first reach 
intersubjectivity about the technology’s potential on the market and need for quality, and to 
overcome the one supplier policy that made Woodstock vulnerable to changes.  
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Elements/ 
interruptions 
Underestimat
ing their 
product 
Quality versus 
cost dilemma 
Divergence 
between 
paradigms 
Challenging 
the ideology 
Lack of 
knowledge 
Lack 
of trust 
Value proposition            
Market segment 
and strategic 
positioning 
        
Revenue Model  
(Costs 
Pricing) 
          
Value Chain 
(Production costs 
Logistics 
Handover) 
           
Value Network           
Table 6. 6 Interruptions in Woodstock's business model creation 
 
Moreover, Woodstock had proved itself to be a product that challenged the teams’ knowledge 
base and established routines, as only few meanings could be based on retrospective, correlating 
findings with patterns encountered by the company before. Therefore, the team has chosen to 
bracket the musts and non-negotiable conditions for becoming a supplier for the window 
industry, and approached them though benchmarking. In this manner, reference points inspired 
by the windows industry were formulated for dealing with warranty and aesthetic (value 
proposition), flexibility and diversity (market segment) that challenged the logistics (value 
chain), pricing (revenue model).  The creation of reference points allowed the team to enact. 
However, the enactment of these elements was a combination between retrospective, imitation 
/benchmarking, and enactment. The first step was to try to find solutions inside the company, 
looking back at different existing practices. If there was no answer, or not suitable answer for 
Woodstock, imitation was the second trial. Thirdly, when realizing that the reference points 
gathered from the industry were not matching the needs and potential of Woodstock, the team 
had to enact, beyond retrospective and imitation.  
 236 
When interruptions were a result of challenging the ideology of Pinta Inc., labelling the 
phenomenon was a method that helped reaching intersubjectivity. In this manner, G1 was 
labelled and accepted as a learning process, while covering the costs of working with a Co-
creator, an essential ticket to entry. Bracketing activities have supported labelling. For example, 
bracketing the window industry to be a fragmented market, Co-creator’s signals of commitment 
as cues for group management.  
In table 6.7, the outcomes of the enactment processes are clarified, reflecting the managers’ 
intentions to establish a “workable level of certainty” (Weick, 1979:3), thus intersubjectivity.
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 E
lem
ents/ 
interruptions 
U
nderestim
ating 
their product 
Q
uality versus cost 
dilem
m
a 
D
ivergence betw
een 
paradigm
s 
C
hallenging the ideology 
L
ack of know
ledge 
L
ack of trust 
V
alue 
proposition  
Focused on one 
national m
arket at 
a tim
e 
L
abel W
oodstock 
a “3
rd look” 
 
C
reating a tem
porary 
collective agreem
ent 
(tem
porary retention) 
about co-branding 
D
efining and re-defining 
targets for installing 
w
arranty  
D
efine G
1 as “valuable 
learning” 
 
 
M
arket 
segm
ent and 
strategic 
positioning 
 
 
G
et acceptance from
 
the ideology, w
hich 
acted as a m
ediator 
 
T
rial and E
rror w
ith the 
C
o-creator 
R
each intersubjectivity 
regarding m
andatory 
entry points into the 
m
arket 
G
et feedback from
 
end-users and 
install new
 
practices at the 
com
pany 
R
evenue 
M
odel  
(C
osts 
P
ricing) 
 
G
oing from
 generic 
subjectivity (control) 
to intersubjectivity 
U
se spinoff project to 
level up costs and 
reduce w
aste 
A
 m
ediator em
erged 
w
hen asked for 
alignm
ent and 
reaffirm
ing W
oodstock 
identity of being 
different 
A
ccept that it w
as a 
lack of know
ledge that 
caused problem
s 
B
enchm
arking 
  M
ediator asked to link 
value proposition w
ith 
pricing strategy and costs 
centres, based on 
custom
er and end 
consum
er behaviour 
H
ire business 
controller for handling 
costs 
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calculating som
e V
P
C
 
V
alue C
hain 
(P
roduction 
costs 
L
ogistics 
H
andover) 
B
enchm
ark 
industry practice 
(alum
inium
 
practices) 
C
reate short term
 
and long term
 
contingency plan 
Install quality 
libraries for all the 
actors involved in 
production 
C
reate 
intersubjectivity 
regarding the im
pact 
on the tim
eline 
Setting a short-term
 
plan 
H
aving m
ediator 
betw
een tw
o internal 
paradigm
s  
R
eaching 
intersubjectivity 
through a m
itigation 
plan 
P
ortfolio m
anager takes 
over tasks tem
porarily 
  
R
etention of 
production cost not to 
be higher than 
proposed tw
o 
euros/square m
eter. 
A
ctivities that w
ould 
increase the costs w
ere 
perceived as 
interruptions. 
Invite the director 
of the production 
facility in the 
Steering G
roup.  
C
oupling 
W
oodstock w
ith 
another product that 
could give volum
es 
V
alue 
N
etw
ork 
A
ccept only 
suppliers and 
custom
ers w
illing 
to be co-
developers 
Install a quality 
library 
 
(O
ne supplier) 
T
em
porarily retained for 
developm
ent purposes 
and to m
eet custom
er’s 
expectations 
H
igh agreem
ent over risk 
T
em
porarily retained 
solutions offered to 
achieve a fully 
developed process flow
 
for custom
ers 
 
T
able 6. 7 O
utcom
e of the enactm
ent processes
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Analysing further, certain enactment steps had a cumulative effect in the emergent process of G3’s 
business model, whilst others were extracting and had a non-cumulative effect, which has resulted 
in further interruptions (see table 6.8). As such, certain enactment steps have allowed learning, and 
even collective learning, for example through the installation of a quality library along the entire 
value network, while others steps perceived as “problems” kept being repeated. One example of the 
latter kind of actions was noticed with regards to solving capacity problems, keeping one supplier 
policy, benchmarking wrongly, or failing to build tracing systems. These were encountered in both 
G1 and G3.  
Enactment with cumulative effects  Enactment with non- cumulative effects 
Eliminated the wood party and the need for tools 
from G1, thus changing the value chain 
 Capacity problems in G1 continued in G3 
 
Co-creation and co-development One supplier policy failed in G1, which repeated in 
G3 
Allowed for trial and error events with the co-
creator 
Failed in building a tracing system in G1, and had 
the same problem in G3 
Learned about liability and warranty Failed benchmarking (too much imitation), for both 
building the warranty, positioning the product on 
the market, and in the revenue model 
Installed quality libraries along the entire value 
chain 
BU waited to have a fully developed product before 
it considered the revenue model 
Looked for feedback from the end-user Hired a business controller late in the process 
Pilot plant Defined Woodstock as a business, not only a 
product, but only close to the handover 
Hired paint specialists and a key account manager 
for the German market 
Focused mainly on technology and product 
development, late on pricing and business cases 
The director of the factory in Germany asked to 
join the steering group in order to create 
alignment in terms of quality 
Applied co-creation principles for the German 
market  
Connected with a spinoff for reducing costs in 
waste 
Table 6. 8 Cumulative and non- cumulative effect of the enactment processes. Examples  
 
Analysing the enactment steps that have determined further interruptions, as outlined in the second 
column of table 6.8, shows that the arguments used for these actions were related to values such as: 
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a. Time.  As seen in chapter six, a lack of time was frequently mentioned as the main reason 
for not choosing another supplier, even in the cases of interruptions; 
b. Cost. Producing a pilot plant and taking the risk of not being able to produce for an intake of 
orders;  
c. Feel of control.  The business unit would take over only when they knew that the production 
and logistic flow worked perfectly, thus generic subjectivity. Based on these expectations, 
they have postponed taking over Woodstock several times. However, at the handover 
moment, these processes were still under development, albeit to a lesser degree. 
Furthermore, the action of benchmarking for defining the reference points to be followed in 
Woodstock’s development was explained through the same need of control: “Do we have 
reference points for these? We need reference points to compare ourselves with. That would 
also help us to control the process, or how else would we know that we are on the right 
track?” (Steering meeting, 2014) 
 
Additionally, for elements that were perceived as being crucial for the business, such as production 
costs and production flows, it was expected to reach a generic subjectivity, thus high level of 
control. For elements, such as market segmentation, competitive strategy and even revenue model, 
however, they were willing to accept greater risks and uncertainty, and working at an 
intersubjectivity level was accepted.   
On the other hand, looking at the first column of table 6.8, the values that allowed the enactment of 
cumulative decisions were always based on an acknowledgement that there was a need for:  
a. Learning and experimentation: that is, the acceptance of co-creation and experimentation 
with a co-creator, and building a pilot plans for trial and error.  This was fuelled by positive 
feedback from the market that determined that Pinta Inc. accepted co-creation activities with 
both markets, despite the costs. Positive feedback from the market has also allowed co-
branding to be temporarily retained, even though the BU did not agree on the need for this 
element. The market reaction to Woodstock in both G1 and G3 was the most influential cue 
for group management, and the decision by the CEO to allow Woodstock to be developed; 
 
b. Reaching intersubjectivity along the entire value network: implementing quality libraries, 
enlarging steering group, and accepting risks only in cases of high intersubjectivity for the 
risk (as in the case of the interruption with the paint system) 
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Therefore, as seen in table 6.7 as well, in the case of elements such as market segmentation and 
competitive strategies, reaching intersubjectivity was a sufficient condition for going on, as it 
allowed further iterations. However, for elements perceived as vital for Woodstock’ acceptance as a 
business, such as production costs and logistics, it was expected to reach a generic subjectivity, 
namely high level of control.  
Interestingly, majority of interruptions have resulted from the divergence between internal actors, 
resulting in paradigm disagreements based on different expectations for Woodstock and from each 
other. This implies that, in the majority of cases, time-consuming interruptions did not result from 
certain technological faults, but from the manner R&D and BU approached them. Failing reaching 
intersubjectivity resulted in subsequent interruptions. For example, the BU was perceived as a 
passive observer of the enactment processes of R&D: regardless of the numerous times R&D 
requested assistance, they only seemed willing to intervene when costs were set to increase. They 
seemed to be waiting for the cues that would signal that Woodstock is ready to be taken over. By 
acting as a passive observer, the BU had difficulties understanding and accepting the business 
model the R&D team has developed; for example, accepting the co-branding policy and exclusivity 
given to certain customers. Thus, once the BU had taken over, new models were considered, as they 
could not internalize those practices in their unit. Acting as a mediator, the VP R&D played an 
important role in establishing convergence between these two actors and sensemaking process. Yet, 
regardless of all these factors, the condition for the existence for Woodstock was cost based 
imposed by the ideology.  
The heterogeneity of the interruptions demonstrates the emergent nature of a business model, which 
has to overcome more than only inertia and resistance to change, as shown in the business model 
literature. These interruptions have generated a back and forth between intersubjectivity and general 
subjectivity, and, therefore, has influenced the emergent nature of the individual interpretations and 
organisational actions. Actors involved in Woodstock project have realized that moments of general 
subjectivity are not only difficult to reach, but also very challenging to be maintain. They have 
learnt, especially BU, to accept working at an intersubjectivity level. Therefore, the heterogeneity of 
the interruptions has determined working with contingency steps and accepting solutions on short 
term, called by Sandberg et al. (2015:11) “satisfactorily restored” moments, which had allowed the 
project to move further.   
Finally, several important aspects relating to how the elements of the business model emerged and 
evolved should be highlighted, as not all the components of the model emerged simultaneously, as 
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affirmed by the activity system perspective, but were enacted progressively together with the 
development and increasing complexity of the product, in the dialog between intersubjectivity and 
generic subjectivity; thus, innovation and control (Weick, 1995:72). This also shows people do take 
plausible decisions, as Weick (1995) explains, sense was made of interruptions as they arose, and 
not ahead of time. As seen before, these elements did not stand-alone; they influenced each other in 
different stages of development to enable the emergence of something new. This observation is 
opening the discussion about interlinkages, which is to be addressed in the next chapter. 
Thus, following chapter will analyse how the elements presented herein interacted with each other, 
to reveal the process informing business model enactment.  
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Chapter VII: The Emergence Process of a New Business Model  
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, interruptions had to be overcome to allow the development of Woodstock. 
The analysis showed that each interruption determined not only the development of certain 
elements in different ways, but also a co-influence relationship between them, unexpected and 
unpredicted by managers. As certain co-influence relationship, for example value network-cost, has 
triggered further interruptions, it required form R&D team and BU to continue the enactment 
processes.  
The research under activity system perspective and dynamic capability argue for the existence of 
continue, tightly coupled linkages between the elements of the business model, a priori planned by 
managers who seeks to design, or re-design a business model. Zott and Amit (2010:2918) explain 
these linkages offer insights into the processes that enable the activity system’s evolution in time.  
Still, in Woodstock’s case, these linkages were enacted by the manner how managers made sense of 
certain interruptions. As interruptions happened over time, these linkages appeared in time as well, 
some temporarily, until meaning was created, other being retained for good.    
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse the emergence of these linkages and the role 
they played in going from the intended to the “real-ized” (Weick, 2001: 187) business model. I 
begin with analysing how the elements are linked to each other, the presence of these linkages and 
their sources, followed by showing the emergence process of G3. I conclude the chapter with an 
objective (Weick, 1995:34) illustration of the differences between the intended and the ”real-ized” 
business model of Woodstock.  
Thus, the research question guiding this chapter is: What enables the emergence process of a new 
business model? 
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7.2 Co-influences between elements 
 
The first element enacted was the value proposition, embedded in the technology, and then the 
customers, since the VP R&D decided to focus on the windows industry. The analysis in the 
previous chapter shows that their lack of knowledge regarding the industry determined the 
institution of a co-creation partnership. This type of partnership - co-creation - was new for Pinta, 
and yet, given its success, it was decided to apply it for entering further markets as well.  Figure 7.2 
shows that both the Danish and German markets were entered in the same manner, i.e. via co-
creation. Thus, the link value proposition - customer was the first enactment step in dealing with 
uncertainty. Indeed, it has generated knowledge about the product, the level of quality needed, the 
production specifications, the end-user needs, and the industry. Most importantly, the co-creator 
was the main source of “memory” for Pinta Inc., given the fact Pinta Inc. was lacking sources of 
retrospective (Weick, 1995) in creating this kind of products; therefore, they needed to insource a 
“memory” to rely on. 
 
“We were looking at this technology and thinking what should we do with it, and then the 
VPR&D, he came from the windows industry and knew their struggles and said ‘let’s do 
something for them, we can really do something for them” (Senior Project Manager, 
interview 2013) 
 
“The last time we have created a new business was 20 or 30 years ago, we don’t remember 
anything and we don’t know how to do it, so working with a Co-creator was a very smart 
decision” (Portfolio manager, interview 2013) 
 
Learning from the co-creator about the nature of the industry, which was highly fragmented, lead to 
the question of market segmentation. Thus, a connection emerged between the VP and competitive 
strategy. Interestingly, the competitive strategy element was brought into discussions only when 
changes were needed in the value proposition due to customer requirements.  
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In the case of G1, the focus was on the value chain and logistics, since there were many actors 
involved in the chain, making the logistics very expensive. Once on the market, these costs became 
clearer as customers were not willing to pay as much, meaning the company needed to subsidize. 
Here, the link between cost and profit became the determining factor in stopping G1. In G3, the 
value proposition became more enlarged, for example in terms of its lack of maintenance and 
aesthetics, while eliminating third parties from the supply chain. The change in design allowed the 
company to position themselves against other competitors. However, the dependency of value 
proposition on the suppliers became even more accentuated. Firstly, there was a need to create a 
common warranty, thus the enacted link VP-value network was determined by the industry 
requirements of giving warranty. Secondly, the creation of aesthetics and the visual quality of 
Woodstock needed a very high level of intersubjectivity regarding the definition of quality along 
the entire value network.   
The new value proposition in G3 required the questioning of how value could be captured from 
such a product, avoiding giving things “for free” (Business director). The newness of Woodstock in 
Pinta Inc. made the development team and the BU question the means of pricing such a product. 
Learning about competitors’ practices and getting end user feedback influenced the linkage between 
these two elements. In terms of learning what their new competitors were practices, benchmarking 
was the first solution of the R&D team and BU to deal with uncertainly. It became an important 
strategic step used in both G1 and G3, when R&D and the BU were bracketing practices and 
creating reference points to imitate. In this light, competitors’ practices were used as a source for 
benchmarking for the components of the VP – namely the type of warranty needed, the level of 
aesthetics, and logistics - in terms of practices that were used for transporting the profiles from 
production pilot- supplier- customer and back, as well as pricing mechanisms, as seen in figure 7.1  
 
Figure 7. 1 Source of benchmarking 
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Nevertheless, not all of these linkages were mentioned permanently, as benchmarking was no more 
relevant after R&D team and BU has gotten the feedback from customers that Woodstock needs to 
be positioned on the market as a third look.  
Furthermore, as seen in chapter six, the most mobilized element in the development of Woodstock 
was the cost due to co-influences between production costs - value proposition. Present in all 
project and steering meetings, Woodstock expected to be aligned with the other internal businesses 
in terms of the mark-up level. Thus, Woodstock’s core linkage was the production cost – value 
proposition as a condition of existence imposed by group management.  
 “In Pinta Inc. we operate with very big contribution margins, and if we compare business, 
then they will find out that Woodstock is only making a contribution at 5 %, that will not be a 
good sign.” (Portfolio manager) 
This independency between production costs- value proposition was the only link that has been 
decided from the beginning of the project and was kept along the entire development process.  
Table 7.1 showcases these linkages with quotations from the case:  
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 Y
ear 
Interruptions 
E
lem
ents and linkage 
Source of the link 
Q
uotes 
 
2010 
E
ntering 
a 
new
 
m
arket 
never 
served 
before  
V
P
-custom
er 
(C
o-creator) 
E
nacted 
link, 
determ
ined 
by 
the 
need of learning.  
T
he elem
ents influence each other.  
 
“The 
co-creator 
w
as 
a 
trem
endous 
source 
of 
inform
ation, 
and 
w
e 
w
ould 
have 
been 
very 
slow
 
w
ithout him
.” (P
rogram
 director) 
 
2011 
L
earning 
about 
the 
industry 
being 
fragm
ented  
V
P
-com
petitive strategy 
E
m
erged 
link 
determ
ined 
by 
the 
industry specificity, w
here the V
P
 is 
influenced by the industry.  
“It w
as a crisis m
om
ent finding out how
 fragm
ented 
the m
arket w
as. H
ow
 are w
e going to serve them
 
all?”  (P
rogram
 director) 
 
G
1 failure  
 
V
P
-cost –value chain 
L
ink em
erged from
 the nature of the 
design and the focus on logistics.  
“The final product w
as not very good. A
s you have 
heard the story, it w
as a design problem
 and value 
chain 
w
as 
w
ay 
too 
com
plicated 
and 
expensive.” 
(P
roject m
anager) 
  “G
1 failed because it w
as not the right product. It 
w
as too expensive, it w
as too com
plicated to produce, 
it 
w
as 
logistically 
not 
adequate 
because 
it 
w
as 
relying on a lot of sub-suppliers that w
ere not suited 
to m
ake this product or to distribute this product.” 
(Senior project m
anager) 
 
C
ost-P
rofit  
L
ink that w
as needed for keeping 
G
1 on the m
arket, but did not exist 
in this case. 
“I could see that w
e have to ask m
ore for this if w
e 
w
anted to m
ake m
oney on it, the cost w
as higher than 
the custom
er w
as w
illing to pay, w
e didn’t provide 
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enough value.” (Senior project m
anager) 
 
2012 
G
3 
V
P
-com
petitive strategy 
L
ink 
enacted 
by 
the 
change 
in 
design, 
w
hich 
positioned 
the 
product against new
 com
petitors. 
 
“W
e m
oved into another segm
ent, because w
e could 
m
ake a different surface.” (P
rogram
 director) 
 
C
o-branding  
V
P
-profit 
L
ink 
expected 
to 
exist 
as 
a 
legitim
ization of value proposition. 
It 
w
as 
not 
present, 
w
hich 
determ
ined 
co-branding 
to 
be 
stopped. 
 
“C
o-branding is only specific to the D
anish w
indow
 
m
anufacturer; w
e are not going to take it to another 
custom
er. (…
) It costs m
oney and I don’t think it 
generates profits.” (B
usiness director) 
 
2013 
W
arranty 
building: 
looking for reference 
points 
 
V
P
-com
petitive strategy 
E
nacted 
by 
the 
w
illing 
to 
benchm
ark, thus to learn. H
ere the 
V
P
 is influenced by the industry. 
“I did a bit of stuff on w
arranty also. So I looked 
through all the hom
epages and looked at w
hat are 
they 
actually 
prom
ising 
their 
custom
ers? 
I 
w
as 
looking, 
of 
course, 
especially 
for 
the 
alum
inium
 
w
indow
s 
to 
see 
w
hat 
I 
w
as 
up 
against.” (Senior 
project m
anager) 
 
V
P
-value netw
ork 
L
ink 
em
erged 
from
 
the 
need 
of 
fulfilling 
industry 
requirem
ents 
in 
term
s 
of 
w
arranty. 
T
he 
elem
ents 
influence each other.  
 
“B
efore w
e m
ake the w
arranty, w
e need a w
arranty 
from
 our (sub) suppliers.” (Senior project m
anager) 
  
C
hallenges 
in 
building 
aesthetic 
quality (in focus for 
entire 
2013 
and 
V
P
-custom
er-value netw
ork-
value 
chain- 
(production) 
costs  
L
inkages 
em
erged 
from
 
the 
challenging situation of building in 
term
s 
of 
aesthetics. 
S
everal 
technical issues had influenced the 
“W
e 
are 
now
 
w
orking 
on 
a 
quality 
library 
w
ith 
exam
ples of surface phenom
ena. A
cceptance criteria 
are to be coordinated betw
een us, our custom
er and 
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2014) 
visual 
quality 
of 
the 
profile, 
increasing costs.  
our suppliers.” (P
roject m
anager) 
 “P
inholes in the finished profiles have a very high 
priority 
due 
to 
an 
increase 
in 
w
aste 
by 
the 
co-
creator. 
A
 
brainstorm
ing 
m
eeting 
w
ith 
the 
participation of the co-creator, the supplier of the 
paint system
, the supplier of painting m
ethods and 
W
oodstock w
ill be scheduled to discuss the pinhole 
issue.” (P
roject m
anager) 
 
C
apacity challenge 
P
roduction-custom
ers 
L
ink 
em
erged 
from
 
the 
business 
success that raised the question of 
balance 
betw
een 
production 
capacity and num
ber of custom
ers 
and orders. 
“It is of a bit chicken and egg story, w
e are talking 
w
ith a lim
ited num
ber of custom
ers, and w
e can’t talk 
to them
 because w
e don’t have production, w
e can’t 
produce 
profiles. 
W
e 
learn 
from
 
this 
discussion.” 
(B
usiness director) 
 
2014 
E
nter G
erm
an m
arket 
V
P
-custom
er-com
petitive 
strategy 
L
ink 
enacted 
w
hen 
they 
interact 
w
ith possible G
erm
an custom
ers. 
“
W
e got help from
 a G
erm
an custom
er to enter the 
m
arket; C
o-creation again.” (B
usiness director) 
 “The G
erm
an m
arket w
ants a sandy structure instead 
of 
the 
sm
ooth 
surface 
w
e 
have 
today.” 
(Project 
m
anager) 
 
“L
ogistics 
nightm
are” – need to 
learn how
 to em
bed 
flexibility 
in 
the 
C
ustom
er-value 
chain-value 
netw
ork  
L
inks 
enacted 
by 
the 
need 
to 
coordinate the offer of flexibility. 
L
ink 
enacted 
by 
the 
industry 
requirem
ents. 
“N
ext to the fact that the w
indow
s producers have 
orders from
 one day to another, the lead tim
e from
 
order to deliver is four w
eeks. F
rom
 the custom
er to 
him
 and to us and back to him
 is pretty tight!”
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value chain 
(B
usiness director) 
 “The painting m
ethods supplier should advise both 
us 
and 
the 
co-creator 
about 
the 
profiles 
and 
quantities they are shipping. O
rders from
 the co-
creator are increasing.” (B
usiness director) 
 
O
ne supplier policy  
V
alue 
netw
ork 
- 
value 
proposition 
Inherited 
link 
from
 
the 
com
pany, 
w
hich w
as used to w
ork w
ith one 
supplier. 
“W
e 
are 
very 
dependent 
on 
external 
com
panies!” 
(B
usiness director) 
 “It is com
m
on practice in P
inta Inc. to have one 
supplier.” (B
usiness director) 
 
V
alue netw
ork - cost  
L
ink em
erged from
 the dependency 
on one supplier.  
“This 
is 
a 
tem
porary 
solution, 
as 
P
rofile 
P
ainter 
charge us per profile, nor per m
eter, so this is a very 
costly operation.” (P
roject m
anager)  
 “It’s critical because it is extrem
ely expensive for us 
to produce profiles in 1.5, 2, or 3 m
eter lengths, it’s 
not feasible for our business. So w
e need to m
ake 
them
 
in 
6 
m
eter 
lengths 
very 
soon!” 
(P
roject 
m
anager) 
 
H
ow
 
to 
price 
prem
ium
 products? 
C
om
petitive 
strategy- 
pricing- custom
er 
L
ink 
em
erged 
from
 
the 
need 
of 
learning 
how
 
to 
price 
G
3. 
Input 
cam
e 
from
 
both 
the 
industry 
and 
“H
ow
 w
ill the custom
er price tell us som
ething about 
how
 w
e can price it.” (P
ortfolio m
anager) 
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their custom
ers. 
T
he 
purpose 
of 
this 
link 
w
as 
to 
learn 
how
 
to 
create 
a 
linkage 
betw
een V
P
-revenue m
odel. 
 “ It's also about pricing, because the w
ood-alum
inium
 
w
indow
s 
are 
priced 
at 
50%
 
above 
norm
al 
w
ood 
w
indow
s. ” (P
ortfolio m
anager) 
 “The discussion I think is w
hether w
e should price 
position us as alum
inium
, or above, or below
. H
ow
 to 
get in to the m
arket?” (P
ortfolio m
anager) 
 
2010-
2015 
W
oodstock’s 
condition 
for 
existence: 
low
 
production cost 
P
roduction 
costs-value 
proposition 
Inherited link from
 the ideology, as 
a 
very 
low
 
production 
cost 
w
as 
considered 
P
inta 
Inc.’s 
core 
com
petence. 
“It’s in our D
N
A
 to produce stone w
ool cheapest on 
the m
arket. That is w
hat w
e are good at, and w
e are 
proud of it. W
oodstock needs to reach low
 production 
costs to be accepted by group m
anagem
ent.” (V
P 
R
&
D
) 
 
T
able 7. 1 L
inkages in business m
odel 
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In table 7.3, a certain working logic of the R&D and BU teams can be noticed, a combination of 
reactive and active sensemaking. The team has a reactive manner of making sense when it concerns 
creating things that they are not experts about, such as a competitive strategy or a pricing and profit 
formula. In these cases, they tend to respond rather than create stimuli. For example, when noticing 
the pricing strategy of their customers, they realized that they had under-priced their product, which 
had a high value on the market. On the other hand, the R&D and BU team displayed a more 
courageous attitude in enacting and experimentation - even improvising - in areas where they were 
confident, such as production and technology development.  
The elements of the business model, as given by the theory, were not all present in managers’ mind 
from the beginning of Woodstock’s development, as seen in Table 7.3.  These have been enacted, 
and they became visible in glimpses, in moments of interruptions when people needed to pay 
attention to them; same with the linkages between the elements.  
Additionally, table 7.3 shows that the linkages between the elements could have not been planned in 
advanced, as suggested by activity system and dynamic perspective. In Woodstock’s case, these 
seemed to have three sources: 
a. They were enacted by the team, in search for learning: co-creation, benchmarking. In the 
case of co-creation, there was a co-influence relation between value proposition - customer, 
yet, in the case of competitive strategy – value proposition, there is only a single way 
influenced, as seen in figure 7.1. 
b. They were inherited from the ideology: production cost – value proposition, with a co-
influence relation. 
c. They emerged from unexpected events and manner how managers made sense of the event, 
and numerous the trial and error episodes.  Moreover, some of the co-influences emerged as 
a further interruption, such as value chain - cost, while others, customer-value network, 
triggered solutions to the aesthetic-related interruption.  
Apart from these links, there is also an expectation of a co-influence between value proposition – 
profit, to legitimize the business.  In Woodstock’s case, this link had the ability to stop both G1, and 
co-creation.  
Thus, the emergence of a business model became an outcome of how these moments of 
interruptions were made sense of, and based on which source of enactment. Figure 7.2 and 7.3 are a 
snapshot of the processes of business model emergence in Woodstock, G1 and G3, incorporating 
the development within the time frame and the linkages between the elements:
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 F
igure 7. 2 Interlinkages in the G
1 business m
odel                                                            F
igure 7. 3 Interlinkages in the G
3 business m
odel 
 (V
P
- V
alue proposition 
C
S
- C
om
petitive strategy 
C
 - C
ustom
er 
P
.cost – P
roduction costs  
P
 – P
rofit 
V
C
 – V
alue chain 
V
N
 – V
alue netw
ork) 
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As analysed in table 7.3 and then shown in figures 7.2 and 7.3, these elements are not present all the 
time, and neither in the complete formula as suggested by the activity system or dynamic capability 
stream of research on business models. They appear in groups of several elements in different 
constellations, when these elements become important, but not before.  
The figures 7.2 and 7.3 also reveal that there are multiple mediation processes that allow the 
emergence of a business model. In some episodes, the cost is being the mediator device between 
value proposition and market – linked inherited from ideology, while other times the customer 
between the value chain and value network, or value proposition - value network: links emerge 
from the need of learning. Thus, the enactment source of a linkage, as identified previously, is 
deciding who is the mediator in a certain interruption. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
The research question guiding this chapter was: What enables the emergence process of a new 
business model?  
My analysis shows that the emergence of linkages between the elements of the model enables a 
model to get a certain shape. And, as “meaning tends to be stabilized locally” (Weick, 1995:113) 
this shape is stable until the next interruption and the emergence of new linkages, mediating a new 
shape. The manner elements are interacting and influencing each other set things in motion, and 
both interruptions that end-up in solutions retained permanently, or interruptions enacting further 
interruptions, have a cumulative effect towards the new model.  
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002:550) argue that a business model is a “construct that mediates 
the value creation process. It translates between the technical and the economic domains, selecting 
and filtering technologies, and packaging them into particular configurations to be offered to a 
chosen target market.” However, my study shows that there are several mediation processes that 
enable the emergence of a new model, scattered in time, not in a coherent manner, and each one has 
a different mediation device, influenced by the sources that have determined the enactment of a 
link. 
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Moreover, as seen in the previous chapter, these mediation processes are happening between two 
levels, intersubjectivity and generic subjectivity, thus between innovation and the need of feeling in 
control. 
 
Therefore, my study shows that, the so-called “interdependencies” in the activity system and 
dynamic capabilities perspective are not designed from the beginning, but they are enacted as a 
consequence of a certain interruption. Each episode is different in terms of elements and type of 
linkages. In Woodstock, the only linked set from the start of the project was production cost-value 
proposition, however, these have suffered adjustments during the development process of 
Woodstock, from G1 to G3.  
 
7.4.1 Woodstock: from intended to realized business model 
 
As seen in chapter five, the program director and the vice president of R&D asked the newly 
created marketing group to provide support in developing a business plan for Woodstock. Within 
the plan were considerations about the business model that Woodstock should achieve, and what 
was decided was the so-called “scenario C: sell finish profiles to windows producers (…) the 
business model chosen is direct sales through BU sales organization, selling directly to windows 
producers” (Woodstock Business plan, June 2011). Analysing this decision, it can be observed that 
considerations were given regarding what to sell, to whom and the positioning of the project within 
the organization. Furthermore, the choice was made based on some predefined “parameters” 
(Woodstock Business plan, June 2011), namely “business potential, product liability and risks, 
long-term business potential, resources and competences, investments & cost.”  These parameters, 
as seen in table 5.3, have helped them to formulate assumptions about the type of internal resources 
and competencies needing to be developed, the amount of investment required, a prediction of the 
long- term potential, the risk possibilities and the business potential of the different markets. This 
was the foundation for creating Woodstock’s business model.  
 
Woodstock has known two generations within its R&D, namely G1 and G3, where Pinta Inc. went 
from being a supplier of basic materials to being a supplier of fully developed profiles for window 
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producers. Both generations, G1 and G3, were rooted in scenario C, even though the changes 
brought in by G3 were considered more significant. These changes, and the manner they were dealt 
with (as seen in Chapter six), determined a gap between the intended and the realized business 
model until the moment of full handover to BU.  
 
G1 was intended as a finished profile for windows, laminated with wood in such a manner that the 
stone wool would be inside the profile, where Pinta Inc. was “the supplier of basic materials” 
(Internal document, 2011). The value proposition was higher thermal insulation properties and 
design services which were embedded into a value chain (see figure 6.2), where the company was 
dependent on the wood suppliers for laminating the profile, and on providers of special tools for 
cutting the new profiles. Additionally, the value proposition included co-branding, since the vice-
president of R&D had come up with the idea, and was insistent on it. Upon reaching the market, the 
profiles had proved to be too expensive and required Pinta Inc. to subsidize them considerably. This 
determined the decision to stop producing G1, and to continue selling it at a subsidized rate until the 
stock was gone. The reaction of the market was very positive, and G1 sold out. This reaction from 
the market ensured that the team continued the development and created G3. The failure of G1 was 
labelled as being “valuable learning” for Woodstock in terms of both its technology and business 
model:  
 
“The feedback from the market was incredible! If we look back, the profiles were not that good, but 
still, people were willing to buy them. We learned a lot from G1, and we discovered that we needed 
a business model where we are in charge, not our suppliers” (VP R&D, Interview 2013) 
 
Consequently, Generation 3 was designed by moving Woodstock in front of the frame (see figure 
5.2) and Pinta Inc. became the supplier of fully developed profiles for window frames. In this 
manner, the value chain was simpler, following the removal of the wood and tool providers. Whilst 
the design choice made the value chain cheaper, it resulted in a considerable change in the value 
proposition. G3 was still, according to scenario C, a “finish profile to windows producers”, but it 
became a product where its aesthetics and lack of maintenance were considered to be the main 
selling points and its high thermal insulation was a secondary value. The co-branding remained 
until the exclusivity agreement with the co-creator expired. Furthermore, with regards to these new 
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features of Woodstock, the development team had to also start considering the end user. They 
realized that the definition of aesthetics in a business-to-business context, which they were used to 
working with, was very different to a business-to-consumer context. Furthermore, Woodstock G3 
could not be a standard solution, since the window market was very fragmented, with extremely 
different regulations in terms of warranty and aesthetic regulations from country to country. Thus, 
each solution needed to be particular to each country, thereby requiring co-creation for entering the 
market. Additionally, G3 was a model that required very close collaboration with the suppliers, 
given the need for high quality profiles and aesthetics, as well as being a challenge to the significant 
production routines of Pinta Inc.  
 
G3 became a model that combined elements from the insulation and system division models. Thus, 
it required its own production line since the quality of boards needed to be very high, they needed to 
own the logistics, and Woodstock G3 needed to be at a premium price because it was not bulk 
business. The only fixed target which the development team and BU had was the creation of a 
window profile at a production cost of 2 euros per linear metre; at the handover moment, this had 
still not been reached. As seen in chapter six, G3 was considered within Pinta Inc. as being a very 
different - indeed complex – project that challenged existing ideology. Yet, it was allowed to be 
developed even though it was not “a fast project” (Internal document, 2010) as expected, nor was it 
“a simple business” (Business director, BU, interview 2013). It developed fundamentally from the 
initial idea as enshrined in the following quotation: “Please, just remember which product we 
started with, a wood laminated. So, that was the reality. Later on it became much more a facade 
panel.” (Evaluation meeting, 2015) 
The differences between G1 and G3 are presented in table 7.2.  
 
Business model elements Woodstock G1 Woodstock G3 
 Scenario C: sell finish profiles to windows producers 
Customer  Small windows producers  
(Co-creation) 
Small windows producers 
(Co-creation) 
Value proposition  Insulation – EU2020 solution 
Design 
Maintenance free 
Aesthetics  
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Co-branding  
Role of Pinta Inc.: the supplier of 
basic materials 
Full warranty 
High thermal insulation – EU2020 solution 
Design and  
Co-branding 
Standard solutions, different from country 
to country  
Role of Pinta Inc.: supplier of fully 
developed profiles for window frames 
Value chain Profiles (Germany) - pilot plant for 
grinding and cutting (DK) - Tools 
machines - lamination (Finland) - 
customer: Co-creator (Dk) 
BU sales organization 
Profiles (Germany) - pilot plant for 
grinding and cutting (DK)- painting- Co-
creators 
BU sales organization 
Value Network German factory, wood suppliers, 
tools suppliers.  
 
Supply driven business model: Pinta 
Inc. provided the raw material, while 
the wood manufacturers laminated 
and produced the profiles. 
Integrated supply chain: German factory, 
paint system supplier, partner for applying 
the paint, tape supplier. 
Revenue model Pricing: as wood competitors Cost target 2 euros 
Pricing: as aluminium competitors  
Table 7. 2 From intended to realized business model  
  
The development of Woodstock has not stopped with G3, and when the new business director took 
over the BU, he questioned Woodstock’s model. In his mind, Generation 4 was created, where parts 
of the value chain were licensed out. However, he was waiting to propose any changes until 
Woodstock belonged entirely to the BU. “I don’t understand why we need to own the logistics? 
There should be other ways to do this, so I am planning further development of a generation 4 after 
the handover!” (New business director, BU, interview 2014). This statement shows that having a 
business model is not a stable state, and different managers would enact different situations in 
different ways.  
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Chapter VIII: Discussions and Conclusions 
 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of my thesis was to analyse the enactment process of a new business model within an 
established company, through a new theoretical lens, namely sensemaking, where the focus was on 
enactment theory. Rather than looking at the normative ways that companies could or should 
innovate a business model, my study presents insights into the actual sensemaking processes, and 
the interruptions that lead to a new business model. With this purpose, I conducted an ethnographic 
study that traces how a business model is ‘real-ized’ (Weick, 2001: 187). My study illustrates that 
the enactment of a business model is not a liner process, as shown by the activity system 
perspective, nor it is strictly dependent on the internal resources, but rather an emerging one, a 
collective effort of reaching temporary intersubjectivity that would allow innovation to continue, 
against ideology and divergences between paradigms. Furthermore, whilst the business model is an 
outcome, it is not a fixed one; it is only “a moment in the process” (Weick, 1995: 33).  
 
With the purpose of formulating an answer to the main research question, I will summarize my 
findings from chapters five, six and seven by mobilizing the research questions employed for each 
chapter. In the next section, I discuss the contribution to the business model research outlined in 
chapter two, followed by reflections on conducting ethnographic studies, and suggestions for future 
research possibilities. The last section is about implications of my findings for managers. 
 
 
 
 260 
 
8.2 Summary of findings 
 
8.2.1 Frame and cue  
 
The first research question employed was What frame did managers draw on when developing 
Woodstock and why was Woodstock perceived as a sensemaking trigger? and it was addressed in 
chapter five. The question follows Weick (1995)’s argument that sensemaking consists of three 
components - a frame, a cue and a connection - and understanding what people “draw on” (Weick, 
1995:109) when interpreting objects is central to sensemaking. Thus, the question aims to analyse 
the case company together with the actors involved in the creation of Woodstock’s business model 
in order to showcase why Woodstock was perceived as a cue that triggered a sensemaking process.   
Woodstock was localized inside two vocabularies, that of ideology and paradigms, specifically 
vocabularies of work. It was born in a company where the vocabulary of the ideology was centred 
on factories, the engineering of stone wool fibres, costs and producing the raw material in the 
cheapest way for the market. The latter was considered to be the company’s “DNA”. Furthermore, 
Woodstock was developed at a moment when a significant number of changes were occurring in 
Pinta Inc., since there was a new vice-president of innovation, the financial crisis had led to the 
formulation of a new strategy along with reflections on how many business models they had and 
should have, the creation of a new group marketing department, and finally the presence a new 
CEO. 
 
Woodstock was also developed at the intersection between two different paradigms. The first was 
R&D, where the vision was to create a truly innovative product, different from others that existed in 
the company, and the second was the Business Unit, which wanted to create something that 
resembled their normal business. The divergences between these paradigms were fuelled by the 
unfulfilled expectations that each had of the other. It became a source of interruptions in the 
development of Woodstock’s business model.  
Being a production oriented company, defined by its CEO as being very traditional, the focus was 
mainly on technology development, while “business model” type of considerations were not given 
primary importance. As seen in chapter five, the “business model” was actively used in three 
meetings at Woodstock’s beginning, but not afterwards during their five years of development. In 
that context, the term business model was used to convey a message about how money flowed 
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inside the value chain, and “what we sell.” On the other hand, when managers were asked by me 
about either the company’s or business unit’s business model, they talked about their everyday 
questions in the context of Pinta Inc.: how to produce in a cheaper way, and positioning in the value 
chain, what is the “the route to market.”  However, business model was not an expression that was 
present in their vocabulary. It was brought in the company by the new group marketing and, new 
CEO.  
Interestingly, the documents from Woodstock’s beginning, created by a newly employed marketing 
manager, show that a business model would be chosen based on its perceived business potential, 
product liability and risks, long-term business potential, resources and competencies and 
investments & cost needed from the company side. Once the model was decided based on these 
preconditions, the business model became the objective to be achieved, as can be seen with 
Woodstock. 
Regardless the theoretical perspective undertaken, researchers on business models have emphasised 
both the role of leadership in business models innovation (McGrath, 2010, Doz and Kosonen, 2010) 
and management skills in designing business models and the manner activities are related to each 
other (Zott and Amit, 2010, Teece, 2010). Furthermore, Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) 
explain that technology managers must expand their manner of understanding how value can be 
captured from the technology, while Doz and Kosonen (2010) talks about the need of developing 
“meta-capabilities” in leaders to be able to foresee transformation possibilities in business models. 
While my findings resonate with these studies, they emphasize, first of all, the necessity of having a 
business model vocabulary that would guide a development team in their sensemaking process of a 
new technology and market.  
 
Within this frame, Woodstock – especially in the form of Generation 3 – was threatening the 
company’s DNA. While G1 was considered “a fit” for the company, it died on the market; G3 grew 
into something that challenged the core of the company. Woodstock challenged the company’s 
manner of production, its definition of quality, its standing with regards to costs, its focus on 
producing the cheapest on the market, its usual ways of working with customers, its usual approach 
to business development and handing over procedures, the way it calculated costs and invoiced 
premium products. 
 
My findings also show that Woodstock was perceived as being “different,” creating frustrations 
inside the company, due to the lack of retrospective possibilities. However, looking back, it was the 
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driver of enactment. There was no organizational memory about how to build a new business, given 
that the last business built by Pinta Inc. was almost thirty years ago. Thus, the enactment efforts 
have been focused on both creating a new business model for G3 and getting its acceptance.  
My findings show that ideology was present when the preconditions for making the choice 
regarding the model were defined, but the development of the model per se was a matter between 
paradigms. Ideology would appear again in kill/no kill decisions in crisis situations. Thus, it is not 
only the dominant logic (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995), the inertia (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002) of a company that plays a role in filtering information in or out, but there are more 
vocabularies managers are drawing on in their sensemaking process.  
 
8.2.2 Enactment processes for business model elements 
 
The second research question guiding my analyses, and employed in chapter six, was:  
What are the enactment processes that enabled the creation of the elements of Woodstock’s 
business model and how do managers of Pinta Inc. made sense of the emergence of a new business 
model?   
 
My findings show that not all the elements of the business models are planned by managers 
simultaneously, as argued by the activity system perspective (Zott and Amit, 2010), but they are 
enacted progressively, as response to a heterogeneity of interruptions, in the interplay between 
intersubjectivity and generic subjectivity; thus, innovation and control (Weick, 1995:72). 
 
Chesbrough (2010) talks about confusion and obstruction as the main barriers for business model 
innovation, as this could challenge the firm’s resource configuration, and the managerial cognition 
embedded in a certain dominant logic. My study reveals a large heterogeneity of interruptions, apart 
from these two, which have been encountered, or enacted, by the development team (R&D team 
and BU together) in their efforts to bring Woodstock on the market. These were provoked by: an 
underestimation of the product, given the lack of understanding of Woodstock’s potential on the 
market; quality versus cost dilemma; challenges to ideology (by installing new routines); a lack of 
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knowledge (in pricing high value products, production processes in high quality specifications, 
handling costs); and a lack of trust between partners (both internally, between R&D and the 
business unit, and towards the co-creator).  These interruptions have triggered different enactment 
processes that have facilitated Woodstock’s business model to emerge, namely trial and error, 
experimentation, benchmarking for formulating reference points, labelling, co-creation and co-
development.  
 
Furthermore, each of the elements of the business model was enacted when it became important for 
Woodstock. The elements of the business model, as described by Chesbrough and Rosenbloom 
(2002), and emphasised by activity system and dynamic capability perspective, were not planned 
from the initiation of Woodstock as a project, but rather emerged through enactment. Thus, the 
creation of each of the elements differs, and there was no constant focus on them all along the 
development process.  
 
For value proposition, labelling and benchmarking were important mechanisms that were mobilized 
to create both an internal and external acceptance of the new proposition offered by the company. 
Labelling was powerful for creating a common platform of understanding for all the parties 
involved. For example, the first generation of Woodstock was not named a failure, but rather 
valuable learning. In the same light, everything that was labelled as a “must” condition to be a part 
of the windows industry was approached via benchmarking, a risk averse strategy. In adopting 
imitative behaviour, thereby assuming that the window industry was an analysable environment 
(Daft and Weick, 1984), has resulted in creating reference points to be achieved by Woodstock. 
Facing uncertainty, these reference points allow the team to enact, and not to feel overwhelmed by 
the unknown. Interestingly, the input resulted from benchmarking industry practices was compared 
against other internal projects, and internal benchmarking was preferred in the case of elements 
considered key to the ideology, which in this case was the cost.   
 
The creation of value proposition has necessitated further enactment efforts for getting acceptance 
from the ideology for installing new routines. Co-creation, and especially co-branding, has been 
seen as challenging for both Pinta Inc. and the BU. Co-creation has proved itself as being an 
extremely valuable source of organizational memory, helping the company in their selection and 
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retention processes, where there is a lack of retrospective possibility, as analysed in chapter six. The 
co-creator, the window manufacturer acting as co-creator for Woodstock during the entire 
development phase, has helped the team in their trial and error episodes which were established for 
understanding which type of product was needed in the window industry. The co-creator acted as 
Pinta Inc.’s memory, helping the team in their selection and retention process, since there was a 
lack of retrospective possibilities. Customers, therefore, in the same way as with suppliers, were 
chosen based on their willingness to participate in the development of the product, the production 
process and the business model. In this light, co-creation has been accepted by ideology. However, 
the same was not applicable for co-branding, which was retained only temporarily, to allow 
development with the co-creator. Given that the practice of co-branding was perceived as being a 
value proposition offered “for free,” it was stopped when the agreement with the co-creator expired.   
 
The cost element became the focus of all the discussions, being important especially when it 
collided with the notion of high quality, which was so crucial for Woodstock’s value proposition. 
They had to work with learning curves to explain the cost of the trial and error efforts, and hire a 
business controller as these costs became too complex and difficult to be communicated to group 
management. Moreover, the issue of high production costs triggered the label for Woodstock of 
being “very different” in comparison with the other internal projects in the company. Therefore, the 
focus was on finding the right production process flow that would allow production at a certain cost 
level, thus reaching control over these processes. The discovery of the process flow provoked 
several interruptions, which had a significant impact on the cost structure, thereby determining the 
question of whether or not to stop Woodstock. However, the facts that have resulted in Woodstock 
being allowed to continue by the ideology were:  
a. Positive market reaction for both G1 and G3, where potential customers offered their 
support with no charges; 
b. The internal ‘gimmick’ of using the waste from Woodstock for other internal projects was 
considered successful, and resulted in decreased costs; 
c. Having a visionary leader who played the role of strong, trustworthy spokesperson of 
Woodstock in front of group management, and the role of a mediator when paradigms 
collided. 
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These three intermediaries, positive market feedback, possibility of reducing costs productions, and 
a visionary leader, have mediated the connection between the “frame and the cue” (Weick, 
1995:110).  
 
My study shows that in the cost versus quality dilemma, the enactment of intersubjectivity along the 
value network was a must. Reaching a common definition of quality though the installation of 
quality libraries at the premises of all the actors involved has made the achievement of targets more 
tangible. However, in the enactment of the value network, solutions were temporarily retained, such 
as having one supplier policy and accepting higher costs from them. The explanation for this was 
that a short-term focus meant that it was possible to deliver to the customer.  
The enactment of the revenue model has once again pushed the company into benchmarking efforts, 
trying to imitate their competitors. Thus, benchmarking was a sensemaking resource in creation of 
value proposition, value chain and revenue model.  
 
My findings show that for elements such as market segmentation and competitive strategy, reaching 
intersubjectivity among the actors involved was considered enough. However, for elements 
perceived as vital for the Woodstock’s acceptance by ideology, such as production costs and flow, 
and logistics, it was expected to reach a level of generic subjectivity (Weick, 1995:70) meaning a 
high level of control.  Yet, my findings show that the run after generic subjectivity has triggered 
mistakes, counter productivity and conflicts between the actors involved. These were generated by 
the fact that the transition from intersubjectivity to generic subjectivity involved stopping the 
innovation efforts, and losing the “intimate contact” (Weick, 1995) with the actors involved in 
production and logistics. Failing at a generic subjectivity, the development team had to redefine 
goals and accept working again at an intersubjective level, together with the risks involved. 
Thus, value for retention based on control had an non-cumulative effect, generating further 
interruptions, while retentions based on learning and experimentation and willingness to accepted 
intersubjectivity, had a cumulative effect towards Woodstock’s enacted model. At this level, 
managers’ intentions are to establish a “workable level of certainty” (Weick, 1979:3).   
 
 266 
Therefore, the mediation between “frame and cue” has happened at two levels, intersubjectivity and 
generic subjectivity.  
 
Lastly, my study reveals that product innovation is strongly interlinked with business model 
innovation. The two concepts are answering different questions (Markides, 2006), but the answers 
are dependent on each other. In Woodstock, while the BU was expecting to take over a fully 
developed product that they would then market, they found themselves needing to take decisions 
from the beginning of Woodstock development regarding value chain, networks, value proposition 
and customers. Interruptions emerged from the several unfulfilled expectations that R&D team and 
BU had from each other: R&D team has expected BU to be active in the business development side, 
while BU was expecting a fully developed product. The convergent point between them was the 
vice-president of innovation.   
 
8.2.3 What enables the emergence process of a new business model? 
 
The final research question addressed in chapter seven was What enables the emergence process of 
a new business model? 
 
The research under activity system perspective and dynamic capability argue for the existence of 
continue, tightly coupled linkages between the elements of the business model, a priori planed by 
managers who seeks to design, or re-design a business model. Zott at Amit (2010:2918) explain 
these linkages, parts of a purposeful design, offer insights into the processes that enable the activity 
system’s evolution in time.  
In contrast with this view, my findings show that the manner elements co-influenced each other was 
not planned, but linkages were enacted by the approach managers took in their sensemaking process 
when facing certain interruptions. When elements happened to be linked one to another, it was a 
result of either active enactment by development team, or emerged from unexpected events, or 
inherited from the ideology.  
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As interruptions happened over time, these linkages appeared in time as well, some temporarily, 
until meaning was created, other being retained for good. Furthermore, each interruption was 
different in term of elements and type of linkages, thus groups of several elements were interlinked 
in different constellations, when these elements become important, but not before.  
My findings show as well that a permanent co-influence between elements, as in the one between 
production costs-value proposition in Woodstock, would showcase the central focus and the points 
of concern for the actors involved. Moreover, the link between profit and value proposition, was the 
one legitimizing an activity.  
The different ways of interacting between the elements would determine the path from the intended 
to the “real-ized” business model.   
 
8.3 Contributions  
 
In this section I will discuss my findings in relation to the previous research on business models, 
with the purpose of providing a contribution to the business model innovation literature. As seen in 
these findings, what sensemaking does to the business model theory is that it reveals how people 
makes sense of the interruptions to keep the creation ongoing, illustrating that this is not a linear 
innovation process, but rather an emerging one. Sensemaking helps us understand why an 
organization does what it does, and helps us observe what is going to happen and how people are 
trying to act and explain their actions based on different values. It creates a retrospective 
development of plausible views to rationalize what they are doing. Furthermore, enactment is at the 
core of sensemaking, representing action, and this action would be influenced by identity and 
context. Enactment theory shows that a product grows into a model as people reach an 
understanding about where everyone is coming from - a compromise, at an intersubjective level. 
One cannot know the model from the beginning, since it is a process of considerable effort of trial 
and error, even breaking routines, and collectively building something. 
 
Thus, in the following sections, I discuss what sensemaking adds to business model theory by 
showing what are its convergent and divergent points with other theoretical perspectives as 
identified in the literature review in chapter II, namely activity system, dynamic capability, 
discovery driven, cognitive and actor-network theory.  
 268 
 
8.3.1 A dialog between sensemaking and the activity system perspective 
 
Under the activity system perspective, a business model is a tightly coupled system where managers 
combine internal and external sources to make the “right decision” (Afuad and Tucci, 2003), the 
“concrete choice” (Massa and Tucci, 2013), for an “optimal design” (Zott and Amid, 2010). It is an 
“objective, real entity” (Casadesus-Masanel and Ricard, 2010), which impacts on a company’s 
performance and is the responsibility of top managers. Furthermore, a business model is the 
operationalization of a strategy (Zott and Amid, 2010). Additionally, analysing this perspective 
through Daft and Weick (1984:289)’s Model of Organisational Interpretation Modes, the 
environment is assumed to be analysable, while organizations are passive and “accept whatever 
information the environment gives them (…) they take environments are given and interpret the 
environment within accepted limits” (Daft and Weick, 1984:288). Indeed, they rely on third-party 
resources (Zott and Amid, 2010).  
 
In contrast, sensemaking, with its focus on enactment theory, shows that a business model is a 
loosely coupled system, and the linkages between the elements become important in moments of 
perceived crises. Thus, business models emerge, as well as the links between the elements; they are 
enacted by managers’ acceptance that more knowledge is needed, enacted by managers’ reaction to 
unforeseen situations, and they are inherited from ideology. Should those be designed and decided 
from the beginning, they became an intended model, an objective to be achieved, a moment where a 
meaning was “stabilized locally” (Weick, 1995:33) to allow things to move forward. However, in 
the latter situations, those models are prone to failure if they do not have the ability to reshape 
themselves when facing hiccups. Thus, the value of the business model is not reflected in the 
financial performance of the firm only (Hedman and Kalling, 2003), but rather an internal value 
defined by its ability to shape and reshape itself if required, given the interruptions that might occur. 
Therefore, the business model is the making of subjects into objects, collectively accepted objects, 
and then subjects again (Weick, 1995). 
 
According to the activity system perspective, companies are seen as part of a system, a network of 
suppliers, competitors and customers. While my study shows the importance of co-enacting with 
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suppliers and customers, it also shows that these become resources in the sensemaking process. As 
Zott and Amid (2010) argues, “a business model conceived as an activity system is a set of 
interdependent organizational activities centred on a focal firm, including those conducted by the 
focal firm, its partners, customers, vendors, and so on”, but sensemaking shows that one cannot 
know from the beginning which are the elements, how are they connected, which elements are 
interdepended and which ones are not. They are enacted.  
 
In terms of the role of managers, the task of designing business models is in the hands of top 
management, while the sensemaking perspective argues for collective work (Weick, 1995), at an 
intersubjective level where innovation is fostered, not only a top down made choice.  
 
8.3.2 A dialog between sensemaking and the dynamic capabilities 
perspective 
 
The dynamic capabilities perspective emphasises the importance of having strong internal 
capabilities, which are able to respond quickly to changes imposed by the environment (Teece and 
Pissno, 1994; Katcalo et al, 2010) and where the focus is being difficult to be imitated by 
competitors. Under this perspective, business models are stable for a certain amount of time, being 
therefore provisional and in a “permanent state of transitory disequilibrium” (Demil and Lecocq, 
2010: 240). Focusing on resources and capabilities, managers need to make the choice about how to 
organize them, to create and capture value. For innovating a business model, managers need to be 
able to conduct “sensing, seizing and transforming” (Foss and Saebi, 2015) activities with the 
purpose of identifying opportunities, to know what capabilities and competencies to develop for 
refining the existing business model (Katkalo et al, 2010). 
 
Weick (1995: 18) asks “How can I know what I think until I see what I say?” In my study, the 
development team was not discussing capabilities, but materials, which were determining the types 
of capabilities needing to be developed. Since the technology and business model development 
were an interconnected manner, the needed of having a business model vocabulary emerged. In the 
enactment perspective, managers do not limit themselves by concerns about capabilities, but they 
enact - improvise even - and select after whether a result is retained permanently. Managers take 
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plausible decisions that allow their organizations to move forward (in Woodstock, the team had to 
build a pilot plant, and their portfolio management acted as both a supply chain manager and 
created an invoicing system). Thus, from a sensemaking perspective, the questions managers would 
ask would not be about “what type of capabilities do we have and what can be done with them?” 
but rather questions about who needs to collaborate with whom in order to make things happen, and 
even more, “how does action become coordinated in the world of multiple realities” (Weick, 
1995:75). Therefore, a business model becomes an organizational model that emerges from the 
interactions between actors, ideology and paradigms, rather than from the types of capabilities 
available. Thus, the fear of having a business model, which can easily be imitated, as Teece (2010) 
argues, should not be there, as meaning is made individually and transformed into “we” through “a 
connection through structures” (Weick, 1995:71).  
Interestingly, Demil and Lecocq (2010) argue that managers need to consider how to combine the 
existence resources to generate new value propositions. They argue that it is an “ongoing interaction 
between and within the core components of a business model” (Demil and Lecocq, 2010:234), and 
these interactions are influencing the choice of what type of value proposition to be offered. 
Furthermore, Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010:199) talks about “concrete” choices and their 
consequences, determining “virtuous cycles,” where the consequences are “flexible”, depending on 
the choice made.  
However, my findings show that there is a scattered interaction between the components of the 
business model, having different sources, and influenced by different value for retention, either 
learning or control. Furthermore, at an intersubjective level, not only the consequences are flexible, 
but the choices as well, being influenced by the need to enact.  
 
One consensus between these two perspectives is the acknowledgement that a business model is 
continuously evolving. However, the dynamic capability perspective argues that this happens as a 
result of an external factor - a push from the environment - while enactment theory argues for 
influencing / creating the environment. Given the evolving state of business models and their 
consequent “permanent state of transitory disequilibrium” (Demil and Lecoq, 2010 :240), managers 
are those who can stabilize the model for a short while, until further capabilities can be developed.  
In sensemaking, the creation of a model and the enactment of a moment of stability are given by 
reaching intersubjectivity - a shared understanding - between the actors involved.  
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Analysing this perspective through Daft and Weick (1984: 289)’s model, they would consider 
organizations as having a discovering interpretation mode, where the environment is considered 
analysable and active, intrusive in the environment, with the aim of “detecting the correct answer 
already in an analysable environment, rather than on shaping the answer” (Ibid. 289). 
 
8.3.3 A dialog between sensemaking and a discovery driven perspective 
 
The discovery driven perspective affirms the idea of enactment and applies a trial and error mind-
set in innovating business models, based on the belief that business models cannot be fully known 
from the beginning. Business models are approached from a more discovery driven rather than plan 
driven approach (McGrath, 2010), since “new business models rarely work the first-time around” 
(Sosna et al, 2010: 384). It argues that “making business models does fall under the realm of 
managerial choices” (McGrath, 2010: 248), and that one can experiment as far as possible to create 
a novel learning approach, at lowest cost, with incremental financial investments, until managers 
become confident about innovating their business models. Furthermore, experimentation allows 
companies to have an outside-in approach, and bring customers into their business model 
innovation trials. Installing a trial and error culture would convince incumbent companies and their 
leaders to not be afraid of the idea of innovating their business model (Doz and Kosonen, 2010; 
Sosna et al, 2010). 
  
A checkpoint list of events has been suggested for planning the discovery process (McGrath, 2010: 
259). Many of these points, such as conducting a market study, feasibility studies, and advertising 
studies, assumes that the environment the company is willing to step into can be analysable (Daft 
and Weick, 1984).  While there is a large consensus between this perspective and sensemaking, 
enactment assumes actions even in environments that cannot be analysable, and it implies the 
ability to improvise. Furthermore, from a discovery driven perspective, leadership has a central role. 
My study shows that not only leadership plays a role, but also there is a shared responsibility for co-
enactment of the actors involved.  
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Underlying the business model innovation process, the discovery driven perspective argues that the 
elements of the business model need to be studied separately to be understood (Mcgrath, 2010), and 
to see how they can be brought together in a loosely coupled organization. Sensemaking theory 
helps in doing this kind of analysis, showing that not only are the elements enacted, but also the 
linkages between each other.  
 
 8.3.4 A dialog between sensemaking and the cognitive perspective 
 
The cognitive perspective has been the source of inspiration for a sensemaking study. Studies under 
this perspective, such as Tikkanen et al. (2005), Chesbrough (2010), George and Bock (2011), 
Aspara et al., (2013), Baden-Fuller and Mangematin (2013), and Martins et al., (2015), argue that a 
business model deals with “pragmatic sensemaking issues” (Tikkanen et al., 2005: 805). The 
assumptions formulated by this perspective, for example that business models can be both 
objectively and subjectively defined (Doz and Kosonen, 2010), that managers take decisions based 
on contextual rationality, and that they have a bias influenced by a belief system or dominant logic 
which is shaped in time by managerial actions, are also met under the sensemaking perspective.  
Divergent points arise when sensemaking shows that enacting a business model becomes a 
collective effort for reaching intersubjectivity, a shared understanding that allows compromise.  
Thus, it is not only about management cognitive schemata, or the influence of inertia or dominant 
logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). Furthermore, sensemaking gives people different vocabularies to 
operate with, and it shows that there is not only one type of vocabulary that influences the way 
meaning is created. Within Woodstock, both ideology and paradigms have influenced the 
development, and on many occasions, it was not the ideology that did so, but the negotiations 
between the paradigms, and the voices that were given to people.  
 
In the model provided by Daft and Weick (1984), the cognitive perspective would fall between 
discovering and enacting, and assumes that managers are active and would adopt a trial and error 
approach towards intruding on the environment, no matter whether there was a perception as to 
whether this was analysable or not.  
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8.3.5 A dialog between sensemaking and the ANT perspective 
 
Actor-network theory allows a social-material view of the business model, through which it 
becomes a boundary object, able to evolve in time and space (Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 
2009).  Furthermore, Doganova and Eyquem-Renault (2009) explain that business models act as 
framing devices when embedded in artefacts such as business plants, power points slides and 
reports, and that they have a certain “performative power to shape and influence the action of 
others” (Mason and Spring, 2011: 1038). Using the same perspective, Demil and Lecocq (2015: 32) 
define business models as “an artefact that creates commensurability” and as a network of multiple 
artefacts.   
In comparison to ANT, sensemaking gives the same opportunities for researching and studying the 
processes of creating a business models in practice, but it does not consider non-human actors. 
Furthermore, if in ANT a business model is a framing device for “influencing a sharing collective,” 
Mason and Spring (2011: 1038), in sensemaking the collective and their ability to reach 
intersubjectivity is what allows the business model to be created. 
 
Thus, in the model proposed by Daft and Weick (1984), actor-network theory would be positioned 
at the intersection between the two types of assumptions about the environment. This is because the 
environment is acting as a non-human actor in a network, regardless as to whether the manager 
perceived it as being analysable or unanalysable. Moreover, given the management’s focus on 
creating, enlarging and maintaining a network, it falls under an active intrusive organization.  
 
It is important to make the observation that in all the studies conducted under the above-analysed 
perspectives, the concept of a business model is assumed to exist and be actively mobilized/worked 
with within a company. In the case company analysed in this study, the concept was not used in the 
development of Woodstock, and neither were the managers aware that they were creating a new 
business model until the very last moment when differences were noticed in comparison with the 
existent ones. Therefore, sensemaking, and particularly enactment, is so powerful since these things 
can be created in the absence of knowing beforehand what you create. Related to this, Weick 
(1995:18) asks “How can I know what I think until I see what I say?” 
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Concluding the dialog between sensemaking and the other perspectives employed in studying 
business models, I propose to situate them in Daft and Weick (1984)’s model, which was analysed 
in chapter three:  
 
 
Figure 8. 1 Business model theoretical perspective, seen through Daft and Weick (1984)'s model. Source: Own 
creation 
 
 
Furthermore, I would like to add the sixth perspective to the table created in chapter two, were the 
identified perspectives were analysed. As co-creation and co-development were main resources in 
enacting Woodstock, I am naming the sixth perspective, co-enactment.  
 
Table 8.1 is my contribution to the business model innovation literature. 
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8.3.6 How do established companies enact new business models? 
 
The leading research question of my study was How do established companies enact new 
business models? 
 Having conducted an ethnographic study, which was guided by a sensemaking perspective, I 
am presenting an attempt to answer the question, being aware that different perspectives would 
formulate a different answer:  
Following a sensemaking/co-enactment perspective, a business model can be defined as an 
outcome of a temporary moment of intersubjective stability that emerges from the interactions 
between environment (different external actors), ideology and paradigms. Business models are 
subjective interpretative manners of how managers choose which interruptions to focus on and 
their processes of restoration, influenced by the vocabularies they operate with. 
 
Uncertainty, fuelled by lack of internal retrospective, determines developing teams to enact. 
Business models are enacted progressively, as response to heterogeneous interruptions, through 
trial and error, experimentation, benchmarking for formulating reference points, labelling, co-
creation and co-development, and are depended on factors that mediates them, such as market 
feedback, visionary leadership, and cost issues. The enactment of a business model is 
characterized by scattered interactions between its elements in time, triggered by interruptions, 
and mediated by intersubjectivity or general subjectivity, thus by innovation and need of 
“mutually reinforcing interpretations, and beliefs, values, and assumptions” (Weick, 1995:73) or 
need of control. The linkages, being either enacted or inherited, were the enablers of the 
enactment process, allowing the model to be mediated, to be shaped, and reshaped as time 
passed and more learning was gathered.  
Therefore, the enactment of a new business model becomes a search for answers to the 
questions: “how does action become coordinated in the world of multiple realities?” (Weick, 
1995:75), How do we discover things to enact? Who needs to collaborate with whom about 
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what? How do we enact linkages? How do we reach and maintain intersubjectivity? How do we 
enact an interplay intersubjectivity – generic subjectivity - intersubjectivity? 
 
8.4 Reflections on conducting ethnography  
 
Every method has its limitations, and previous researchers have specified those that affect 
ethnographic research. Most notably, Hammersley’s 1992 work What’s wrong with ethnography 
discusses the challenges encountered when employing this method as well as describing a way 
forward. Hammersley (1992: 2) posed the following question: “To what degree can 
ethnographic accounts legitimately claim to represent an independent social reality?” and 
initiated the debate about “the myth of theoretical description.” Similarly, Brewer (in Cassell 
and Symon, 2004: 318) set out two of the most common criticisms of ethnography, i.e., that the 
ethnographer is involved in the field and in creating situations where she can influence the 
actors, and, second, subjectivity and bias is present in her writing. In particular, those who 
promote research in natural sciences are advocating that the researcher should maintain distance 
from the field. 
To maintain distance from the field, I chose not to be involved in the processes I was observing. 
At times, I was asked by the team to give my opinion with respect to various matters; however, I 
chose only to reflect the theoretical aspects of their question, and not to act as “consultant.” For 
example, the development team held a brainstorming session to decide whether a new factory 
should be opened. They chose to approach the issue using a SWOT tool, and my involvement in 
the session was to explain how the tool was intended to be used. Furthermore, in another 
meeting I spoke about the definition and implications of “open innovation” at a conceptual level.  
Another criticism of ethnography is the “open manner” in which data is collected (Brewer, in 
Cassell and Symon, 2004: 318). This is supposed to give the researcher the freedom to 
determine how they should handle and analyse data. However, Van Maanen (2011) amongst 
others demonstrated that ethnographic studies can be performed rigorously by following a 
systematic approach. Weick (1985: 568), described ethnography as a “sustained, explicit 
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methodical observation and paraphrasing of social situations in relation to their naturally 
occurring context”, thereby, highlighting the fact that it is a ‘scientific’ method. 
Reflecting awareness of this concern, a postmodern critique was formulated to respond to the 
need to ensure the validity of the knowledge acquired using ethnographic methods. Underlining 
criticisms of representation, which questions whether ethnography can produce “universally 
valid knowledge”, ethnographers emphasize that they do not see the world “like it is” but rather 
that they have a “reflexive view” (Brewer, in Cassell and Symon, 2004: 319).  
Arguing for the value of ethnography, Brewer (in Cassell and Symon, 2004: 320) states:  
Post postmodern ethnography’ contends that while no knowledge is certain, there are 
phenomena that exist independent of us as researchers and knowledge claims about them 
can be judged reasonably accurately in terms of their likely truth. This shares with naïve 
realism the idea that research investigates independently knowable phenomena but breaks 
with it in denying that we have direct access to these phenomena. It shares with anti-
realism recognition that all knowledge is based on assumptions and human constructions, 
but rejects that we have to abandon the idea of truth itself. This is the best ethnography can 
claim but it is more than enough. 
  
 
8.5 Avenues for further research  
 
There is need for further studies as to how the business model is enacted and works in practice. 
To reach this purpose, ethnographic studies are very powerful. I agree with Mason and Spring 
(2011) and Demil and Lecocq (2015) who argue in support of more ethnography. This would be 
an opportunity to bridge theory and practice and to study the practice of business model 
innovation, and, more importantly, the type of vocabularies employed. Furthermore, in my study 
the focus was a cost sensitive company; as such, it would be interesting to see how business 
model creation processes change when the ideology is different.  Lastly, I believe that a study 
where co-enactment and ANT perspectives are used as lenses would allow a better 
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understanding of the social materiality of business models, and their creation, and how they help 
to reach and maintain stability moments. 
 
8.5 Implications for practice  
 
The Activity System Perspective advises top managers to focus on designing specific activities 
and interlinkages necessary for a certain type of business model. The Dynamic Capabilities 
perspective suggests that the creation of inimitable resources is imperative, while the Discovery 
Driven perspective emphasizes the importance of applying trial and error to business model 
innovation. Compared to these perspectives, the Enactment perspective distinguishes itself by 
suggesting that managers should interrupt forward – i.e., managers should actively look for non-
recognizable cues, which would facilitate the creation of fast learning loops. My findings show 
that interrupting forward through trial and error, experimentation, benchmarking for formulating 
reference points, labelling, co-creation and co-development, permits an organization to innovate.  
 
The managerial implications of my study aim to make managers aware of the following aspects:  
 Business model innovation is not the same as product innovation, the former being a 
much more complex process which requires managers to formulate considerations about 
customers, partners, value chain, pricing mechanisms. 
 The non-linearity of business model innovation requires managers to actively look for 
non-recognizable cues and interruptions.  
 Business model innovation is not a top down, but a bottom up process with all the actors 
involved playing a pivotal role: middle managers, individual teams, sub-units. Thus, the 
challenge is to create a “We” to allow a stable intersubjectivity level where business 
model innovation can happen.  
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Firstly, my data indicate the difficulty of innovating an unknown concept for the company, 
namely a business model. When managers bracket, retrospectively, every innovation as being a 
product development case, they fail to recognize a business model innovation situation. 
Woodstock was a very vivid example of such a failure. Labelled as a product development 
project and wrapped into a linear plan to reach the market into one year, the focus was on the 
technological aspects. Only later did the innovation team realize that additional and different 
questions should be in focus, such as: what is specific, and non-negotiable, for the new market 
we want to enter? What are the customers’ expectations?  What is the type of value chain 
needed to serve this new market never served before? What kind of revenue model and pricing 
mechanism are expected?   
The traditional mind-set of fully developing a technology first, and only then sent it to a 
business unit hoping to find a way to reach the market, failed in the case of Woodstock. 
Business model considerations should be given on an on-going basis as the technology is 
developing. Most importantly, managers should be aware that when a new market is targeted, 
which has never been served before, it is a business model innovation case. Thus, managers 
need to allocate resources and build mechanisms for understanding the innovation processes 
behind a business model, as this is not a linear, caught-in-rationality process, but rather a non-
linear one built on numerous heterogeneous decisions derived from idiosyncratic situations.   
 
Secondly, Woodstock was expected to perform according to predefined, linear timeline 
planning. However, given its radical potential, Woodstock has gone against the rational 
planning, creating numerous interruptions. As business model innovation is characterized by 
high uncertainty, chaos, and need for trial and error and fast learning loops, it is counter-
intuitive to expect to handle an innovation process with classic control systems. My study shows 
that in their endeavour of creating a new business model, managers failed whenever plans and 
rigid schedules were used to manage the unpredictable nature of a given interruption. In the case 
of Woodstock, managers needed to enact, to accept execution before planning. Even though 
these interruptions were perceived as problems the moment they happened, they made the 
innovation team aware of the possibility of failure being around the corner. This resulted in a 
need to act despite lacking retrospective mechanisms to rely on, and interruptions became 
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mechanisms that drove innovation forward.  Thus, managers should build structures/routines 
that allow non- linear process iteration for business model experimentation and innovation. 
Enactment approach suggests that managers should design organizational structures that 
incentivize teams to actively search for interruptions, actively pushing the business model 
towards failure to discover potential vulnerabilities swiftly. The creation of fast learning loops 
would enable the unit(s) to handle interruptions while simultaneously innovating based on them. 
Thus, managers should create a new value regime for radical business model innovations, taking 
those initiatives away from the normative discourse cost versus quality, standards KPIs and 
bonus systems. These systems inherently create a strong fear of interruptions. Furthermore, 
managers should also create incentives that would encourage sharing found interruptions among 
all the participants as quick as possible. 
 
Lastly, enactment also suggests that business model innovation is not a task exclusively left to 
top level management, but rather a bottom up process, conducted by a strong We, built from 
R&D, business units, customers, and external partners.  
My study demonstrates that the largest number of interruptions was rooted in moments when the 
“We” failed to function, primarily because the actors involved where operating with different 
vocabularies of work and mind-sets. During these crucial moments, I suggest that managers 
should allow a new question to guide their business model innovation process: “how does action 
become coordinated in the world of multiple realities?” (Weick, 1995:75).  As individuals 
originate from different departments and business units, there is a need for creating a common 
vocabulary shared among all the parties involved and willing to stay at an intersubjectivity level. 
This would facilitate co-enactment.   
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